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ROUGE ET NOIR REREAD: A
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE ANGELO
HERNDON CASE
KENDALL THOMAS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

If the ruling and the oppressed elements in a population, if those who
wish to maintain the status quo and those concerned to make changes,
had, when they became articulate, the same philosophy, one might
well be skeptical of its intellectual integrity.
John Dewey'

In 1932, Eugene Angelo Braxton Hemdon, a young Afro-American 2 member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., was arrested in Atlanta
and charged with an attempt to incite insurrection against that state's
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1978, Yale University; J.D. 1983, Yale Law
School. I would like to thank the many readers of early drafts of this Article for their helpful
comments, as well as Worigia Bowman, Blondel Pinnock, and Mano Raju for their research assistance. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the participants in the first Workshop on Critical Race
Theory, held in 1989 at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), and to Katherine Harrison, who
remembered for me. Work on this Article was supported by the Class of 1932 Law Research/
Writing Fund and by Columbia Law School alumni.
1. JOHN DEWEY,PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION 9 (2d ed. 1968). The book was originally

published in 1931.
2. This Article uses the terms "Afro-American," "African-American," and "black American" interchangeably. In recent years, the question of racial designation in law review articles has
come to require a footnote (usually at the beginning of a piece) explaining the author's particular
usage. See, ag., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (using "African-American" and "Black" and explaining the capitalization of the latter term on the ground that "Blacks... constitute a specific cultural group and, as
such, require denotation as a proper noun"); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARV. L. RE. 1745, 1745 n.2 (1989) (employing the term "white" in conformity
with "implicit understandings of racial identity" in the United States, and using a panoply of other
terms-some racial, some ethnic, some cultural-to designate "non-whites"); and Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.

RE'.401, 404 n.4 (1987). For representative press accounts and opinions on one recent chapter in
the long history of American debate regarding the practice of racial naming, see Jesse Jackson,
Negro, Black and African-American, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1988, at A22; Flora Lewis, Jackson as
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lawful authority. Some five years later, in Herndon v. Lowry,3 Herndon

filed a writ of habeas corpus asking the U.S. Supreme Court to consider
the constitutionality of the Georgia statute under which he had been convicted. Two weeks before his twenty-fourth birthday, the Court, voting

5-4, declared the use of the Georgia political-crimes statute against him
unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprived Herndon of his rights to

freedom of speech and assembly and because the statute failed to furnish
4
a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt.

African-American, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1989, at A23; Isabel Wilkerson, "African-American'Favored
by Many of America's Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989, at Al.
The cluster of issues joined in this debate are both difficult and delicate. To take them up fully
here would be impossible. I do, however, want to comment briefly on the particularly puzzling
argument developed in Flora Lewis' article, primarily because it is an exemplary instance of the
muddled thinking that abounds in public debate about the ideology of race in contemporary
America. Lewis uses the word "disturbing" to criticize Jesse Jackson's attempt to call American
blacks African-Americans because, she says, the term "seems to emphasize separateness and division, just the opposite of the goal of integrating society and reducing the importance of ethnic and
racial origin." Id. In a curious example, she compares Jackson's proposal with practices in the
Soviet Union, where "a distinction is made between citizenship (Soviet) and nationality, which may
be Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish [sic], Armenian or Uzbek, for instance." Id. (emphasis added). As
Lewis sees it, the Soviet practice "could bring [the nation's] undoing." Id. Nowhere in her piece
does Lewis take issue with the long-standing and perfectly uncontroversial convention of identifying
individuals as, for instance, Italian-American, Jewish-American, Cuban-American, Irish-American,
Mexican-American, Greek-American, Anglo-American, and so forth. Similarly, she simply notes
without comment the fact (which Jackson remarked on) that during recent presidential campaigns,
"TV profiles.., traced... [the candidates] back to the village of their forebears-Ronald Reagan's
in Ireland, George Bush's in England, Michael Dukakis's in Greece." Id. One may fairly infer from
her silence that Lewis does not view these practices as impeding "the goal of integrating society and
reducing the importance of ethnic and racial origin." In the face of these examples, we might expect
Lewis to explain the difference (if any) between these instances of racial, ethnic, and cultural naming
and the Jackson proposal. But at no point in her piece does Lewis say specifically why the recommendation by a "black" American (a linguistic sign-like "white"-in search of an empirical referent) that Americans of African descent start to identify themselves in terms of ancestral culture
instead of "color" should be viewed as a threat to our national existence rather than a testament to
our national diversity. What precisely is it about the name "African-American" that makes it such a
dangerous sign of "division" and "separateness"? One might well wonder whether something more
(or other) is at stake here than the simple question of the name. I suspect that the real roots of
Lewis' opposition to Jackson's appellative proposal lie less in its connotative than in its performative
implications. See J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975). Might it be that
what Lewis finds "[p]ersonally... disturbing" is not the question of the name as such but rather the
assertion by African-Americans of an inalienable, indivisible right to take this (or any) name to, for,
and by themselves? This Article may be read as an extended meditation on what I believe is the real
issue at stake in the racial nomenclature debate: namely, the relationship, in the terms of my analysis
here, between linguistic and political self-determination.
3. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
4. Id. at 259-62.
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Herndon v. Lowry is generally acknowledged as one of the great civil
liberties decisions of the 1930s, one of the notable "success stories"' of
the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. It marked the
first time the Supreme Court had mentioned the Holmes-Brandeis "clear

and present danger" formula in the ten years since its decision in
Whitney v. California.6 It was also the first case in which the Supreme

Court used the test to uphold the civil liberties claims of an individual
against censorial state action, 7 the first time the Supreme Court reviewed

a sedition conviction from the South, and the first political-crimes conviction reviewed by the Court that involved an African-American
defendant.'
One of the first critical commentaries on the case appeared in the
1941 edition of Free Speech in the United States, Zechariah Chafee, Jr.'s
classic study of First Amendment case law. 9 In an essay entitled Rouge

et Noir, Professor Chafee noted that in Herndon v. Lowry "the Supreme
Court was faced for the first time with the possibility that American citi-

zens might be hanged or electrocuted for nothing except expressing
objectionable opinions or owning objectionable books." 1

Chafee

approached the arrest, trial, and conviction of Angelo Herndon as a case
study in American political justice. Herndon's real crime, argued
Chafee, was that he sought "to put the Fifteenth Amendment into wider
effect."'" Those in power in Georgia, Chafee ironically observed, were
"afraid, not that the United States Constitution would be overthrown,

but that it might be enforced."

2

5. The phrase is Vincent Blasi's. See Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 449, 509 (1985).
6. 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1957). See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (1966).
7. PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at 181-82 (1972).
8. The second Afro-American defendant to appeal a political-crimes conviction to the
Supreme Court was Benjamin Davis. Davis, who represented Angelo Herndon during the initial
stages of the case, secretly joined the Communist Party while acting as defense counsel for Herndon.
He was one of a number of CPUSA members whose convictions under the Smith Act were reviewed
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Court upheld the convictions. For an autobiographical account of his political career, see BENJAMIN DAVIS, COMMUNIST COUNCILMAN FRO"M
HARLEM: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES WRITTEN IN A FEDERAL PENITENTIARY (1969).
9. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). An earlier version of Free Speech in the United States was cited by the lawyers who wrote the first Supreme Court
brief on Herndon's behalf. See Brief for Appellant at 20, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935)
(No. 665).
10. CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 393.
11. Id. at 392. The Fifteenth Amendment states, "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
12. CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 392.
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For Chafee, two features of Herndon v. Lowry were especially significant. First, the opinion stressed "the importance of the procedure in a
sedition prosecution."' 3 Second, the case had forced the Court to take
notice (albeit implicitly) of the political use to which southern states
could put their criminal justice systems, crushing not only radical political activity but moderate dissent and protest as well. 14
Curiously, Professor Chafee attached little significance to the fact
that the 1937 decision marked the third time in as many years that the
Supreme Court had been called upon to decide whether the conviction of
Angelo Herndon violated the First Amendment. Free Speech in the
United States merely points out-in a footnote and without commentthat "the Supreme Court at first refused to consider the case at all."' 5
Chafee does not discuss the Supreme Court's 1935 decision not to take
appellate jurisdiction on the ground that the federal questions raised on
appeal had not been "properly presented";' 6 nor does he mention the
Court's decision later that year refusing (without a written explanation)
to grant Herndon's petition for rehearing.' 7
An interesting and revealing separation and categorization of the
Supreme Court's three dispositions of the Angelo Herndon case has followed in the legal literature. On the one hand, the favorable opinion in
Herndon v. Lowry has been included and discussed in any number of
casebooks on constitutional law'" and political and civil rights.19 Discussion of the first adverse decision, Herndon v. Georgia, on the other hand,
has been confined for the most part to casebooks on federal court jurisdiction and procedure.20 The Court's decision to reject Herndon's petition for rehearing has been ignored altogether. Thus, what is essentially
one case has been doctrinally dissected by scholars as though it were
made up of three severable, marginally related or even unrelated parts.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 397.
Id at 390 n.45.
Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 443 (1935).
Herndon v. Georgia, 296 U.S. 661 (1935).
See, e.g., PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER

PROBLEMS 1158-62 (4th ed. 1977); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1013-15 (11th ed.
1985); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 966-68 (1986).
19. See, eg., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED

STATES (4th ed. 1976).
20. See, eg., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988).
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This conceptual dismemberment of the Angelo Herndon case has handicapped serious historical examination of one of its central themes: the

intersection of race, culture, and politics in American constitutional law.
I do not mean to deny the validity of an orthodox doctrinal treatment of the Angelo Herndon case; but I am persuaded that this proce-

dure does not, indeed cannot, allow for more than a partial account of its
larger historical meaning. Without a cultural anatomy of the Angelo
Herndon case, one cannot hope to attain more than a skeletal picture of
its significance as an episode in the history of American constitutionalism
during the interwar years.
This Article, then, offers a "remembrance"'" of the case in the form
of a cultural history of the political events that led to the Court's first
response to the case. I believe that the concept of a "popular memory"

can offer us great insight into constitutional history, both as object and as
method, and I have made the concept central to this Article, not simply

at the level of accent and emphasis but in terms of epistemology and
interpretation.2 2
21. As my title suggests, I have framed my historical "remembrance" of the Angelo Herndon
case as a "rereading." This designation is meant to underscore that my historical project is first and
primarily interpretive rather than archival. Although I do rely at crucial points in my argument on
archival material, the majority of the texts cited have long been part of an extant and readily accessible record. Nonetheless, for reasons I set forth in the body of this Article, these documents, and
their significance, have been ignored in the legal literature. The interpretive thrust of my undertaking may well disappoint those readers for whom original historical scholarship is synonymous with
(and only with) archival excavation. I cannot share this perspective, which I believe is a symptom of
an affliction most acutely described by H. Stuart Hughes: "Historians in this country seem to have
forgotten-if they ever properly learned-the simple truth that what one may call progress in their
endeavors comes not merely through the discovery of new materials but at least as much through a
new reading of materials already available." H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Historiography:Progress, Paradigms,and the Regression Toward Positivism, in PROGRESS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 245
(Gabriel A. Almond et al. eds., 1982). For a similar critique of the precritical privilege accorded to
the "documentary model" of historical knowledge, see DOMINICK LACAPRA, HISTORY & CRITICISM 20-21 (1985) (discussing the "recurrent temptations of making a fetish of archival research,
attempting to discover some 'unjustly neglected' fact, figure, or phenomenon, and dreaming of a
'thesis' to which his or her proper name may be attached").
22. Three methodological models inform my analysis of the specific events, issues, and implications of the Herndon case. They are (1) the historiographical literature on the subject of "popular
memory" discussed in this section; (2) recent theoretical work on the intersection of culture and
politics; and (3) the critical analysis, straddling a number of disciplines, of rhetorical discourse (its
figural elements, organization, operations, and effects). My chief interest in this theoretical work lies
in its value to the interpretive task I have set for myself in this Article: a critical rereading of the
texts that make up the historical record of Herndon v. Georgia. Accordingly, my explication of the
approaches suggested by each of these fields is, for the most part, interwoven with an analysis of the
Angelo Herndon case itself, in short, the appropriated theory is meant to serve the practice of a
critical historical reading.
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W.E.B. Du Bois once prefaced a collection of documents on the his-

tory of blacks in America with an angry but insightful indictment of the
history profession. Historians, wrote Du Bois, had for too long studied

and written about the past solely through the eyes of those with power
and position. "We have the records of kings and gentleman ad nauseam
and in stupid detail."' 23 Blinded by the view from the lofty heights of
professional history, practitioners had left untold the story of the nation's
powerless and poor. "[O]f the common run of human beings, and particularly of the half or wholly submerged working group, the world has
saved all too little of authentic record and tried to forget or ignore even
the little saved."'2 4 Du Bois called for the close, careful study of American history "from below"; 25 indeed, his own work may be taken as an

exemplary intervention against the majestic myopia of historiography
"from above." 26
In the years since Du Bois wrote, we have witnessed the rise both
here and abroad of a historical literature devoted to the retrieval of "popular memory." 2 7 This diverse body of work is impressive in depth and
23.

HERBERT APTHEKER, AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY: THE MODERN ERA 51

(1971) (quoting

W.E.B. Du Bois).
24. Id.
25. The first use of the notion of a "history from below" is generally attributed to the French
historian Georges Lefebvre. See GEORGE RUDE, Georges Lefebvre as Historian of Popular Urban
Protest in the French Revolution, in THE FACE OF THE CROWD: SELECTED ESSAYS OF GEORGE
RUDE 107 (Harvey J. Kaye ed., 1988).
26. See, eg., W.E.B. Du Bois, JOHN BROWN (1909); and W.E.B. Du Bols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA

1860-1880 (1935).

27. The phrase "popular memory" appears to have originated with the French philosopherhistorian Michel Foucault. Michel Foucault, Film and Popular Memory, in FOUCAULT LIVE 89
(Sylvere Loitringer ed. & John Johnston trans., 1989).
There's a real fight going on. Over what? Over what we can roughly describe as popular
memory. It's an actual fact that people-I'm talking about those who are barred from
writing, from producing their books themselves, from drawing up their own historical
accounts-that these people nevertheless do have a way of recording history, or remembering it, of keeping it fresh and using it ....
Since memory is actually a very important
factor in struggle (really, in fact, struggles develop in a kind of conscious moving forward
of history), if one controls people's memory, one controls their dynamism. And one also
controls their experience, their knowledge of previous struggles.
Id. at 91-92.
Foucault's restriction of the sources of popular memory to those who are "barred from writing"
or unable to produce their own published accounts betrays a much narrower understanding of the
raw materials of popular memory than I would urge here. One of the sources on which I shall rely is
Let Me Live, the autobiography of Angelo Herndon, which was published by Random House.
ANGELO HERNDON, LET ME LIVE

(1937). Although Let Me Live does in fact recount the exper-

iences of people who themselves were barred from "drawing up their own historical accounts," my
interest in Herndon's memoirs is not limited to the traces it contains of the lives of others. Working
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scope."8 Its value lies not only in its concrete study of the history of
from a more expansive understanding of the concept, I shall take Herndon's account of his own
experience itself as an instance of a popular historical record.
The term under which popular history in America is most often subsumed is (the new) "social"
history, which has been applied to diverse and divergent tendencies in contemporary historical
research and writing. One sign of its increasing influence can be seen in the anxious debate recently
summarized and joined by Carl Degler. Carl Degler, Is the New Social History Threatening Clio?, 16
OAH NEWSL. (Org. Am. Historians, Bloomington, Ind.), 1988, at 4. "The breadth of historical
study today, as iymbolized by the predominance of social history, ought neither to depress us nor
frighten us. It is after all, a response to the constantly shifting definition of what history is, how it
can be used, and who we are." Id. at 5.
28. Works on "popular memory" from which I have learned a great deal in the preparation of
this Article are MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1979)
(a study of popular perceptions and representations of crime and criminality in prerevolutionary
France); RANAJ1T GUHA, ELEMENTARY ASPECTS OF PEASANT INSURGENCY IN COLONIAL INDIA
(1983) (a study of Indian peasant resistance to British rule); DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S
FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975) (historical studies
on the relationship among law, politics, and crime in 18th-century England); HISTORY FROM
BELOW: STUDIES IN POPULAR PROTEST AND POPULAR IDEOLOGY IN HONOUR OF GEORGE RUDE

(Frederick Krantz ed., 1988) (essays in the "grass-roots" history of England, France, Spain, and the
Caribbean); E.J. HOBSBAWM, PRIMITIVE REBELS (1959) (a study of popular political consciousness
and action in Spain, Italy, and Latin America); E.J. HOBSBAWM & GEORGE RUDE, CAPTAIN
SWING (1969) (a study of the 1830 revolt of English agricultural workers); LYNN AVERY HUNT,
POLITICS, CULTURE AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1984) (a study of the symbolic
politics of revolutionary France); I, PIERRE RiVItRE, HAVING SLAUGHTERED MY MOTHER, MY
SISTER, AND MY BROTHER... A CASE OF PARRICIDE IN THE 19TH CENTURY (Michel Foucault
ed. & Frank Jellinek trans., 1975) (dossier and interpretive essays); CYRIL LIONEL ROBERT JAMES,
THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (a study
of the 18th- and 19th-century slave rebellion against France in what is now Haiti); GARETH
STEDMAN JONES, LANGUAGES OF CLASS: STUDIES IN ENGLISH WORKING CLASS HISTORY, 1832-

1932 (1983) (a collection of essays on class, culture, and political consciousness among the English
working class); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG (1979) (a study of the culture
and consciousness of newly freed Afro-American slaves during the post-Civil War period); MAKING
HISTORIES: STUDIES IN HISTORY WRITING AND POLITICS (Richard Johnson et al. eds., 1982) (a
collection of methodological and historical essays in British popular memory); ALETTA BIENSACK,
THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY ALETrA BIENSACK (Lynn Avery Hunt ed., 1989) (a
collection of methodological and historical essays); PEOPLE'S HISTORY AND SOCIALIST THEORY
(Raphael Samuel ed., 1981) (a collection of theoretical and historical essays on popular memory
from an international, interdisciplinary perspective); GEORGE RUDE, THE CROWD IN HISTORY,
1730-1848 (1981) (a study of popular politics in France and England); GEORGE RUDE, IDEOLOGY
AND POPULAR PROTEST (1980) (an exploration of the rise of "popular ideology" and its attendant
politics); Ranajit Guha, On Some Aspects of the Historiographyof Colonial India, in I SUBALTERN
STUDIES: WRITINGS ON SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 1 (1982) [hereinafter Guha, Some
Aspects of Historiography](a theoretical-polemical essay arguing for a distinction between "elitist"
and "subaltern" accounts of opposition to the British colonialist project in India); Ranajit Guha, The
Prose of Counter-Insurgency,II SUBALTERN STUDIES: WRITINGS ON SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY AND
SOCIETY 1 (1983) [hereinafter Guha, The Prose of Counter-Insurgency](a semiotic analysis of the
textual politics of historical writings on Indian peasant rebellion); E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF
THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963) (a study of the rise and development of English working
class consciousness during the late-18th and early-19th centuries); AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE:
THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES (John

2606

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2599

"subaltern" classes and communities2 9 but also in the powerful analytical
terms and procedures it deploys to articulate a "popular" 30 historical rec-

ord, or "countermemory." What has emerged is a way of thinking and
writing about the historical process that challenges not only the premises

but also the overall project of much mainstream historiography. 3
American constitutional history remains one of the few disciplines
in which the call for the rigorous reconstruction of our national past

from the bottom up has for the most part been ignored.32 The historical
treatment of constitutional law and politics in America is, in short, still

largely an institutional history. We have yet to move beyond magisterial
accounts of "great" advocates arguing "great" cases involving "great"
issues decided by "great" judges sitting on "great" courts.33 I believe
Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980) [hereinafter

AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE]

(historical essays on

popular understandings of law and the state).
29. The concept of the "subaltern" used here originates with Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci distinguishes between "dominant" and "subaltern" groups. See Antonio Gramsci, Historyof the Subal-

tern Classes Methodological Criteria,in

SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS

52 (Quintin

Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
30. Raphael Samuel and Stuart Hall (among others) have alerted us to the difficulties inherent
in the notion of "popular history," the most obvious of which has to do with its overlapping and
often opposite meanings. Stuart Hall, Deconstructing the Popular, in PEOPLE'S HISTORY AND
SOCIALIST THEORY, supra note 28, at 227. Two additional problems with the concept bear observing here. First, the term "popular history" denotes neither a fixed nor an easily discoverable object
of study. The people whose history its practitioners seek to recover can be (and have been) defined
differently in the light of considerations of, for example, nationality, class and caste, race and ethnicity, gender, literacy and linguistic community, region, and period. Raphael Samuel, People'sHistory,
in PEOPLE'S HISTORY AND SOCIALIST THEORY, supra note 28, at xiv, xxi. Second, popular history
is not simply an object of study; it is also in a very real sense a form of political practice. The
methods used to research and write popular history are "shaped in the crucible of politics, and
penetrated by the influence of ideology on all sides." Id. at xx. In some of its "conservative" versions, popular history is presented as a history "with the politics left out." Id. at xxi. The conservative repudiation of politics, of course, reflects an oblique ideological choice. In radical
historiography, the political register is often more explicit. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supranote 28. The
crucial point to note here is "that there is no popular memory to be retrieved in its virginity."
Michael Bommes & Patrick Wright, Charms of Residence: The Public and the Past, in MAKING
HISTORIES, supra note 28, at 254, 256.
31. For a discussion of historiography, see infra notes 170-76, 179-83 and accompanying text.
32. There are, of course, a few notable exceptions. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO
(rev. ed. 1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); PETER H. IRONS, THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS (1988). In the English context, see HAY ET AL., supra note 28; E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975). See generallyWilliam Forbath, The Ambiguities of FreeLabor:
Laborand the Law in the GuildedAge, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 767; William Forbath et al., Introduction:
Legal Historiesfrom Below, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 759; Hendrik Hartog, PigsAnd Positivism, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 899; Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows" Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819.
33. For work in this mode that covers the period in question, see, e.g., SAMUEL HENDEL,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951); David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504 (1987); and David P. Currie,
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that American legal scholarship has paid insufficient attention to the cultural history of constitutionalism in America. The chief task of a cul-

tural history of American constitutionalism is to identify and interpret
the records left by those who have experienced the American constitu-

tional order from its underside. A cultural history of constitutionalism
from below diverges from institutional history both in its object of study
and in its method and procedures. Its project thus differs from the institutionalist enterprise in at least two respects. 4 First, a cultural history of
constitutionalism from the bottom up recognizes the right of "un- or misrepresented human groups to speak for and represent themselves in
domains defined, politically and intellectually, as normally excluding
them, usurping their signifying and representing functions, overriding

their historical reality."35
More is at stake, however, than "adding one part of a population,

that which has been neglected, to another, that which has provided the
traditional information base." 6 Constitutional history from the bottom
up also seeks to challenge the conceptual order or hierarchy that subtends the exclusion of the common run of human beings and their con-

cerns from the historical study of constitutional law. This project, then,
is not directed simply at reversing the long-standing bias against the record of the subaltern in American constitutional history. It also represents an effort "to broaden the basis of history, to enlarge its subject
matter, make use of new raw materials and offer new maps of
knowledge."3 7

One might anticipate that a popular memory of American constitutionalism will force us to rethink the very terms of constitutional history.
The rereading offered here of the Angelo Herndon case3" should be taken
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-1941, 1987 DUKE L.J. 800
[hereinafter Currie, Civil Rights]. Paul Mishkin has argued that "referring to the Court by the Name
of the Chief Justice [has] a significant tendency to affect our thinking" about the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. He suggests that the analytical presuppositions at work in this practice are not at
work in the similar "practice of captioning cases by individual's names." Paul J. Mishkin, Equality,
43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1980). I disagree. See infra note 38.
34. One can envisage an institutionalized cultural history of American constitutionalism. This
is in part the project, for example, of the Supreme Court Historical Society.
35. Edward W. Said, Orientalism Reconsidered, in LITERATURE, POLITICS AND THEORY 210,
212 (Francis Barker et al. eds., 1986).
36. Michael Brown, History and History's Problem, 16 Soc. TEXT 136 (1986-87).
37. Samuel, supra note 30, at xvi.
38. The reader will have noticed my reference in several places to the "Angelo Herndon case."
In an earlier footnote, I cited Paul Mishkin's assertion that the analytical presuppositions at work in
the practice of referring to the Supreme Court by the name of its Chief Justice are not at work in the
similar "practice of captioning cases by individual's names." Mishkin, supra note 33. However, I
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as an illustration of the type of contribution that the quest for the recovery of a popular memory can make. It offers a case study of a period in
our constitutional history of which we have important, but finally inadequate, institutional accounts: the turbulent decade of the 1930s, which
has come to be known, significantly, as the "years of protest." 39 As we
shall see, even a cursory review of historical work on the Angelo

Herndon case reveals the limitations of the notion-explicit or implicit in
much of the literature-that the institutional "great case" model permits
us to fully grasp the complex, contradictory logic of the story of American constitutionalism. Constitutional history in the institutional mode is
hostile at all points to the type of thinking about historical research and
interpretation suggested by work in popular memory. Perhaps the most
significant threat that popular historical method represents for the dominant tradition of great-case historiography is its critical posture toward
the notion that American constitutionalism is a story of the protracted
but almost preordained emergence and progressive elaboration of the
rules and principles that make up our fundamental law. In short, it chal-

lenges the conventional theoretical framework within which American
constitutional history is viewed as a tale of "conflict within consensus. '"40
believe that interpretive premises do lurk behind this practice, although their existence and effects
are likely to elude anyone who is thoroughly socialized by certain professionalist habits of mind.
Edward Said has noted that the proponent of the notion that "nothing, not even a simple descriptive
label, is beyond or outside the realm of interpretation, is almost certain to find an opponent saying
that science and learning are designed to transcend the vagaries of interpretation, and that objective
truth is in fact attainable." Said, supra note 35, at 214. Insofar as the unreflective use of a case name
cuts off avenues of analysis and inquiry, the practice is far from innocent: It inscribes or smuggles an
institutionalist perspective into a project whose aim is precisely to challenge the analytical and ideological limits of institutional method. One might restate the point by recalling the etymological
family to which the word "caption" belongs: The case name caption is the sign of a conceptual
seizure or capture by which institutionalist method holds alternative interpretations hostage within
its restricted horizon. The practice assumes without argument that the decision in Herndon Y.Georgia was a judicial response to a controversy raised by and involving only (or primarily) the two
named parties-an individual and a state. In my view, this institutional perspective on the case does
not exhaust the case's constitutional significance. The citation form actively hampers exploration of
the larger sociocultural conflicts that are inscribed in the case and in the opinion itself.
Thus, while I use the conventional caption form at various points in this Article, I also refer
simply to the "Angelo Herndon case" as a way to discursively mark and provisionally overcome the
interpretive privilege traditionally accorded to "official" legal materials and "professionalist" ways
of naming and knowing.
39. This is the title of a collection of writings from the period edited by Jack Salzman, See
YEARS OF PROTEST (Jack Salzman ed., 1967).

40. See MICHAEL

KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION

'INAMERICAN CULTURE (1986). Kammen's subtitle suggests that this study was intended to be read
as, a cultural history of American constitutionalism. However, Kammen's epistemological bias
short-circuits the more critical perspective that I believe a cultural historical analysis of American
constitutionalism dictates. This bias is reflected in Kammen's central interpretive thesis: "I would
describe the basic pattern of American constitutionalism as one of conflict within consensus." Id. at
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The perspective of popular historical method permits us to see the
extent to which the history of constitutionalism in America, viewed from
its underside, can be plotted as a story of a body of law born of sustained
struggle, the outcome of painful, passionate political and ideological contests between subordinate groups and dominant institutions. 4' This is a
story that the optic of institutional historiography is by definition unable
to see, much less view empathetically. In my alternative account and
interpretation of the Angelo Herndon case, I hope to show that it is only

through the lens of popular memory that we can begin to reach a critical
understanding of this and other chapters in the history of American constitutionalism. The method of popular constitutional history does not

just re-create a legal case; it recalls a larger, largely forgotten political
culture. It permits us to see Angelo Herndon not simply as an issue or

problem for constitutional discourse but as a conscious agent in shaping
29. Curiously, Kammen steps back from this claim at a number of points in the text. See id. at 30
(stating that "[t]he volume of evidence is overwhelming that our constitutional conflicts have been
consequential, and considerably more revealing than the consensual framework within which they
operate"); id. at 46 (arguing against the view that a constitutional consensus emerged soon after
1789); id. at 51 (arguing that "[o]ne cannot say that a consensus existed about serious matters of
constitutional interpretation"); id. at 185 (stating that he is "skeptical" of the "generalization" that
"'the 19th century did achieve a comparatively well-accepted consensus about the Constitution and
the Supreme Court'-what Robert G. McCloskey called a 'kind of synthesis in American constitutionalism' that only began to fall apart in the twentieth century") (citations omitted); id. at 186
(stating that "[p]erhaps the most to be said for 'consensus' is that people of diverse persuasions
shared a commitment that might be described as elitist, resistant to change, and exceedingly anxious
about concentrations of governmental authority in any single branch or level of the constitutional
system"); id. at 399 (stating that "constitutionalism embodies a set of values, a range of options, and
a means of resolving conflicts within a framework of consensus").
Although the consensus framework within which Kammen works has been rigorously (some
would argue persuasively) deconstructed, he proceeds as though it had never occurred. There is not
a single reference in the book to the literature that critically examines the "cult of consensus." See,
eg., John Higham, The Cult of the "American Consensus'. HomogenizingOur History, 27 COMMENTARY 93 (1959); John Higham, Beyond Consensus: The Historianas a Moral Critic, 67 AM. HIsT.
REV. 609 (1962). Michael Kammen cites the latter article in his introduction to a collection of
papers on contemporary historical writing in the United States. Michael Kammen, The Historian's
Vocation and the State of the Discipline in the United States, in THE PAST BEFORE US 19, 23 n.8
(Michael Kammen ed., 1980). For a capsule history of the debate among professional historians, see
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., Clio and the Culture Concept: Some Impressions ofa ChangingRelationship
in American Historiography,in THE IDEA Of CULTURE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 77 (Louis
Schneider & Charles M. Bonjean eds., 1973).
41. In this respect, this Article goes further than the program urged in a recent article by
Randall Kennedy, who calls for a revisionist constitutional history aimed at "creating and preserving a memory of [the] suffering" inflicted on subordinate groups. Randall Kennedy, Race Relations
Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622,
1661 (1986). In my view, this project is crucial but in itself incomplete. An equally if not more
urgent task is to tell the story of how the intended victims, here of racial and class injustice, fought
back and resisted oppression.
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this discourse.42 In short, popular constitutional historiography refuses
to view constitutionalism in American culture as the exclusive preserve
of elites and institutions.
Part II of this Article begins with a reading of Angelo Herndon's
political autobiography, Let Me Live.43 After placing Let Me Live within
the popular tradition of Afro-American resistance literature, I use it and
other contemporaneous texts to offer an alternative account of the
Angelo Herndon case from the bottom up. I shall, of course, take up the
specific legal issues that were raised, argued, and decided during the
course of the case; thus, much of what I have to say will necessarily be
cast in the familiar terms of orthodox constitutional history. However,
in my reading of these texts of 1930s institutional legal consciousness, I
search for traces of popular memory: My central focus is on discovering
what the official statements of constitutional doctrine in the Angelo
Herndon case tell us about insurgent political consciousness among African-Americans at one key moment in our national past. My purpose in
this part, as in the rest of this Article, is most emphatically not to offer a
revisionist "doctrinal" history of the Angelo Herndon case." Rather,
my main interest is in the larger lessons that this episode in our constitutional history conveys about a people's search for political literacy and
42. This is an appropriate point at which to emphasize that this Article is not an exercise in
"black" or "Afro-American" historical studies. Stated bluntly, I reject the notion that such a compartmentalization, such an exile to a subdisciplinary ghetto, is either possible or desirable. I believe
the late C.L.R. James was right when he remarked on the limitations of black studies as such:
[To] talk to me about black studies as if it's something that concerned [only] black people is
an utter denial. This is the history of Western Civilization. I can't see it otherwise ....I
only know the struggle of people against tyranny and oppression in a certain social and
political setting, and, particularly, during the last two hundred years, it's impossible to me
to separate black studies from white studies in any theoretical point of view.
C.L.R. JAMES, AT THE RENDEZVOUS OF VicrORY 194, 201 (1984). This Article should be read as

an attempt to move the African-American constitutional experience from the margins to the center
of American constitutional history.
43. HERNDON, supra note 27.
44. Proponents of doctrinal analysis as a core activity of legal scholarship (if not the core of
legal scholarship) might think that my criticism of compartmentalization is misplaced. Any case is
one unit (so their argument might run); doctrinal dissection of a case is justified because its subunits
present distinguishable legal issues that merit separate consideration. However, I think that this line
of reasoning overlooks two crucial points, both of which pose unsettling questions about the adequacy of orthodox doctrinal method as a framework for a critical or historical understanding of legal
thought.
The first point bears on the active role that professional legal consciousness plays in creating
and constructing (as opposed to merely discovering) the doctrinal categories that it takes as the
object of its analysis. The neat compartments into which doctrinal analysis places various aspects of
a particular case are not a given, but are continually made and remade. This is so even when the
doctrinal analysis purports simply to track the organization of the opinion or opinions on which it
focuses; the legal critic's submission to the stated doctrinal horizon of a given opinion is not a question of necessity, but of conscious or unconscious choice. Indeed, there may well be instances in
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the obstacles thrown in their way. This lesson is a broad one, of which
the doctrinal dimensions of the case are merely one component.
The analysis of the events that brought Angelo Herndon before the
U.S. Supreme Court paves the way for Part III of this Article, which
which the substantive logic of a particular opinion can be charted only if one actively questions the
doctrinal formulations in which that logic is expressed.
A second point goes to the disenabling consequences of pure doctrinalism on the understanding
of law as a historical phenomenon (as opposed, for example, to the instrumental aims of the genre of
legal scholarship whose primary purpose is to "contribute" to the reform or refinement of a given
area of law). In its dominant mode, doctrinal taxonomy tends to abstract legal issues from their
larger social context, implicitly or expressly denying the constitutive relationship between legal ideas
and the concrete historical conditions of their emergence. One consequence of the doctrinalist
approach, then, is that it perpetuates an ahistorical conception of legal thought and practice. Robert
Gordon employs the term "legal rationalism" to describe the basically ahistorical orientation of
what I call "doctrinalism"; Gordon contrasts legal rationalism and historicism. Robert Gordon,
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 n.1 (1981). Although Gordon's distinction is
useful, I believe that it is potentially misleading, because it implies that legal rationalism or doctrinalism altogether eliminates the question of time in legal analysis. I do not think this characterization is altogether correct. One of the more vexing aspects of doctrinalist method is that its
fundamentally ahistorical drift is sometimes difficult to detect; this is so because (as Gordon himself
notes) it often coexists (albeit uneasily) with an express acknowledgment and analysis of the temporal dimension of legal ideas. Id. at 1028-36 (discussing the "adaptationist" response of legal rationalism to the "historicist" challenge). Here the decisive gesture of doctrinalism is not so much
rejectionist as reductionist: The doctrinalist strategy does not seek to avoid the chronic dimension of
law; rather, it absorbs the question of time within a theoretical framework that remains essentially
ahistorical. To put the point another way, we might describe doctrinalism as the substitution of a
limited, relatively unproblematic temporality for a broader, more consequential historicity. This
metalepsis signals an important shift in emphasis, accent, and scope. It permits doctrinalism to
represent itself as historical while retaining the opposition between the "legal" and the "social"
whose epistemological interrogation is one of the chief tasks of historicist method. For a discussion
of similar problems in anthropological study, see JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How
ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECr (1983).
By way of conclusion, two disclaimers are in order. First, none of what I have said should be
taken as an assertion that doctrinalism cannot usefully analyze some aspects of legal thought and
practice within its restricted ambit. Nor am I suggesting that the results of doctrinalist analysis have
no value. Second, my remarks regarding the limits of doctrinalist method should most emphatically
not be confused with the quite different claim that doctrinalist analysis or argument can never be of
service to scholars who are committed to fundamental change in the legal and political status quo.
To my way of thinking, any such essentialist claim is as ahistorical as the doctrinal method it
attacks. Paraphrasing a line of argument developed by Fredric Jameson in another setting, we might
say that such a global claim about the sociopolitical dimensions of doctrinalism can be sustained
only if one isolates "the form of thought (or its equivalent, the form of discourse) from that practical
context in which alone its results can be measured." The political aims and effects of doctrinal
discourse "can... never be evaluated independently of their function in a given historical situation."
FREDRIC JAMESON, The Ideology of the Text, in FREDRIC JAMESON, IDEOLOGIES OF THEORY:
ESSAYS 1971-1986, at 62 (1989). I am not making a political argument that doctrinal discourse is
inherently conservative. Indeed, it is not difficult to adduce cases in which doctrinalism has provided the terms for radical political and legal argument. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 n.2 (1984) (citing CHRISTOPHER HILL, PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION: STUDIES IN INTERPRETATION OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF THE 17TH CENTURY 58
(1958)); John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763-74:A Study of RadicalNotions of Governance,
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offers a critical review of three mainstream historical treatments of the
Angelo Herndon case and places the case in the broader history of First
Amendment law and politics. My goal in this part is to specify how (and
to suggest why) these professional constitutional histories work to
obscure, ignore, and overlook some of the most important-and unsettling-lessons of the case. Focusing on the logic and the language of
these three contributions to the Angelo Herndon case historiography, I
argue that significant interpretive and ideological consequences flow from
the way each represents to itself (and to the reader) its un- or undertheorized relationship to the elements of the case it seeks (or refuses) to
study, as well as to the textual and narrative structures in which those
elements are situated.
Part IV offers a revisionist reading of the text of the Supreme
Court's opinions in the Angelo Herndon case. I begin with a critical
discussion of a contemporaneous commentary on the case by Felix
Frankfurter and Henry Hart, setting their treatment within the larger
intellectual currents, both inside and outside the legal scholarship, of
which it was a part. I then examine the complex relation between reasoning and rhetoric in the text of the Court's opinion in Herndon v. Georgia. Borrowing critical terms from recent theoretical work on the
politics of rhetorical discourse, I challenge the standard view that
Herndon v. Georgia addresses itself only to the procedural forms of constitutional adjudication. A rhetorical reading of Herndon v. Georgia suggests that in this instance, the line between form and substance in
constitutional law cannot be so cleanly and categorically drawn.
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL
LANGUAGE
[A]nd carmade Hall next he read a piece in The Atlanta Georgian that
they was 6,000 dollars raze for the unployed releaf after the Demestrahun at the Cort house on Thirday morning ....
Anonymous, Handwritten "Minutes" of July 1, 1932,
in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE, supranote 28, at 128 (discussing the oppositional political uses of
the common law discourse and actions by John Wilkes and his followers in 18th-century England).
Consequently, my observations should be strictly construed. They aim to illuminate the inhibiting epistemological and historiographical tendencies of doctrinalism. These tendencies may be at
work in any given instance of doctrinal discourse, regardless of the political ideology that underwrites it and independently of its political consequences in the particular case. This is not, of course,
to say that one cannot speak meaningfully of a politics of doctrinal discourse in the Angelo Herndon
case. It is to suggest that any claim one makes about the specific political force of doctrinal rhetoric
in Herndon v. Georgiamust derive from the particular features of that case and not from any general
global view about the politics of doctrinal discourse as such.
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Meeting of the Ford and Foster Clubs4 5
A.

POPULAR CULTURE AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The Angelo Herndon case powerfully underscores the extent to
which the history of the struggle of Afro-American people against an
oppressive cultural (social, political, and economic) order has also always
been the history of a struggle against an oppressive discursive or symbolic order. Lucius Outlaw describes this struggle as a collective effort
to embrace where available, to construct where unavailable, those productions and expressions of meaning which serve to reflect the selfaffirmations of black people, our views of the world, in concepts and
forms which we have projected for these purposes.
...[G]iven the history of enslavement, subjugation, subordination, discrimination, oppressions . . . which have been (and are)
directed against us, [the struggle for cultural and political integrity]
involves... "a counter-movement away from subordination to independence, from alienation through refutation, to self-affirmation," via
a process of "reflection" which. . . "creates46a different (and opposing)
constellation of symbols and assumptions.",
One decisive dimension of the African-American struggle for political

self-determination has been the practice of symbolic reversal. This term
designates a process "whereby one moves on the level of symbolic meaning (and, it is hoped), the level of existence, from imposed determination
of one's (a people's) existence to those generated [by] oneself (by the people themselves) in the process of living as affirmations of that existence in

its authenticity."'

7

Although one may question the adequacy of the

larger framework in which it is embedded, Outlaw's basic point is surely
45. Transcript of Record at 76, Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597 (Ga. 1934) [hereinafter Transcript]. James W. Ford, a trade unionist, was a leading black member of the Communist Party and
its vice presidential candidate during the national election of 1932. See HARVEY KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE DEPRESSION DECADE 330-31 (1984). William Z. Foster, of
Irish-immigrant background, was for many years the best-known American Communist and the
party's perennial presidential candidate. See id. at 19-20. While one might assume that the name
Ford and Foster Clubs was used to conceal the fact that the persons mentioned in the minutes were
attending a meeting of the Communist Party, it should be noted that in 1932 several prominent
nonradical blacks (among them the poet Countee Cullen and the intellectual Kelley Miller) were
recruited as members of the Ford-Foster Committee for Equal Negro Rights, led by William Jones,
the managing editor of the Baltimore Afro-American. See id. at 469 n.16.
46. Lucius Outlaw, Language and Consciousness: Toward a Hermeneutic of Black Culture, 1
CULTURAL HERMENEUTICS 403 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting James Turner, The Sociology of
Black Nationalism, in 1 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 18 (1969)).
47. Outlaw, supra note 46.
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correct: The strategic manipulation and reversal of the dominant cul-

ture's political symbols is, and has long been, a central feature of African-American resistance movements, in both their reformist and their

radical incarnations.48
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, 49 African-Americans have lived by

and fought through symbols: We cannot hope to comprehend the history
of their collective encounter with the ideology and institutions of American constitutionalism unless we carefully attend to its symbolic aspects,
conceived as both an arena and an arsenal of struggle.50 This is to
48. An in-depth discussion of Outlaw's argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but I do
want to note two features of his analysis that seem to me to be at odds with the emancipatory project
Outlaw proposes. First, Outlaw introduces what I view as an unfounded opposition between "the
level of symbolic meaning" (consciousness) and "the level of existence" (lived experience or real life).
As Outlaw himself concedes, the "linguistic productions" of black people are central to what he calls
their "life world." Id. at 411. Put another way, the symbolic meanings produced by African-Americans (or, for that matter, by any group) are a "complex of material-social practices" that inform and
are informed by their concrete conditions of existence. The two cannot legitimately be separated.
To put the point aphoristically, we can say that cultural symbols matter. For a critical discussion of
the similar separation of culture and material life in the Marxian corpus, see JOHN BRENKMAN,
CULTURE AND DOMINATION 59-101 (1987).
Second, while I agree with Outlaw that the practice of symbolic reversal is the indispensable
inaugural gesture in an African-American cultural politics (as theory and practice), I would argue
that such a gesture, without more, is incomplete. If one accepts the proposition that the study of
constitutional history informs the practice of constitutional law and politics today (a proposition too
plain to be contested), it is not enough simply to reverse the terms with which the past and present
experience of African-Americans under American constitutionalism are described. We must go further and displace the entire analytic and ideological system that underwrites that experience. Readers familiar with poststructuralist thought will recognize in my insistence on a twofold critical
strategy the influence of the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida. What Derrida writes of his interpretive practice suggests the need here to extend the analytical program (which is also a political program) that Outlaw sketches. What is required is a
double gesture, a double science, a double writing [that permits] an overturning of the
[oppressive symbolic] oppositions [and] a general displacement of the [semantic] system [on
which they rest]. It is only on this condition that [a critical theory of race and law] will
provide the means with which to intervene in [and thus transform] the field of [oppressive]
oppositions that it criticizes.
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 329 (Alan Bass trans., 1982). I have elsewhere
described the critical procedure proposed here as a strategy of rigorous "double crossing." Kendall
Thomas, A House Divided Against Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slavery, And Emancipation," 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1481, 1501 (1989).
49.
50.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
Of course, we should not overlook the fact that throughout the nation's history, cultural

representations have been marshaled to legitimize as well as to oppose the condition of blacks (and
other people of color) in the American constitutional order. That is, there is nothing inherently
subversive about the political uses of culture. Indeed, one of my aims in this Article is to suggest
that appeal to the cultural meanings of race, law, and politics was a central feature of discourse on
both sides of the Angelo Herndon case.
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acknowledge the centrality of culture as the site in which African-Americans have historically sought to make sense of, and respond to, their
experience in the United States.5 1
By culture, I mean a broad range of practices, rituals, attitudes,
beliefs, doctrines, images, and ideas that traverse or "saturate"5 2 the
entire social formation. 3 From this perspective, culture does not "stand
above or apart from the many other activities and relationships that
make up a society, including the socially organized forms of domination,
54

exploitation, and power pervasive in our own society and its history."

To note the significance of cultural practices in the history of American
constitutionalism is to view culture as formed by, contributing to, and
embedded in law and politics.5
51. For a valuable historical discussion of African-American cultural consciousness from slavery through the early years of the 20th century, see V.P. FRANKLIN, BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION

(1984). Franklin identifies four core components of the African-American "cultural value system":
self-determination, resistance, education, and freedom. Id. at 4-5. Recent history suggests that African-American cultural forms carry a resonance even for those who share a different history of
oppression. Indeed, the political uses of African-American culture now extend far beyond American
borders. For example, one of the more powerful moments in the media coverage of the November
1989 events in Berlin was the footage of Germans gathered near the Brandenburg Gate singing We
Shall Overcome.
52. See EDWARD W. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRITIC 9 (1983).
53. "Culture," as Raymond Williams has noted, "is one of the two or three most complicated
words in the English language." RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE
AND SOCIETY 87 (1983). As I use it here, the term should be understood in its broad social science
sense rather than in its narrower (currently dominant but relatively recent) sense of artistic processes
and their artifacts. Culture, then, denotes a "way of life" of which aesthetic activities and institutions are but one component. For discussion from a number of disciplinary perspectives of this more
inclusive conception of the culture concept, see THE IDEA OF CULTURE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
supra note 40.
54. BRENKMAN, supra note 48, at vii. In A Dialectical Approach to Culture, the Guinean
leader and political theorist Sekou Tour6 sets forth a definition of culture for continental Africa that
parallels the conception of culture central to an understanding of political practice among the people
of the African diaspora in the United States:
[Culture embraces] all the material and immaterial works of art and science, plus knowledge, manners, education, a mode of thought, behavior and attitudes accumulated by the
people both through and by virtue of their struggle from the hold and domination of nature
... [Culture also] stands revealed as both an exclusive creation of the people and a source
of creation, as an instrument of socioeconomic liberation and as one of domination. Culture implies our struggle-it is our struggle.
Sekou Tour6, A DialecticalApproach to Culture, in CONTEMPORARY BLACK THOUGHT 5 (Robert
Chrisman & Nathan Hare eds., 1973). For a discussion of the importance of cultural practice for
critical race theory, see Arif Dirlik, Culturalism as Hegemonic Ideology and LiberatingPractice, 6
CULTURAL CRITIQUE 13 (1987).
55. My point is most emphatically not that culture and power politics are identical. What I do
mean to suggest is that cultural products and practices, including legal culture, are part of a "large
intellectual endeavor-systems and currents of thought connected in complex ways to doing things,
to accomplishing certain things, to force, to social class and economic production, to diffusing ideas,
values and world pictures." SAID, supra note 52, at 170.
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It is with this view of the relation between constitutional struggle
and cultural contestation that I want to introduce my account of the
events for which Herndon v. Georgiabecame a site of intersection. In my
view, Angelo Herndon's autobiography, Let Me Live, offers a discursive
enactment of the strategies of symbolic reversal and displacement to
which a critical history of the subaltern in American constitutional law
and politics must attend. Let Me Live illustrates the dynamic interaction
during the Depression decade between cultural and political practices.56
The book reveals as well the way culture and politics provided an ideological context in which one African-American reached a critical understanding of, and response to, the American constitutional order.
Shortly before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Herndon
v. Lowry, Random House published Let Me Live." Let Me Live articulates the cultural foundations of the political struggles waged by AfricanAmericans during the Depression. On one level, Herndon's book is an
extended meditation in autobiographical form on the relationships
between language and power and between cultural and political
consciousness.
The cultural tradition within which Herndon comes to grasp the
nature of politics is the religion of the black Christian church. Early on
in Let Me Live, Herndon describes his childhood religious conversion by
an old uncle at a revival meeting."8 As Herndon tells it, this experience
shaped and at the same time circumscribed his perception of the problem
of race relations in America. 59
Years after the event, he compares and contrasts the emancipatory
potential of religious belief with that of political radicalism after he is
introduced to the work of the Unemployed Councils, a national organization for jobless workers of all colors that had formed in the winter of
56.

Some of the most important explorations in American legal scholarship of the relations

among law, politics, and culture were made during this decade. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Edward S.
Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1071 (1936); Max Ler-

ner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937). A reading of these four texts
suggests that this Article's cultural analysis of American constitutional law and politics is not
anachronistically imposed upon the historical record but rather inheres in it.
British historians have already produced a rich literature addressing the role of culture in English political life during the 1930s. Three especially useful works are RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1780-1950 (1983); CULTURE AND CRISIS IN BRITAIN IN THE THIRTIES (Jon
Clark et al. eds., 1979); and CLASS, CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A NEW VIEW OF THE 1930s
(Frank Gloversmith ed., 1980).
57. HERNDON, supra note 27.
58. Id. at 20-25.
59. Id. at 88-89.
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1929-30.' At his first meeting, the unemployed black teenager listens to
an old black steelworker explain why he has joined the Unemployed
Council. 6 1 By the end of the meeting, Herndon decides to become one of
the "reds," whom the black church had taught him were "wicked people
blaspheming against God."'62 In a passage that evokes the tradition of
spiritual autobiography, Herndon describes his entry into radical politics
and consciousness as a second conversion experience:
Strange, only once before had I walked up to a speaker who had
moved me so deeply and been converted. That was the time when my
Uncle Jeremiah preached his first sermon ....The emotional motivation in both cases was identical, but what a difference in their nature
and in their aim! The change of my viewpoint was almost fabulous,
emerging from the urge to escape the cruelties of life in religious
abstractions into a healthy, vigorous and realistic recognition that life
be
on earth, which was so full of struggle and tears for the poor, could
63
changed by the intelligent and organized will of the workers.
For the first time, writes Herndon, he comes to see the promise and
necessity for the political program of the CPUSA, which aimed to forge
class alliances across the color line. This recognition entails nothing less
than a complete reworking of Herndon's world view:
That night when I went to bed, I couldn't fall asleep. My mind was
too excited by the events of the evening to calm down. Something very
important had happened to me, I knew, and I lay with wide open eyes
staring into the darkness of my room and thinking that it was at last
necessary for me to revise my attitude toward white people. I had
discovered at last the truth that not all white people were enemies and
exploiters of the Negro people. In fact, the same vicious interests that
were oppressing Negro workers were doing the same thing to white
workers, that both black and white workers could solve their problems
60. The Communist Party's Unemployed Council (which Herndon refers to as the Unemployment Council in Let Me Live) successfully forced important concessions from local relief authorities
and landlords, through both advocacy on behalf of the unemployed and direct action-such as eviction protests and demonstrations at relief offices, city halls, and state capitals. The council was
particularly effective during the early years of the Depression, when local relief programs were singularly incompetent in dealing with mass unemployment. According to historians of the period, the
Unemployed Council played an important role in the "breaking down of barriers" that had frustrated the political coalition between poor whites and blacks, particularly in the South. Roy Rozensweig, "Organizing The Unemployed'" The Early Years of the Depression, 10 RADICAL Am.37, 42
(1976). The CPUSA has maintained that the council was the "tactical key" to its work during the
1930s. Id. at 40. For a history and analysis of the rise and fall of this movement, see FRANCES Fox
PIVENS & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 41-95 (1977).

61.
62.
63.

HERNDON, supra note 27, at 77-78.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
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only by a united effort against the common enemy: the rich white peo64
ple, they who owned the mines, the mills, the factories, the banks.
Hemdon's initiation into a new political language-Marxismbrings him to consciousness of the power of language itself. He writes:
My education, as I have made clear in this narrative, was practically
nil. Throughout all my struggles and vicissitudes I hungered for learning .... But a new force now entered into my life. It created a revolution in it. The education I longed for in the world I had expected to
find it [sic], I surprisingly began to receive in my new Communist
circles. To the everlasting glory of the Communist movement may it
be said that wherever it is active, it brings enlightenment and culture.... Every meeting of the Unemployment [sic] Council became a
classroom for me. I never left one of them without bearing away with
me the discovery of [a] new idea. Of course, I did not always understand everything that I heard or read, but what of it? It was enough
that I understood that they were on the right track.65
Throughout Let Me Live, Herndon stresses the centrality of education to his political development. At one point, he notes the "painful
concentration" with which he read a copy of the Communist Manifesto
that a white worker gave him.66 To test his understanding of Marx and
Engels, Herndon writes a "simple account"'67 of the text "in my own
68
words":
The worker has no power. All he possesses is the power of his hands
and his brains. It is his ability to produce things. It is only natural,
therefore, that he should try and get as much as he can for his labor.
To make his demands more effective he is obliged to band together
with other workers into powerful labor organizations, for there is
strength in numbers. The capitalists, on the other hand, own all the
factories, the mines and the government. Their only interest is to
make as much profit as they can. They are not concerned with the
well-being of those who work for them. We see, therefore, that the
interests of the capitalists and the workers are not the same. In fact,
they are opposed to each other. What happens? A desperate fight
69
takes place between the two. This is known as the class struggle.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

79-80.
87-88.
81.
82.
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"The idea," says Herndon, "seemed so self-evident that I scolded myself

for having been so stupid as not to have recognized it before."70 In this
moment, Herndon appropriates the grammar and categories of Marxist
theory for use as a discursive means and an analytic tool with which to
explain his condition and that of people like him. His effort to rewrite
the Communist Manifesto in his own language is an attempt to rewrite

his own life experience. Herndon's discovery of the language of class is
the beginning of a decisive transformation of his thoughts and feelings
about race in America.71

The chief theoretical interest of these passages from Let Me Live,
from the perspective of popular constitutional history, lies less in the substance of Herndon's Marxist politics than in what they indicate about the
cultural process and forms through which Herndon's political consciousness was fashioned. Despite its flaws (and there were many), 72 the political culture of American Marxism enabled Angelo Herndon to acquire
what so many young African-American men in our time find in the institution of the American prison: a political education providing a basic set
of terms-a language-with which to interpret their place in society and
try to change it.
70. Id. at 82.
71. To be sure, Herndon's attempt to understand the state of African-Americans in the 1930s
never moves beyond the horizons of orthodox Marxism. Indeed, one of the blind spots of Let Me
Live lies in Herndon's unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the autonomy of racial and cultural
identity. Instead, he uncritically collapses the two into the category of class in a way that ignores
their specificity. Because Let Me Live was meant to enhance the development of a distinctly black
socialist consciousness in America, its reduction of racial and cultural struggles to class struggles
alone is unfortunate.
72. The Communist Party line on the "Negro question" was based on an analysis by Soviet
Communists that African-Americans were an oppressed nation whose only hope lay in the creation
of a sovereign state in the southern "Black Belt." The historical record clearly shows that the theoreticians in Moscow completely misread the aspirations of black people in the United States. The
Soviet elite was unable to understand that African-Americans were less interested in being separate
from American society than in being fully part of it. Further, the Soviet Union attempted to fit the
historical experience of black Americans into the conceptual framework of its policy toward its own
ethnic and racial minorities, refusing to acknowledge the particularity of black Americans' experience. Nevertheless, the fact remains that during the 1930s, the CPUSA was the only political party
in the United States seriously committed to the struggle for racial equality in America (and committed in a sustained way) and the only political party in which African-Americans had a leadership
role. See generally HARVEY KLEHR, supra note 45; MARK NAISON, COMMUNISTS IN HARLEM
DURING THE DEPRESSION (1983). For a discussion of the specific question of black American selfdetermination, see HARRY HAYWOOD, BLACK BOLSHEVIK (1978). For an interesting contemporary
debate on the "black nation" thesis and the CPUSA program to establish an independent, blackcontrolled political entity in the southern Black Belt, see LEON TROTSKY ON BLACK NATIONALISM
AND SELF-DETERMINATION (George Breitman ed., 1978).

2620

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2599

It is easy to say in hindsight that Herndon and his black contemporaries were unwitting pawns in a cynical political game waged by the
Soviet Union against the United States (and locally by the American
Communist Party against the NAACP).7 3 It is equally easy to show
that, as a theoretical and practical matter, the CPUSA was unwilling or

unable to acknowledge that race and culture in American politics could
not be subsumed under the language of class struggle.74 There is some

truth in both these claims. In a sense, however, these criticisms are
beside the point. We are still left with the task of explaining why blacks
like Angelo Herndon chose to join and stay in the CPUSA and why,

given all its theoretical and practical shortcomings, an organization like
the CPUSA was still able to become such an "important force within the
black community during the first years of the depression."" More fundamentally, these interpretations run the risk of refusing to see Angelo

Herndon and those like him as historical actors in their own right and
not merely objects or "instruments of some other will." 7 6 Nothing could
be more elitist than to blithely dismiss Herndon's narrative of his trial
and conviction, whether the dismissal takes the form of a weak claim
that Let Me Live is a layman's legal history with which we need not be
concerned, or whether it rests instead on a stronger assertion that the
book is merely a piece of audacious Communist Party propaganda.77
73. The most vocal proponent of this line of argument is Wilson Record. See WILSON REcORD, THE NEGRO AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1951); WILSON RECORD, RACE AND RADICALISM: THE NAACP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CONFLICT (1964). Harold Cruse, whose
perspective is sympathetic to black nationalism, reaches similar conclusions. HAROLD CRUSE, THE
CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL (1967). Of the two, Cruse offers the more thoughtful analysis, perhaps because he is less evidently committed to the ideology of the Cold War. See also ROBERT L. ALLEN, RELUCTANT REFORMERS 233 (1974) (arguing that the CPUSA's practices "reduced
black people to the role of passive objects to be manipulated in accordance with priorities that had
little or nothing to do with the economic or political objectives of black workers themselves").
74. HAROLD CRUSE, REBELLION ON REVOLUTION 229 (1968) (criticizing the inability of
Marxists "to set the Negro off and see him in terms of his own national minority group existence and
identity, inclusive of his class, caste, and ideological stratifications"). Phyllis Jacobson extends the
arguments of Cruse and Allen, see supra note 73, criticizing the orthodoxy of the CPUSA with
respect to the whole of American society. Phyllis Jacobson, The "Americanization" of the Communist Party, 1 NEw POL. 152, 161 (1986).
75.

FRASER M. OTT-ANELLI, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE

DEPRESSION TO WORLD WAR

II 42 (1991).

76. Guha, The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,supra note 28, at 38.
77. None of this is to deny the manifest orthodoxy of Herndon's analysis or its lack of sophistication on the intersections of race, nationalism, and class. One could not and perhaps should not
place Let Me Live in the same class as the work produced at roughly the same time by leftist African,
Afro-American, and Afro-Caribbean writers, such as George Padmore, C.L.R. James, Eric Williams, Jomo Kenyatta, and W.E.B. Du Bois. These men were by temperament and training critical
intellectuals. They shared a deep commitment to antiracist and anticolonialist politics in Asia and
Africa (as well as Great Britain, France, and the United States). They were never willing to accept
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The belief that Herndon's purported ignorance makes Let Me Live irrele-

derives from
vant, or that his perceived insolence makes it unreliable,
78
premises that are more ideological than intellectual.

Perhaps the historical literature is indifferent to Let Me Live not
because it has made a considered judgment of the text, but rather because
it adheres to the questionable notion that Let Me Live is presumptively
disqualified as a serious source for the historical understanding of legal
issues because of Herndon's insistent emphasis on the social, cultural,

and political meanings and background of his case. I reject this view.
Let Me Live demands attention precisely because of the challenges it
poses to orthodox assumptions and understandings of the nature and
uses of law. First, Let Me Live challenges the priority that the institutional history of American constitutionalism uncritically accords the official language and forms of law. Second, it suggests that no adequate
historical account of the legal controversy presented by the Angelo
Herndon case can ignore the larger "struggle over the historical and cultural record"7 9 of which that legal contest was a part.
A constitutional history of the Angelo Herndon case that proceeds
from the bottom up begins and ends with a recognition that the legal,
cultural, and political dimensions of the case are indivisible parts of an

integrated whole. None of this is to suggest that a historical analysis of
the Herndon case should proceed as though no conceptual distinctions
can be made among legal, political, and cultural practices. Rather, it is
the primacy that orthodox Marxism assigns to economic factors and class struggle. Accordingly,
their work and writings reflect an analytical rigor and independence of mind that is absent from Let
Me Live. Unlike Herndon, and unlike the majority of black radicals influenced by Communism,
these men did not hesitate to criticize openly Soviet and Communist Party complicity with Mussolini
during the Italian-Ethiopian War (the Soviet Union sold war materials to the Fascisti); to attack the
Third International's opportunistic dissolution of the International Trade Union of Negro Workers
(a decision taken to win acceptance in the West); or to ridicule the Comintern's call for the establishment of a "Black Republic" in the United States. See RON RAMDIN, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK
WORKING CLASS IN BRITAIN (1987) (for a discussion of James and Padmore); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983) (for a discussion

of James and Du Bois).
78. During the course of my research on the Angelo Herndon case, I have encountered more
than one legal historian who has expressed some doubt about whether Herndon actually wrote Let
Me Live. A review of the surviving correspondence between Angelo Herndon and his editors at
Random House has left me with little cause to question Herndon's authorship. Letter from Angelo
Herndon to Bennett Cerf (Feb. 2, 1937) (on file in the Rare Book and Manuscript Collection,
Columbia University); letter from Angelo Herndon to Robert K. Haas (Dec. 12, 1936) (on file in the
Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, Columbia University); letter from Robert K. Haas to Angelo
Herndon (Dec. 16, 1936) (on file in the Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, Columbia University); letter from Angelo Herndon to Robert K. Haas, (Dec. 24, 1936) (on file in the Rare Book and
Manuscript Collection, Columbia University).
79. BARBARA HARLOW, RESISTANCE LITERATURE 7 (1987).
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to insist that these analytical distinctions may not fully comport with
empirical realities: Legal, cultural, and political practices can be and are
encapsulated or "articulated"' in the same historical moment. Thus, in
Let Me Live, the fusion of legal, political, and cultural practices in
Herndon's experience transforms the meaning of each; this inscription of
law, culture, and politics in a common epistemic or discursive field
requires a change in our conceptual framework.
For the popular constitutional historian, one of the most interesting
aspects of Let Me Live is that it offers an exemplary instance of the way
law, politics, and culture articulate at the level of individual consciousness and sensibility. At one point in Let Me Live, Herndon acknowledges that "[s]ome people may, perhaps, accuse me of preaching or
making unnecessary propaganda for the Communist cause. After all,
they might say, this is only the story of my life and does not call for
evangelical outbursts.""s Herndon offers the following response:
To this I will answer in all earnestness that the story of my life without
my reactions to my own problems and to the problems of the world
with the Communistic viewpoint as its key and guide, without my fervors and indignations, without my hatreds and without my loves,
would remain
an untrue and distorted narrative, without blood and
82
entrails.
These words provide a concrete illustration of the more abstract points I
have made concerning the relationship among law, culture, and politics.
Consider the cultural content and connotations of the expressive form in
which Herdon defends his reliance on the political language of Marxism. Herndon's references to his "fervors and indignations," his
"hatreds" and "loves," disclose a distinctive "structure of feeling"-a set
of "meanings and values as they are actually lived or felt" as opposed to
80. A number of theorists working in the poststructuralist tradition have used the term "articulation" to describe and critically analyze social objects whose components are not isolable. For our
purposes, the primary value of the concept lies in its recognition that when discrete phenomena are
combined, their characters change. For a discussion of articulation in contemporary political theory, see ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY 105
(1985) ("[We] will call articulationany practice establishing a relation among elements such that
their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice."). An example of its use in poststructuralist literary theory may be found in PIERRE MACHEREY, A THEORY OF LITERARY PRODUCTION 90 (Geoffrey Wall trans., 1978). A recent effort to develop an analysis of articulation in
sociocultural history is JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE 153 (1985)

(explaining that the concept of articulation "permits us to view the joining of distinct systems, themselves dynamic orders of practice and meaning, into a unitary formation, the novel product of particular historical circumstances").
81. HERNDON, supra note 27, at 89.
82.

Id.
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formal ideologies or worldviews.8 3 As Herndon tells it, he cannot not
make use of the "enlightenment and culture" 84 he has acquired through
his involvement with the CPUSA, because they have been woven into his
very sensibility. It is only through the template of his cultural and political encounter with Marxism that Herndon can give meaning to his personal experiences in the courtrooms and jail houses of Georgia.85 The
passage above registers the degree to which Herndon's grasp of legal ideology and institutions emerged from and was embedded in practices and
perspectives that were at the same time cultural and political.
Let Me Live resists the disciplinary and discursive encroachments of
an institutionalist constitutional orientation. The story it tells is an episode in our constitutional history whose symbolic significance cannot be
captured by the instrumental language of law. While an interpretation
concerned solely with the legal "issues," "questions, ....
rules,....
holdings," and "principles" raised by the Angelo Herndon case is important,
it cannot begin to address the case's deeper cultural and political foundations. Of course, to say that the account of the Angelo Herndon case
offered in Let Me Live eludes the language of conventional constitutional
history does not mean that it cannot be told at all. The story of the role
black political insurgency has played in American constitutionalismthe story of which the Herndon case is a part-can indeed be told, so
long as we give due regard to the cultural sources from which that insurgent consciousness emerged, and to the cultural forms through which it
was expressed. Herndon's account of what his experience with the law
meant to him in political and cultural terms is a story that a constitutional history of the case from the bottom up holds itself bound to
83. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 132 (1977). Analysis of the structures of feeling inscribed in a text-be it an autobiography like Let Me Live or the Supreme Court's
opinion in Herndon v. Georgia-concernsitself with the "elements of impulse, restraint, and tone;
specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships" and the like. Id. Although the
emphasis on a structure of feeling might suggest an opposition to structures of thought, the concept
embraces both. As an interpretive construct, the idea of a structure of feeling aims to capture the
constitutive relation between thought and feeling. Taken together, feeling and thought produce a
distinctive sensibility in which the two elements are combined. In Williams' words, we are not
talking about "feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought." Id. (emphasis
added).
84.

HERNDON, supra note 27, at 87.

85.

This sensibility is reflected in Herndon's editorial work with the novelist Ralph Ellison

during the 1940s on The Negro Quarterly, founded by the Communist-sponsored Negro Publication

Society of America. The Negro Quarterly published poems, essays, and articles by a diverse group of
independent writers, including Sterling A. Brown, Langston Hughes, L.D. Reddick, Owen Dodson,
Stanley Edgar Hyman, and J.Saunders Redding. Moreover, it took editorial positions on racial
politics that were often at odds with the official Communist Party line. Significantly, The Negro
Quarterly was subtitled A Review of Negro Life and Culture.
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respect. By using Let Me Live as the starting point for my discussion of
Herndon v. Georgia, I aim to enact at the level of method something
similar to the symbolic reversal that Lucius Outlaw has identified as a

defining characteristic of African-American political history, 86 and thus
to bring the cultural dimensions of the Angelo Herndon case from the

margins to the interpretive center of our historical concerns.
B.

"A

SCRAP OF PAPER": THE TRIALS OF ANGELO HERNDON

Let Me Live is a textual record of the inextricable links among law,
politics, and culture in the history of Afro-American insurgency. What
E.P. Thompson has observed of the literary record left by eighteenthcentury English Puritans is equally true of Let Me Live. Herndon's
account may be read as a "sign of how men felt and hoped, loved and
hated, and of how they preserved certain values in the very texture of
their language." 87 Let Me Live may be interpreted as a product of, and a
meditation on, one of the central themes in the history of African people
in America: the struggle of a people for political literacy and against the
political resistance mobilized to frustrate that collective endeavor. Seen
in this light, the Angelo Herndon case is an important episode in the
historical effort of African-Americans to find a political language with
which to understand their past aspirations and to articulate their future
aspirations. Against this thematic backdrop, I turn to an account of the
"discursive events" 8 that brought Angelo Herndon before the bar of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
86. See discussion supra note 48 and accompanying text.
87. THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 49.
88. "Discursive event" is meant to capture the actional emphasis of the theory of discourse
developed in the work of Michel Foucault. I will not try in this brief space to give a detailed account
of Foucault's discursive analysis but will rather rehearse some of his key claims. Generally speaking,
for Foucault, "discourse" refers to the practice of language; it is not limited to the study of the
semantic or syntactical properties of verbal or written texts. For Foucault, analysis of discursive
formations is possible only if we are alert to their performative dimensions. Foucault thus shifts his
focus from a static model of the text as object to a dynamic model of the text as event: This in turn
implicates such issues as the status of the speaker or writer, the circumstances in which the speaker
or writer speaks or writes, and the social sites from which the speaker or writer launches the text.
The crucial distinction between Foucault's project and other recent explorations of linguistic
performance to which it has often been compared, most notably the "speech-act" theory of J.L.
Austin and John Searle, see AUSTIN, supra note 2, lies in its sustained attention to the connections
between discourse and power. Foucault develops a conception of discursive practice as an empirical
phenomenon that is underwritten by and embedded in a complex field of social forces. Thus, he
argues that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized
and redistributed by a certain number of procedures." MICHEL FOUCAULT, L'ORDRE Du DiscoURS
10-11 (1971) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, L'ORDRE Du DISCOURS] (my translation). One obvious
instance of such a procedural constraint on discourse is the prohibition (l'interdit, which may be
literally translated as "the interdict"): "[We] know very well that we do not have the right to say
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everything, that we can not speak of anything in any circumstance, that not just anyone, in a word,
can speak of anything." Id. The combined prohibitive force of what Foucault calls the "taboo
[regarding] the object [of discourse], the ritual of the circumstance [of discursive performance], [and]
the privileged or exclusive right of the subject who speaks" operates to police the boundaries of
discourse, restricting admission and conditioning effective participation in the "society of discourse"
to those who adhere to the religious, political, or philosophical "doctrines" that make a particular
discourse a "discipline" or body of knowledge. Id. at 11, 41-45.
An example from our own "discipline" might make these claims concrete. The dominant view
of legal principles and propositions is that they are tools with which to analyze, anticipate, avoid, or
adjudicate competing claims of right and duty. In the dominant view, the cognitive content of a
legal proposition in no way turns on whether the site of its use is a court, a conference room, or a
lecture hall. Consider the following sentence: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The dominant view holds that as a legal
proposition, this rule retains its epistemological status no matter where it is and no matter who reads
or says it: whether a judge reads it in a brief, a legislative counsel puts it in a memorandum, a student
memorizes it for an examination or recites it during a mock trial, or a maintenance worker finds it
typed on a scrap of paper in the law library wastebasket. Proponents of this view would readily
concede that the meaning and application of this proposition can be contested or, indeed, changed
over time. They would agree that the different settings in which, and purposes for which, the rule is
read or spoken do make a difference. But they think that the rule remains essentiallythe same as an
ontological matter no matter what the social or institutional context in which it appears. One implication of this view is that the meaning of a text can be productively (if not exhaustively) discussed
and analyzed apart from its context.
Foucault suggests another way to think about legal propositions and the "discipline" to which
they belong. (Here we might note the epistemological and institutional resonance of this notion of
"discipline.") His point of departure is the line that separates text and context. In broad terms, he
distinguishes sentences from statements, syntactic form from signifying force. For Foucault, attention to a context reveals that the sentence used by a judge in a courtroom is not the same statement
when it is used by an actor playing the role of a judge in a courtroom. One cannot unilaterally
decide that one's utterance of the words of the First Amendment will carry the force of a judicial
pronouncement; one cannot publish a commentary on the First Amendment in a homeowners-association newsletter and expect the fact of publication in itself to grant the status that the same words
would have in a scholarly journal. We all know that there are practices of exclusion and inclusion
external to the text that determine how much recognition a particular legal utterance will be
accorded; indeed, this process of propositional accreditation is often the site of fierce ideological
contestation.
I can think of two such instances of struggle in recent American legal scholarship. One is the
debate over the proper role (if any) of critical legal studies in American legal education. See Paul D.
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226-27 (1984) (arguing that proponents
of such a "nihilist" perspective toward law ought not to teach in law schools); Peter W. Martin, "Of
Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J.LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) (presenting responses and counterresponses to Carrington's article by Peter Martin, Robert Gordon, Paul
Carrington, Paul Brest, Phillip Johnson, Louis Schwartz, William Van Alstyne, Guido Calabresi,
and Owen Fiss). A second is the controversy over Randall Kennedy's article Racial Critiques of
LegalAcademia. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1747 (attacking the view that "the value of intellectual
work marked by the racial background of minority scholars is frequently either unrecognized or
underappreciated by white scholars blinded by the limitations of their own racially defined experience or prejudiced by the imperatives of their own racial interests"). For a response to this article by
one of the scholars of color to whom Kennedy directs his critique, see Richard Delgado, When a
Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990). For treatments of this
debate in the popular press, see Charles Rothfeld, Minority CriticStirs Debateon Minority Writing,
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Writing and Resistance

An anonymous letter set the events in motion. 9 On the night of
June 29, 1932, hundreds of copies of a leaflet were distributed in the poor
white and black neighborhoods of Atlanta. It read:
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1990, at B6; Jon Weiner, Law Profs Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 4, 1989, at
246.
These are obvious points, so obvious that their ramifications for an understanding of legal discourse are often ignored. What they suggest is that the context of an utterance is not a contingent
feature of discourse but a fundamental condition of both its possibility and its actual existence.
Because the powers immanent in the discursive situation and in the relative status of its participants
elude a text-bound theory of discourse, we must always ask, as Foucault puts it:
Who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to
use this sort of language [in what settings and with what effects]? Who derives from it his
own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the
assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the
individuals who-alone-have the right, sanctioned law or tradition, juridically defined or
spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 50-51 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans.,
1972).
As Edward Said has observed, Foucault's work permits a deeper understanding of the way "the
will to exercise dominant control" in society has historically clothed itself in the language of rationality, utility, objectivity, and neutrality. SAID, supra note 52, at 216. Discourse is both the dressing
room and the dress uniform, as it were, in which the will to dominate disguises itself. Clothed in the
rarefied rhetorical robes of the "knowledge" that is its public enemy and its secret ally, "power"
naturalizes, rationalizes, normalizes, and authorizes itself in the name of, and as a form of, the
discourse of truth. One might conclude from this representation of power that Foucault sees little or
no possibility that anyone could resist the will to dominate. As a number of commentators have
demonstrated, there is some support in Foucault's texts for this view. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT,
A CRITICAL READER (Dennis Couzens Hoy ed., 1986). However, it would be wrong to suggest that
Foucault altogether ignores the ways discourse can be and has been mobilized to fight the dominant
powers. The rules that determine the who, where, how, and when of effective discursive practice are
inscribed in an intricate network of active, mobile power relations. Therefore, discourse "is not
simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but that for which, that by which
one fights, [discourse is] the power which one tries to seize." FOUCAULT, L'ORDRE DU DISCOURS,
supra, at 12 (my translation).
What I find most valuable in Foucault's analysis is the set of terms it provides for grasping the
contestatory core of the Angelo Herndon case. I draw heavily on Foucault in the following pages to
develop the thesis that discursivity is the linchpin on which a deep understanding of the Herndon
case hangs: The case is most productively analyzed as a struggle in, over, and about speech, which
itself must be understood as a powerful instrument of, and impediment to, social, political, and
constitutional change.

For other treatments of Foucault's thought, see MARK COUSINS & ATHAN HUSSAIN,
(1984); HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT:

FOUCAULT

STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS

(2d ed. 1982);

MICHEL
BEYOND

& GARTH GILLAN,
(1982); KARLIS RACEVSKIS, MICHEL
(1983); ALAN SHERIDAN, MICHEL FoU-

CHARLES C. LEMERT

MICHEL FOUCAULT: SOCIAL THEORY AND TRANSGRESSION
FOUCAULT AND THE SUBVERSION

OF THE INTELLECT

(1980). Two excellent studies exploring the relevance of Foucault's
work for legal scholarship are PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987) and GILLIAN ROSE,
CAULT: THE WILL TO TRUTH

(1984).
89. This epistolary intervention in politics belongs to a long literary tradition. For an interpretive study of the politics of anonymous letter writing in 18-century England, see E.P. Thompson,
DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM: STRUCTURALISM AND LAW
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WORKERS OF ATLANTA! EMPLOYED
AND UNEMPLOYED-NEGRO AND WHITEATTENTION!
MEN AND WOMEN OF ATLANTA
Thousands of us, together with our families, are at this time facing
starvation and misery and are about to be thrown out of our houses
because the miserable charity hand-out that some of us were getting
has been stopped! Hundreds of thousands of dollars have been collected from workers in this city for relief for the unemployed, and most
of it has been squandered in high salaries for the heads of these relief
agencies. Mr. T.K. Glenn, president of the Community Chest, is
reported to be getting a salary of $10,000 a year. Mr. Frank Neely,
executive director of the Community Chest, told the County Commission Saturday that he gets $6,500 a year, while at the same time no
worker, no matter how big his family, gets more than two dollars and a
half to live on. If we count the salaries paid the secretaries and the
investigators working in the thirty-eight relief stations in this city, it
should not surprise us that the money for relief was used up and there
is no more left to keep us from starvation. If we allow ourselves to
starve while these fakers grow fat off our misery, it will be our own
fault.
The bosses want us to starve peacefully and by this method save
the money they have accumulated off our sweat and blood. We must
force them to continue our relief and give more help. We must not
allow them to stall us any longer with fake promises. The city and
county authorities from the money they have already collected from us
in taxes, and by taking the incomes of the bankers and other rich capitalists, can take care of every unemployed family in Atlanta. We must
make them do it.
The Crime ofAnonymity, in HAY ET AL., supranote 28, at 255. Robert McElvaine notes that during
the Depression, "both the volume of mail reaching the White House and the high percentage of it
coming from the poor" reached an unprecedented level. DOWN AND OUT IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION: LETrERS FROM THE FORGOTTEN MAN 5 (Robert S. McElvaine ed., 1983). After Franklin D.
Roosevelt was elected President, a significant number of the letters sent to the White House in
particular and to national officials in general came from poor, often barely literate African-Americans. Id. at 81. More often than not, blacks focused not so much on the inadequacy of relief programs as on the racially discriminatory manner in which they were run. Id. Like many whites,
black letter writers often wrote anonymously or asked to have their identities kept secret. Unlike
white letter writers, however, black letter writers were motivated less by the shame of petitioning for
help than by the fear that they would be jailed, beaten, lynched, or otherwise terrorized if their
names were revealed. Id. Nonetheless, "in spite of the requests for confidentiality, many of the
letters blacks addressed to the Roosevelts [and other federal figures] were referred to local relief
agencies: to precisely the people against whom the allegations of discrimination had been made." Id.
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At a meeting of the County Commissioners last Saturday, it was
proposed by Walter S. McNeal, Jr., to have the police round up all
unemployed workers and their families and ship them back to the
farms and make them work for just board and no wages, while just a
few months ago these hypocrites were talking about forced labor in
Soviet Russia, a county where there is no starvation and where the
workers rule! Are we going to let them force us into slavery?
At this meeting Mr. Hendrix said that there were no starving families in Atlanta, that if there is he has not seen any. Let's all of us,
white and Negroes, together, with our women folk and children, go to
his office in the country court house on Pryor and Hunter streets
Thursday morning at 10:00 o'clock and show this faker that there is
plenty of suffering in the city of Atlanta and demand that he give us
immediate relief! Organize and fight for unemployment insurance at
the expense of the government and the bosses! Demand immediate
payment of the bonus to the ex-servicemen. Don't forget Thursday
morning at the county court house.
Issued by the
UNEMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE OF ATLANTA
P.O. Box 339.90
The following morning Angelo Herndon, a 19-year-old black organizer for the Communist Party USA in Atlanta, was among the leaders
of a peaceful march to the Fulton County court building.9 ' More than a
thousand people, black and white, participated in the protest.9 2 The
march was reportedly the largest biracial demonstration in the South in
decades.9 County officials called in a group of white marchers to discuss
their concerns but refused altogether to talk to any of the black demonstrators. 4 The day after the rally, the Fulton County Commission
approved a $6000 emergency appropriation to buy food for the 23,000
95
people who had been solely or largely supported by the relief system.
The importance of this demonstration lies in the fact that it served
both an instrumental and an expressive function: The gathering at the
Fulton County courthouse was simultaneously a political and cultural

event. Using forms of popular protest, these hungry and homeless men
90. Transcript, supra note 45, at 123-24. The pamphlet is the first of several texts in the documentary dossier at the end of Let Me Live. I give it pride of place in my narrative in the belief that
its insurgent consciousness will enhance our epistemic point of view.
91. CHARLES H. MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTicE 6 (1976).
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. Id.
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and women were able to force material concessions from government
officials who had ignored their plight. Equally significant, however, was
the symbolic challenge this collective action posed to the racial status
quo. In refusing to respect the racial boundaries that had separated them
for so long, the poor blacks and whites who participated in the demonstration had taken tentative steps toward the creation of a new political
and cultural community. For a brief moment, class consciousness
trumped color consciousness, creating the possibility of an effective political coalition, and collective self-identification, across the color line. This
extraordinary fact was not lost on the organizers of the gathering. In a
leaflet announcing the government's concession, the Unemployed Council boasted of having "crammed the lie down the throat" of the commissioner who had denied that starving people existed in Atlanta, and it
encouraged participants in the rally to help the council "force these fakers" to give more and regular support to the unemployed.96
The circular also pointed out that the county commissioners had
attempted to divide the demonstrators along racial lines, warning that
"[if] we allow the bosses to divide us they will keep us both starving."
The pamphlet urged black and white workers to "stick together because
that is the only way we can win. The bosses know this: that is why they
work so hard to separate us. The privilege of starving separately don't
mean anything to any sensible worker these days."9 7 The leaflet called
on the unemployed to resist any attempt by landlords to try to evict people in their neighborhoods, and it urged "the workers of every neighborhood to get together, organize your committees and see that no worker is
evicted because he can't pay the rent."9 " The leaflet ended with a threat
that was also a rallying cry: "We refuse to starve!"99
The Atlanta Police Department immediately assigned a squad of
detectives to shadow the suspected leaders of the Unemployed Council. 1" The department instructed detectives to put the city's post office
under special surveillance, because both leaflets had listed a post office
box there as the Unemployed Council's mailing address.101
On the evening of July 11, 1932, two Atlanta policemen arrested
Angelo Herndon as he was taking mail from post office box number
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Transcript, supra note 45, at 124-25.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 126.
MARTIN, supra note 91, at 7.
Id.
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339.102 Hemdon was taken to his apartment, where the policemen seized
all of his books as well as bundles of pamphlets published by the CPUSA.
Hemdon was then taken to the Fulton County jail, where he was held for
eleven days without bail "on suspicion. ' 1°3 On July 21, a local white
lawyer and two black lawyers filed a petition seeking the release of
Herndon, who still had not been formally charged with any crime." ° A
judge for the Fulton County Superior Court denied the request, but he
did order the Fulton County Solicitor General's Office 5 to secure an
0
indictment within twenty-four hours or let Hemdon go.'
The next day, the Fulton County grand jury issued a formal indictment against Herndon.
[S]aid accused, in the County of Fulton and State of Georgia, on the
16th day of July, 1932 [a date on which Herndon was in the custody of
the Atlanta police], with force and arms, did make an attempt to join
in combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State of Georgia
with intent to the denial of the lawful authority of the State of Georgia
and with intent to defeat and overthrow the lawful authority
of the
06
State of Georgia by violent means and unlawful acts...'
To support these charges, the indictment recited a long list of criminal
acts that Hemdon had allegedly committed. The indictment reads like a
register of forbidden speech and transgressive discourse, an index of all
the ideas that Georgia authorities feared a disaffected citizen of any class
or color might think, hear, utter, read, or write. Hemdon, the indictment charged, had called "public assemblies and mass meetings in the
homes of various persons names and addresses are to the Grand Jurors
unknown and did make speeches to various persons to the Grand Jurors
unknown,"'" 7 allegedly to establish a group of persons "white and
colored" under the banner of the courts
and to provoke "combined oppo08
state.1
the
to
resistance"
and
sition
The indictment further accused Herndon of soliciting persons
"whose names are to the Grand Jurors unknown" to join the Communist
Party and the Young Communist League.' 0 9 Despite the fact that the
102. In Let Me Live, Herndon writes that when he demanded to know why he was being
arrested, he was told that it was because of "those threatening and scurrilous letters that you have
been passing around." HERNDON, supra note 27, at 193.
103. MARTIN, supra note 91, at 7.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Transcript, supra note 45, at 5.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id.
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CPUSA and its subsidiary organizations had not been banned by law in
Georgia, the indictment stated that Herndon's organizing work was
animated by a criminal purpose to create "by acts of violence, by unlawful means and by revolution" a new government "known as the United
Soviets Soviet Russia (sic)," sometimes called and known as the "the dictatorship of the Propertyless People."1 1 0 The indictment also charged
Herndon with circulating a number of books and pamphlets that called
for insurrection, riots, and armed uprisings against the state. The writings cited included The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers, which stated
that in "no other so-called civilized country in the world are human
beings treated as badly as these 15 million Negroes. They live under
perpetual regime of white terror, which expressed itself in lynchings,
peonage, racial segregation and other pronounced forms of white chauvinism .... ,"" Other writings listed in the indictment included a book
called Communism and Christianism, which exhorted its readers to
"[b]anish the Gods from the Skies and Capitalists from the Earth and
Make the World Safe for Industrial Communism," ' 12 and the Southern
Worker and The Daily Worker, both CPUSA publications. 13
Given the language and history of the statute that formed the basis
of the indictment, the Herndon case would likely have been politicized
even if the defendant had not been a Communist Party member. Angelo
Herndon was indicted under section 56 of the Georgia Penal Code,
which read: "Any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others
to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State
shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection."1'14 Anyone who reads
this provision in the context of its long and infamous history is able to see
the fear of racial unrest and radical politics that is reflected in every
word.
During the 1830s a number of southern state legislatures, shaken by
the Nat Turner rebellion and frightened by the increasingly militant posture of the abolitionist movement, enacted criminal laws against insurrection. The purpose of these laws was to guarantee that the full coercive
power of the state would suppress not only attempted or actual slave
revolts but any public opposition whatsoever to the institution of slavery
and its ideology. 11 The Georgia legislature revised its criminal calendar
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MARTIN, supra

note 91, at 20.
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in 1833 to read: "Exciting an insurrection or revolt of slaves, or any
attempt by writing, speaking, or otherwise, to excite an insurrection or
revolt of slaves, shall be punished with death."'1 6 The next section of the
penal code, which was intended to stop the flow of abolitionist literature
into the South, made into a capital offense the introduction or circulation
within the state of any written text aimed at inciting resistance, revolt, or
insurrection among slaves or free blacks. 17
After the Civil War, the southern states were forced to revise their
statutes to acknowledge the new status of their former slave population.
Accordingly, in 1866 the Georgia legislature redrafted many of its laws,
including the slave revolt provisions. Specific references to slaves were
deleted from the text of these laws, but the concept of insurrection
remained central. Insurrection was defined as combined resistance to the
lawful authority of the state. The Georgia Penal Code was then amended
to read that any "attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to
join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State, shall
constitute an attempt to incite insurrection.""1 8 Unless a jury recommended mercy, the statutory punishment for insuriection or attempted
insurrection was death." 9 The revised statute set no specific punishment
for an attempt to incite insurrection (the crime of which Angelo Herndon
was accused many years later); presumably, the legislature thought that
an attempt to incite insurrection would fall within the language of the
amended code. The state legislature also changed the accompanying section of the code dealing with insurrectionary texts, substituting a five- to
twenty-year prison term for capital punishment. 2 0
There were two recorded prosecutions under the Georgia insurrection laws between 1866 and 1932. The first took place in 1868. John T.
Gibson, described in the record as a preacher and a "free person of
color,"' 12 1 was charged with inciting 100 blacks to break into a Georgia
jail to rescue a local black man being held there. Under Gibson's alleged
direction, armed blacks attempted to enter the jail but retreated after a
guard fired a shot into the crowd. No other violence followed. Gibson
was sentenced to death following his conviction for attempting to incite
22

insurrection. 1
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 21.

Id.
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In 1869, Gibson's attorneys appealed his conviction to the Georgia
Supreme Court. They argued that the state's penal code failed to
expressly include attempts to incite insurrection, as distinguished from
insurrection itself and attempted insurrection. 123 The court found for the
defense and ordered Gibson's release, reasoning that the rule that
required strict construction of penal statutes rendered the Gibson conviction void because the statute had not specifically included attempts to
incite insurrection. 124 The opinion called the attention of the legislature
to the omission and expressed a hope that this defect would be cured.12
The Georgia legislature obliged in 1871, making an attempt to incite
insurrection a capital crime. The statute remained unused for nearly
sixty years, until Fulton County authorities turned to it in the early
1930s.
The second recorded use of Georgia's insurrection laws came in the
case of the "Atlanta Six." The Atlanta Six were four men and two
women, all members of the CPUSA, who were accused of attempting to
incite insurrection and circulating insurrectionary literature.1 26 It was
clear from the beginning that the prosecution of the Atlanta Six was
based on the group's political ideology and not on any alleged criminal
acts. 127 Through the efforts of Walter Wilson, a member of the ACLU,
several state newspapers published a statement during the summer of
1930, signed by sixty-one prominent Georgians, condemning the political
prosecution of the Atlanta Six.' 28 Although the statement did not go so
far as to endorse Communism, it did argue that members of the CPUSA,
like all Americans, should 29be protected in their constitutional rights of
free speech and assembly.'
2.

War of Words

William L. Patterson, the black secretary of the International Labor
Defense (the CPUSA's equivalent of today's NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund), arrived in Atlanta shortly after Herndon's arrest to
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 22.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 22-24. Among the group of white Southerners who were briefly involved in this
effort was C. Vann Woodward. Woodward, then a young English instructor at Georgia Tech, would
pay for his activity: He was one of a number of professors subsequently terminated by Georgia Tech
in an alleged austerity move. Id. at 78 n.45.
129. The charges against the Atlanta Six were dropped in 1939, two years after the U.S.
Supreme Court found Angelo Herndon's conviction unconstitutional. Id. at 212.
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organize Hemdon's legal defense. Patterson promptly denounced the
case as a "frame-up" and charged that almost "every bit of [the] so-called
'Red' literature found in [Hemdon's] room after this arrest may be found
in books, magazines and pamphlets at the public library. Why not arrest
the librarian?"' 3 0 John H. Hudson, the prosecutor who later argued the
state's case against Hemdon, had already made Fulton County's position
toward the young black radical, and others like him, emphatically clear.
"You well know that this country cannot survive if people are allowed to
go from one end to another of this country preaching, teaching, and
working for its destruction," Hudson warned. "The Communists must be
put down or civilization will fail."''
These remarks were the opening shots in a rhetorical battle that was
to escalate rapidly in the months before Hemdon's trial, in early January
1933. Viewed in the context in which it was fought, this war of words for
control over the political interpretation of the Angelo Hemdon case was
not at all surprising. At the time, there were mounting racial tensions in
Atlanta; growing discontent among the city's unemployed in the worst
year of the longest, deepest economic depression in modem American
history; a perceived need among those in power to crush any and all signs
of political insurgency among poor white and black communities; and a
single-minded determination on the part of the CPUSA and the International Labor Defense to make the Angelo Hemdon case a symbol of
racial injustice in America. All this, together with the fact that the arrest
and conviction of Angelo Hemdon followed closely upon the success of
the Unemployment Council's June 1932 demonstration, made for a clas32
sic "political" trial.1

A publication from the period shows the degree to which the intertwined issues of race, radical politics, and political repression had come
to occupy an important place in mainstream political discourse in
America. The Crisis, a publication of the NAACP, "ask[ed] fourteen
editors of leading black newspapers their opinion of Communism"' 133 and
printed their responses in its April and May issues. The editor of a
Maryland newspaper, The Afro-American, wrote, "The Communists
130. MARTIN, supra note 91, at II (quoting DAILY WORKER, Aug. 3, 1932).
131. Id at 26 (quoting ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Mar. 23, 1932).
132. For notable attempts at a theory of the concept of "political" trials, see THEODORE
BECKER, POLITICAL TRIALS (1971); Orro KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE (1961). Although I
have found both works to be illuminating explorations of the political uses of law, neither explicitly
takes up the question of the discursive politics that is the focus of my analysis here.

133.

HERBERT APTHEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE

UNITED STATES 700 (1973).
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appear to be the only party going our way. They are as radical as the
N.A.A.C.P. were [sic] twenty years ago. Since the abolitionists passed
off the scene, no white group of national prominence has openly advo' 13 4
cated the economic, political and social equality of the black folks."
Although the editor of Virginia's Norfolk Journaland Guide did not
think Communism offered "the way out for the Negro which shall be
most beneficial and lasting in the long run," he predicted that the
CPUSA would continue to gain adherents in the black community
because "traditional American conditions with their race prejudice, economic semi-enslavement, lack of equal opportunity, and discrimination
of all sorts have made the Negro susceptible to any doctrine which
promises a brighter future, where race and color will not be a penalty."' 3 5 The editor of the New York Amsterdam News noted that
"[s]ince America's twelve million Negro population is so largely identified with the working class, the wonder is not that the Negro is beginning, at least, to think along Communistic lines, but that he did not
embrace that doctrine en masse long ago." 136 The editor of the Philadelphia Tribune argued that while
[t]houghtful Negroes may reason that the philosophy and economic
theories of Communism are unsound and will not obtain for them a
more equitable distribution of the products of their labor, or a larger
degree of justice ... a drowning man will grab at a straw. When it is
considered that equality is the theory of Communism, and that inequality is the result of the present system, it is amazing that millions of
Negroes have not joined the followers of the red flag, instead of a few
thousands. 137
The editor of the Atlanta World argued that "the Negro as a whole fears
Communism-probably because white America has not accepted it.
Some frankly believe Red promises would be forgotten were they in
power, for aren't they white men too? '1 3 s The editor did admit, however, that if "enough of us would go Red," 12 million black Communists
"would be too big a group to deal with by force."13' 9 Ten years before,
such openly positive views on the Communist Party from leading figures
in the black establishment press would have been unthinkable. 14
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
cern on

Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 706-07.
Black Americans' widely held sympathy for the American left was a cause of official conthe national as well as the local level. For a history of congressional investigations into the
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The year 1932 also saw the publication of Georgia Nigger, a thinly

fictionalized account of life in a Georgia prison camp, written by a white
journalist named John Spivak. "' Spivak had been given permission from

the state prison commissioner to tour the Georgia convict camps in preparation for a "study" of the state's penal system. Spivak's study turned
out to be a scathing expos6 of the state's brutal prison system, complete

with powerful documentary photographs. Although Spivak took care to
note that "Georgia does not stand alone as a state lost to fundamental
justice and humanity," '4 2 this did little to mollify state officials when
they learned that a resolution had been introduced in the U.S. Senate

calling for an immediate and thorough investigation of the charges Spivak had made. 43 Although GeorgiaNigger never directly addressed the
political ramifications of a penal system dominated by a largely black
population, the CPUSA and the International Labor Defense took full
advantage of the propaganda value of Spivak's book and used its image

of racial injustice to bring the Angelo Herndon case into the national
political consciousness.'"
influence of Communists on the African-American community during this period, see Delacy Wendell Sanford, Jr., Congressional Investigation of Black Communism (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York (Stony Brook)).
141. JOHN SPIVAK, GEORGIA NIGGER (1932). For a discussion of Spivak's work in the context
of the larger documentary movement of which it was a part, see WILLIAM STOTT, DOCUMENTARY
EXPRESSION AND THIRTIES AMERICA (1973).
142. SPIVAK, supra note 141, at ii.
143. Id.
144. One of the most popular films released that year was Warner Brothers' I AM A FUGITIVE
FROM A CHAIN GANG. (Warner Brothers 1932.) The film, which starred Paul Muni, was based on
white author Robert E.Burns' national best-seller. ROBERT E. BURNS, I AM A FUGITIVE FROM A
GEORGIA CHAIN GANG! (1932). Some years before, Burns had been sentenced to 6-10 years' labor
on a chain gang for his participation in a grocery store holdup. Like Burns, the hero of the film is a
veteran of the Great War who, seeking freedom from the regimentation of factory life, ends up on a
chain gang. He escapes to Chicago, where under an assumed name he establishes a reputation as a
civil engineer and becomes "one of the city's most respected citizens." When lie threatens to leave a
marriage into which he has been blackmailed by a woman who has discovered his past, he is
betrayed and returns (voluntarily) to the state in which he had been imprisoned, on the condition
that he will be pardoned after 90 days. However, because he has caused a scandal by exposing the
brutalities of life on the chain gang, the State reneges on its promise, and he is condemned to serve
out his sentence. He escapes a second time, and at the end of the film he disappears into the night
after a brief rendezvous with the only woman he has ever loved. Among the episodes in the film
most relevant to us are a scene from the hero's first stint on the chain gang, during which a white
convict sees a black convict bust rock and exclaims to the hero, "Look at that big buck swing that
sledge! He never misses. You lay down a nickel and they'd knock the buffalo's right eye out of it.
They like his work so much they're gonna keep him here the rest of his life"; a scene in which the
woman for whom he longs replies to his question about whether she's free for the evening with the
words, "I'm free, white, and 21"; and a montage toward the end of the film, after the hero has
returned to the prison camp, in which the soundtrack plays the strains of black men singing work
songs on the chain gang. Predictably, there is only one black character with a speaking role in this
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3. Race, Radicalism, and Rights
Such was the complex political backdrop against which the trial of
Angelo Herndon took place. Although the trial lasted a mere three days,
during its course issues were raised and argued that went far beyond the
technical legal question of whether Herndon was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempting to incite insurrection. These issues opened onto
the whole history of the black experience in the American South: the
exclusion of blacks from petit and grand juries in Georgia; the treatment
of black prisoners in Georgia jails; the long-standing taboo against black
lawyers arguing cases as politically charged as Herndon's; the ideology of
southern law and order (laid bare when death threats were made against
Herndon, his attorneys, and anyone else who was bold enough to publicly support or participate in the effort to build a defense movement
around the case); the myth of white supremacy, which trumpeted the
racial superiority of even the poorest, most illiterate white worker and
demonized the class-color alliance of the Unemployed Council as an
offense against God and nature; and the meaning of the Marxist theory of
revolution generally and the theoretical platform of the CPUSA in particular. By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, these
explosive issues of race, class, and radicalism would be submerged from
view. At the trial stage, however, each of these issues provided a site of
fierce ideological contestation.
It was the issue of race, though, that served as the most potent conductor for white Georgians' fear of Angelo Herndon and what they took
him to represent. Two characteristic passages from the trial record provide an index of the centrality of racial ideology in the Herndon case.
One hotly contested question had to do with how Herndon's race
would be referred to during the trial proceedings. At one point, T.J.
Stephens, an assistant in the Fulton County Solicitor General's Office
and the prosecution's main witness, referred to Herndon as "this
darkey." The following exchange ensued between Lee B. Wyatt, the trial
court judge, and Ben Davis, the black lawyer and recent Harvard Law
School graduate who represented Herndon:
Attorney Davis: Mr. Stephens refers to the defendant as "darkey."
Your Honor, we wish to remind the prosecution if they insist on using
such opprobrious terms to the defendant, we will have to ask for a
mistrial, because it is prejudicial to our case.
otherwise hard-hitting cinematic expos6 of a system that bore down disproportionately on the African-Americans it ensnared. In contrast, it is interesting to note that the Georgia Nigger photographs
Spivak took during his tour of the state's prison camps are exclusively of black convicts.
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The Court: I don't know whether it is or not; but suppose you refer to
him as the defendant.
Witness: Your honor, I wish to state that "negro" is the name this man
referred to his race by in his conversation with me-these are captious
objections.
Attorney Davis: But he says "darkey."
The'Court: Well, refer to him as the defendant then.
Witness: I will refer to him as "negro" which is better; he gave the
name of Alonzo Herndon-Angelo Hemdon; he is the darkey with the
glasses on. . .145
A second heated exchange took place during the prosecution's
cross-examination of T.J. Corley, an assistant professor of economics at
Emory University whom the defense sought to have qualified as an
expert witness on the Marxist theory of the state. 146 The subject under
exploration was the "Black Belt" doctrine of the CPUSA, which called
for black self-determination and political control over areas of the South
in which African-Americans constituted a majority.'

47

After trying

unsuccessfully to paint the witness as a Communist sympathizer, if not
an outright member of the CPUSA, 141 the prosecution introduced a
motif that it was to play upon throughout the trial.
Q. "Equal rights for the negroes; self-determination in the black
belt"; you're able to tell us what that means, aren't you, Doctor?
A. No sir. I did not testify that I understand the planks in the communist platform, I said I was familiar with the party platform. As to
whether I will now swear that I understand it, the question which you
raise, I should say, is a question of opinion and not of fact, there are
some questions of opinion, I could give you my opinion of what it
means. As to whether it takes an opinion to tell the court and jury the
ordinary Decatur Street meaning of self-determination, I think it is a
matter of opinion, there are several techniques by which self-determination might be expressed, for instance, there might be a plebiscite
vote, or there might be an election for representatives to a body-there
are a number of ways in which self-determination would assert itself,
and I think it is a matter of opinion. I have not read this little pamphlet entitled The Communist Positionon the Negro Question. I would
145.
146.

Transcript, supra note 45, at 60-61.
Id.

147. On the "Black Belt" thesis, see JAMES FORMAN, SELF-DETERMINATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN PEOPLE (1984);
HARRY HAYWOOD, NEGRO LIBERATION (1948); NELSON PERRY, THE NEGRO NATIONAL COLONIAL QUESTION (1972); LEON TROTSKY ON BLACK NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION,

supra note 72.
148. Transcript, supra note 45, at 34.
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be glad to give the court and jury my understanding of the expression
"Equal Rights for Negroes," the meaning of the phrase, as I see it, it is
these: These rights are equal rights, are equal rights under the law.
Q. You understand that to mean the right of a colored boy to marry
your daughter, if you have one?
Attorney Davis: We object to that question on the ground that it is
irrelevant and immaterial and calls for a conclusion of the witness.
The Court: He has him on cross-examination and that's a part of the
language in the platform.
Attorney Davis: There is nothing whatever in the platform about
intermarriage.
The Court: The same quotation he is reading there is in the platform,
as I understand.
Attorney Davis: You overrule my objection, Your Honor?
The Court: I overrule the objection; go ahead.
A. A negro doesn't happen to have the right to marry my daughter,
under the laws of this State. I don't know how many States there are
in the Union where they do have that right.
Q. Did you know there are twenty States in the United States where
the two races can intermarry?
A. No, I didn't know that, I knew there was a number, I didn't know
how many.
Attorney Davis: I don't see what that has to do with this particular
case, Your Honor, we object to it as irrelevant and immaterial.
The Court: He has the witness on cross-examination, and he has testified that he knows what that phrase means, and he has a right to determine how much he knows about it, on cross-examination-it isn't his
witness. 149

From our contemporary perspective, it is tempting to laugh at these
dialogues, which seem at times to parody themselves. But a proper historical reading of the trial record must remain mindful of the fact that
these comic exchanges might well have had a tragic, deadly denouement:
Herndon's life hung in the balance. If we viewed Herndon v. Georgia
through the optic of an institutionally oriented constitutional history, we
might well be tempted to discount these portions of the trial record on
the ground that they have no bearing on the way the procedural and
substantive issues raised by the case were discussed before the Supreme
Court. As I shall argue presently, however, when viewed through the
lens of popular memory, these apparently marginal moments from the
Herndon trial record present cultural images and arguments the impact
of which was decisive to the outcome of the Herndon prosecution.
149.

Id. at 80-81.
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My interest at this juncture is in the content of these interrogative
exchanges. These questions and answers, and the ensuing verbal volleys
between the prosecution and defense counsel, carry a twofold significance. First and most obviously, they indicate that the legal issues raised
in the Herndon prosecution were immediately translated into questions
of race and cultural power. The cultural meanings attached to the fact
that Herndon was black quickly and definitively eclipsed the issues of
free speech and radical politics raised by the case, quite literally coloring
each and every aspect of the trial proceeding. A second and more complicated issue is the degree to which the Herndon case was invested with

a sexual dimension. The intersected histories of race and sex in America
tell an unseemly story beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nonetheless, some attention to the ideology of "sexual racism"' 50 is indispensable in order to understand the precise cultural inflections of the Angelo
Herndon case. This is so because "at the core of the heart of the race
' 51
problem is the sex problem."
One prominent and recurrent theme in the black American experience is whites' defensive resort to sexual mythology as a source of ideological resistance to demands for racial justice. The ideology of white
supremacy has rarely failed to find a dark and dangerous sexual motive
behind the assertion of black political and civil rights. This almost reflex-

ive ascription of sexual meanings to black political militancy is surely one
of the most constant and curious features of our national history. In this
respect, the Hemdon trial record provides a historical case study of the

effects of sexual racism on the administration of law generally and the
150. I take this term from

CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM (1976).
151. Id. at ix (quoting James Weldon Johnson). Joel Kovel has described the psychosexual
roots of white racism in the following terms:
In the classic South-and, as the fantasies generated there were diffused, throughout
America-the sex fantasy has been incorporated into the white assumption of superiority
and the demand for black submission. Whenever a black man bowed and scraped, whenever a white man called a black man "boy," or in other ways infantalized him, just below
the surface of the white man's consciousness, a sexual fantasy would be found yoked to the
symbol of power and status. These sex fantasies erupted whenever the power relationships
were threatened. In the colonies, the slightest rumor of a slave revolt was accompanied by
wild stories of blacks wreaking their ultimate revenge in wholesale rape of white women.
Nor should anyone think that, below the surface of reasonable concern, the fears aroused
in whites by the current black rebellion are different. The specter of omnipotent black
sexuality has obsessed whites from their first glimpse of an African until this very day.
JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 68 (1970). For another overview of this history,
see CALVIN C. HERNTON, SEX AND RACISM IN AMERICA (1965). The most publicized recent chapter in the history of the vexed relationship between sexuality and race in American political culture
is the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the charges of sexual harassment leveled at Clarence
Thomas. For a treatment of these issues, see Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit,in RACE-ING JUSTICE,'
EN-GENDERING POWER

364 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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protection of black political speech in particular.1 52 From the outset, the
legal and political issues raised by the Herndon case were distorted by
the sexual fears and fantasies projected onto Herndon by a cultural
mentality in which power and dominance were shot through with passion and desire. For the men who controlled the government of Fulton
County, the most effective way to control, if not crush, the emerging
political discontent that Herndon and the local CPUSA had successfully
tapped was to evoke the racist mythologies of rapacious black male
sexuality.
The language I have quoted from the Herndon trial record thus provides a vivid textual instance of how deeply the cultural norms, practices,
and protocols of the racially stratified society in which Herndon lived
were inscribed in the workings of the law. At base, the legal question of
Herndon's guilt or innocence could not be separated from either the cultural meanings attached to the idea of race or from the political relations
of white supremacy and black subordination of which those cultural
meanings were both a cause and consequence. Once drawn, the connection between race and radicalism meant that contested notions of cultural identity and ideology would constitute the chief terms in which the
legal questions raised in the Herndon case would be described, discussed,
debated, and decided during the trial proceedings. No one doubted that
the outcome of the case would thus depend as much, if not more, on who
Herndon was as on what he had done.
Prosecutor Hudson sought to make the perceived threat that
Herndon posed to the local racial order the pivotal issue in the case. He
made every effort during the trial to ensure that the racial implications of
the events leading up to Herndon's arrest would be brought to the attention of the all-white jury. As the passages from the trial record indicate,
the prosecution lost no opportunity to exploit the symbolism of
Herndon's race. During the course of the proceedings, the language of
race was used both to degrade Herndon (as in the dispute about what to
call him) and to demonize him (as in the exchanges about the CPUSA
position on interracial marriage). Given the prosecution's mobilization
of racial meanings and metaphor, Herndon's lawyer had to choose
between two equally untenable options. Benjamin Davis could either
152.

For an example from the modem civil rights period, see DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING

THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFER-

94 (1986). During the trial of several whites who had been accused of bombings during the
Montgomery bus boycott, Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the Montgomery Improvement
Association, was asked, among other things, whether he had ever been sexually intimate with a
ENCE

white woman.
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admit that Herndon's race was in fact a central issue in the case and
respond directly to the prosecution's race baiting, or he could downplay
the racial aspects of the case and address the issue only when the racist
tactics of the prosecution forced him to do so. He took the latter, defensive posture.
Davis' defense of Angelo Herndon had two components. First,
Davis tried to establish the technical insufficiency of the evidence introduced by the prosecution. During his cross-examination of Stephens, the
assistant solicitor general, Davis successfully pressed the prosecution's
key witness to admit that he had no personal knowledge of "any of the
acts that have been alleged to be committed in the indictment by the
defendant."1'53 In addition to Professor T.J. Corley, whose cross-examination allowed the prosecution to raise the specter of interracial marriage, Davis called Mercer G. Evans, a professor of economics at Emory
University. Although Judge Wyatt refused to qualify Evans as an expert
witness," 4 Davis did use Evans' testimony to show that the same Marxist literature found in Herndon's possession could be read at the Emory
University library. 5 5
The second component of Herndon's defense was more straightforwardly political. The prosecution had sought to shape the meaning of
the events leading to Herndon's arrest by resorting to racial rhetoric.
Davis sought to transcend the issue of race by depicting the charges
against Herndon as a campaign against the working class. This counterstrategy became clear when Angelo Herndon took the stand in his own
behalf. Under Georgia criminal procedure, a defendant could make only
an unsworn statement. This statement was not subject to questions by
either prosecution or defense lawyers; it was a direct address from the
defendant to a jury made up of his peers (in this case, Herndon's "peers"
were all white)., 6 Herndon began by describing the closing of Fulton
County relief agencies in June 1932 and explained the purpose behind the
public rally that was organized by the Unemployed Council a few days
after the termination of relief was announced.1 5 7 He stressed the power
and potential of a class coalition such as that symbolized by the biracial
demonstration at the Fulton County courthouse, ending his statement
with a prediction that the alliance between poor whites and blacks forged
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Transcript, supra note 45, at 64.
MARTIN, supra note 91, at 50.
Transcript, supra note 45, at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
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by the Unemployed Council would not be destroyed by silencing its

leaders.
The capitalist class teaches race hatred to Negro and white workers
and keeps it going all the time, tit for tat, the white worker running
after the Negro worker and the Negro worker running after the white
worker, and the capitalist becomes the exploiter and robber of them
both.... It is in the interest of the capitalist to play one race against
the other, so greater profits can be realized from the working people of
all races.... [A]t the present time there are millions of workers in the
United States without work, and the capitalist class, the state government, city government and all other governments, have taken no steps
to provide relief for those unemployed. And it seems that this question
is left up to the Negro and white workers to solve, and they will solve it
by organizing and demanding the right to live, a right that they are
entitled to some of the things that they have produced. Not only are
they entitled to such things, but it is their right to demand them.
When the State of Georgia and the City of Atlanta raised the question
of inciting to insurrection and attempting to incite insurrection, or
attempting to overthrow the government, all I can say is, that no matter what you do with the Angelo Herndons in the future, this question
of unemployment, the question of unity between Negro and white
workers cannot be solved with hands that are stained with the blood of
an innocent individual.
You may send me to my death, as far as I know. I expect you to
do that anyway, so that's beside the point. But no one can deny these
facts.158
One student of the case has suggested that Herndon's "undiplomatic
and inexpedient speech, with its simplistic Marxist interpretations, did
little to aid his cause." 159 As one reporter who covered the case wrote,
Herndon had "really talked himself into jail. It seemed to me that he
wanted to make a martyr of himself, and he did."16 ° These observations
are undoubtedly true. The position Herndon took in his courtroom
address to "the unseen jury of the working class the world over" 16 1 provides ample evidence of his willingness to be enlisted as a "sacrificial
158.
159.

160.
161.

Id. at 76-78.
MARTIN, supra note 91, at 53-54.
Id. at 54 (quoting JAMEs H. STREET, LOOK AWAY!: A DIXIE NOTEBOOK 149 (1936)).
ELIZABETH LAWSON, TWENTY YEARS ON THE CHAIN GANG? 8 (1935).

2644

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2599

goat" (to use the words of W.E.B. Du Bois)' 6 2 on the altar of international Communism. The immediate goal, however, was clear: Herndon
hoped to awaken the class consciousness of the jurors.
The closing statements continued the strategies that the prosecution
and defense had followed throughout the trial. The prosecutor predictably played on the jurors' racial solidarity, arguing that they were duty
bound as white men to crush Herndon's plan to "attack homes, take our
property, rape our women, and murder our children." '63 The final
words of Herndon's attorney to the jury were that anything short of
Herndon's acquittal would be "making a scrap of paper out of the Bill of
Rights, the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia.""' Taking Herndon's lead, however, he spent the greater portion of
his summary of the evidence trying to discredit Hudson's use of the race
card as a cynical diversion from the real issues in the case. Davis accused
the prosecution of seeking to "conjure up" the "basest passion of race
prejudice"' 6 5 in thejury. He appealed to the jurors not to let the prosecution's racist tactics blind them to the class interests that they shared
with Herndon:
Gentlemen of the Jury, just as starvation, want and suffering knows
[sic] no color or race line, neither does injustice and exploitation.
What happens to Herndon today as you ponder his fate in the jury
room is going to determine what is going to happen to you when the
sharp pains of hunger166tug at the helpless emaciated forms of your
loved ones tomorrow.
By the time the case went to the jury, the ideological battle lines between
defense and prosecution could not have been more starkly drawn: At
base, the choice between the two competing characterizations of
Herndon's political activities would turn on the jurors' choice between
competing claims of class and color.
Although Judge Wyatt had not hidden his hostility toward Herndon
during the trial, his instructions to the jury were remarkably restrained
and, from Herndon's perspective, generally favorable. Wyatt's charge to
the jury was based on a much more generous interpretation of section 56
than the interpretation placed on it when the case was appealed to the
162. W.E.B. Du Bois, W.E.B. Du Bois 92 (William M. Tuttle ed., 1972), quoted in Bernard
Boxill, The Race-Class Questions, in PHILOSOPHY BORN OF STRUGGLE 107 (Leonard Harris ed.,
1983).
163. MARTIN, supra note 91, at 60.
164. HERNDON, supra note 27, at 354.
165. Id. at 353.
166. Id.
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Georgia Supreme Court. After reminding the jury that Herndon was
entitled to a legal presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,1 67 Judge Wyatt went on to read the indictment. He
noted that mere advocacy of insurrection, "however reprehensible morally,")168 would not warrant a guilty verdict unless the State had met its
burden of proving that the advocacy was intended to be acted upon
immediately: "In order to convict the defendant, gentlemen, it must
appear clearly by the evidence that immediate serious violence against
the State of Georgia was to be expected or was advocated." 169 Judge
Wyatt added that "the mere possession of radical literature ...alone is
not sufficient to constitute the crime of attempting to incite insurrection."' 170 After admonishing the jury that the "object of all legal investigations is the discovery of the truth,"17 the judge sent the twelve white
men off to decide the fate of Angelo Herndon.
After deliberating just two hours, the jury returned to announce its
verdict. It found Angelo Herndon guilty of attempting to incite insurrection but also "recommended" that the state grant him "mercy," as the
jury had the power statutorily to do.'7 2 This meant that instead of being
sentenced to die, Angelo Herndon would be condemned to eighteen to
twenty years 73 of what John Spivak had described in Georgia Nigger as
the living death of a chain gang.
A review of the record leaves little doubt that the prosecution of
Angelo Herndon was a classic political trial. Politics figured in the
Herndon case in at least two discrete senses. First, the Herndon trial can
be called political because of the nature of the formal charges against
him. As the language of the Georgia Penal Code and the indictment
made clear, the attempt to incite insurrection was deemed a political
crime against the "lawful authority of the State of Georgia." 174
However, the Herndon prosecution discloses a second political
aspect that is best understood in cultural rather than legal terms. Attention to the language used at Herndon's trial indicates the degree to which
the courtroom struggle over the legality of Herndon's political activities
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

MARTIN, supra note 91, at 60.
Transcript, supra note 45, at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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took place within a larger field of cultural contestation over racial mean-

ings. It is not simply that the ideological disputes over race and culture
that took place during the Herndon trial were intimately linked to ideo-

logical arguments about the legal control of political dissent. Rather, the
legal debates at the Herndon trial about the competing claims of state
power and individual rights were at the same time debates about the cultural politics-and the political culture-of white racism. To state the
point in slightly different terms, it was in the language of race that the
courtroom clashes about the proper legal interpretation of Herndon's
CPUSA activities found their most potent "cultural signifiers," to use a
term of G. Edward White: 7 ' Racial rhetoric inscribed itself alongside
and within legal argument. The language of race served as an instrument
and a symbol of cultural contention over radical politics and state
76
power. 1
When the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to review the constitutional issues raised by the Angelo Herndon case, its response betrayed no
sign that this had been what one contemporary observer termed "one of
1 77
the most spectacular trials in the annals of Fulton Superior Court.'
By that time, the heated disputes over race, culture, and power that had
figured so prominently at the trial had apparently disappeared without a
trace. With the passage of time and the change of judicial venue, the
political passions and prejudices that had led to the trial and conviction
175. G. EDWARD WHITE,THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 4
(1988) (arguing that cultural signifiers are "words intended to convey a bundle of associations and
thereby to invoke an appeal to values perceived to be of great importance in the culture").
176. My discussion thus far has consistently connected race and culture. Implicit in this connection is a view that I have until now declined to make explicit. I understand and use the term
"race" here to refer to a cultural category, not a biological fact. To put the point in slightly different
terms, the concept of race "is an ideological construct and thus, above all, a historical product."
Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in REGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD 150 (J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982). In emphasizing the ideological and historical character of race, however, I by no

means intend to suggest that this cultural category is not real. This is not merely because racial
ideology is "the embodiment in thought of real social relations," id. at 151; racial ideology is real
also because it has a material location and a weight. The reality of race can be detected in the ways
this ideology inscribes itself on bodies, carves up space, and allocates and sustains social power. An
adequate account of the Angelo Herndon case is impossible if we do not attend to the culture of race,
because racial motives and meanings were an independent determinate force in the case from its
inception. The cultural and ideological significance ascribed to Herndon because of the color of his
skin is no less fundamental to an explanation of the case than the character of his politics. I do not
believe that the First Amendment issues in the case exhaust its constitutional significance.
Herndon's arrest, indictment, prosecution, and conviction-and, more crucially, the language by
which the State's response to Herndon was both justified and challenged-simply cannot be understood apart from the cultural and constitutional politics of race during the 1930s.
177. MARTIN, supra note 91, at 61.
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of Angelo Herndon were obscured, though not utterly erased, by the cool
logic and language of the law.
I shall discuss presently how the restricted rhetorical range of the
Court's opinion in Herndon v. Georgia allowed it to ignore the concrete
political and cultural context of the constitutional issues presented by the
case and thus to read race right out of the Herndon record. Before I do
so, however, I want to show how a similar textual strategy has governed
interpretation of the Herndon case in the courts of constitutional history.
III. THE COURT OF HISTORY:
HERNDON AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORIANS
A rationale of history is the first step whereby the dispossessed repossess the world.
17 8
Kenneth Burke
A.

HERNDON AND THE ESCAPE FROM HISTORY

179

This section considers the fate of the Angelo Herndon case in American constitutional historiography. My intention in what follows is not
to offer an exhaustive descriptive account and analysis of mainstream
American legal scholarship on the case. Rather, my goals are decidedly
selective and critical. I want to review three typical historical views of
the Angelo Herndon case, developed in the work of Wallace Mendelson, 1 80 Paul Murphy, 8 1 and David Currie.' 82 More precisely, I want to
advance an argument about the rhetorical forms in which these interpretations are cast. I begin with a brief description of the main outlines of
what each of these authors has to say about the Angelo Herndon case.
178. KENNETH BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY 315 (1937).
179. I play here on Lawrence Friedman's claim that before 1950, legal history "was history that
tried to escape from history." Lawrence Friedman, American Legal History:Past and Present,34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 563, 564 (1984).
180. Wallace Mendelson, Clear and PresentDanger-FromSchenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 313 (1952).
181. MURPHY, supra note 7.
182. Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33.
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1. Herndon and the History of an Ideal
In an article entitled Clear and Present Danger-FromSchenck to
Dennis, 8 3 Wallace Mendelson traces the evolution of the clear and present danger doctrine from its initial use by Justice Holmes. 84 Although
Mendelson concedes that the doctrine "has embodied a deeply democratic instinct favoring the free expression of ideas,"' 85 he suggests that it
"has been more significant as a pervasive atmospheric pressure, than as a
reliable standard for the decision of a specific case or as a rationale for a
line of cases."' 8 6 The burden of the article is to show how and why clear
and present danger has remained more of a "great ideal" than an effective "guide to decision." '8 7
Mendelson's main reference to the Angelo Herndon case appears in
a brief discussion of the use of the clear and present danger doctrine
between 1930 and 1940. According to Mendelson, the "decade of the
thirties far surpasses all prior decades in the number of Supreme Court
decisions vindicating civil liberties."' 8 8 And yet, he observes, "[t]he danger rule... was mentioned only twice-once as an oblique underpinning
for the Court's position and once in a dissent by Mr. Justice Cardozo."' 8 9
Both references (we find in Mendelson's footnotes) involve judgments by
the Court on the issues raised in the Angelo Herndon case.190
In charting the fortunes of the clear and present danger test during
the 1930s, Mendelson aims to paint a picture in which the Hughes Court,
unlike its predecessors, courageously assumed the role of guardian and
protector against efforts by state and federal authorities to make inroads
on the freedom of expression guaranteed under the First Amendment.
"The chiefjusticeship of Mr. Hughes;" writes Mendelson, "clearly marks
a new dispensation."'' He concludes that the primary contribution of
183.
184.

Mendelson, supra note 180.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919).

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Mendelson, supra note 180, at 313.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 317.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 317 & nn.20 (citing Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)), 21 (citing Herndon v.

Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935)). Note that Mendelson gives citational pride of place to Herndon v.
Lowry, even though it followed the adverse decision in Herndon v. Georgia by some two years. Note
too that Mendelson does no more than cite the two decisions, even though they marked the only
instances during the entire tenure of the Hughes Court in which the loctrine that is his subject
figured in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
191. Id. at 317.
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the Hughes Court is that it kept Holmes' "great ideal"1 92 alive (albeit
"obliquely") until it could be "revived by a virtually unanimous
Court" 193 in the next decade.
2.

Herndon and the History of an Agenda

Another discussion of the history of the Herndon case is found in
Paul Murphy's The Constitutionin Crisis Times, 1918-1969.194 For Murphy, the Herndon case is most profitably understood as a product of a
decisive ideological shift on the Supreme Court. Under Murphy's interpretation, the social and economic dislocation of the Depression engendered a corresponding crisis in predominant conceptions of the nature of
the judicial function in particular and the relationship of law to society in
general.' 95
For Murphy, Herndon must be set against the backdrop of this fundamental ideological transformation. Murphy thinks of the First
Amendment decisions of the Hughes Court as part of "a new judicial
campaign that sought to undermine irresponsible state or state-sanctioned action."' 196 These decisions reflected the Supreme Court's acceptance of the increasingly influential idea advanced by the legal realists that
government "had an obligation to eliminate legal strictures that prevented the constructive use of personal liberty."' 197 In Murphy's reading,
however, the Herndon case also demonstrated that the Court's new commitment to the protection of individual freedom did not represent a complete break with old understandings. For Murphy, the clearest evidence
of this underlying continuity is the fact that the Court did not rush to
judgment in the Herndon case:
The Court, on the other hand, clearly had no intention of upholding
every vague challenge to local authority simply because local citizens
felt that their rights were in one way or another being abrogated. It
rejected, in 1935, the plea of a Negro Communist organizer in Georgia
that an ancient insurrection statute under which he had been arrested
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Its denial was based on the
fact that he failed to specify which rights were being violated. Only
when, in subsequent appeal, specific charges of free speech violation
were leveled did the justices consider the issue. Then, speaking
192. Id. at 333.
193. Id. at 332.
MURPHY, supra note 7.
195. Id. at 99-101, 107-08.
196. Id. at 121.
197. Id. at 119.

194.
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through Justice Roberts, they held that the statute as construed and
applied was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment in that it furnished no sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt and that it interfered unduly with speech and assembly not demonstrably creating a
clear and present danger of the use of force against the state. 193
In Murphy's account, the Court's refusal to disregard its procedural
requirements was an attempt to reconcile its respect for established principles of constitutional federalism with its increased receptivity to First
Amendment claims against the states.
3.

Herndon and the History of an Institution

A third and more recent historical treatment of the Herndon case
appears in David Currie's The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil
Rights andLiberties, 1930-1941.199 Like Mendelson and Murphy, Currie
characterizes the 1930s as a period in which the decisions of the Court
evidenced its increasing inclination "toward stricter scrutiny of punishment for allegedly subversive expression." 2"
Of the Court's three considerations of the Herndon case, Currie
mentions only Herndon v. Lowry.20 1 Herndon v. Lowry stands out
because it is the "least revolutionary ' 20 2 of the Court's three main decisions regarding the federal constitutional protection against state invasions of civil liberties.2 °3 In Currie's analysis, the constitutional
significance of Herndon v. Lowry lies in the fact that it evinced the
Court's willingness to examine and assess the nature of the evidence on
which a challenged conviction for subversive speech was based. For Curre, the Court's "new spirit of aggressiveness in reviewing ...

judicial

expression ' '2 4

findings affecting
in Herndon v. Lowry was a sign that a
majority of the Court had come to accept the orientation toward First
Amendment analysis that Justices Holmes and Brandeis had staked out
in earlier decades.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
283 U.S.
204.

Id. at 122.
Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33.
Id. at 811.
301 U.S. 242 (1937).
Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33, at 811.
The other two were De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Stromberg v. California,
359 (1931).
Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33, at 813.
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A

We may begin by noting what is perhaps the chief characteristic

common to the three texts I have just reviewed: their resolute refusal to
identify or defend the theoretical premises and program (if any) that
frame their historical interpretations of the Angelo Herndon case. Anyone familiar with the history of the discipline of legal history knows that
this silence is not at all uncommon. In this context, however, such
silence calls for investigation. This is so because it is precisely the common failure of these historical treatments of the Herndon case to make
explicit the intellectual assumptions from which they proceed that permit
Currie, Murphy, and Mendelson to interpret the case, and the Court's
disposition of it, as a free speech victory.
One useful measure of the difficulties that attend our way may be
taken from a recent reflection on the subject of history and theory2 °5 by
one of the nation's preeminent legal historians. "Anglo-American legal
history," writes Morton Horwitz, "has been persistently untheoretical." 2 °6 This is a claim that would no doubt find many adherents both in
and out of the field. The most significant aspect of this statement for our
purposes is the way Horwitz frames the relationship between "history"
and "theory" in legal historiography: "History and theory" evokes an
image of a discipline that fences off historical inquiry and interpretation
in a conceptual field where theory fears to tread.
One of the lessons I take from my reading of these three historical
treatments of the Angelo Herndon case is that the relationship between
theory and history in the work of Anglo-American legal historians is in
fact considerably more complex than Horwitz' formulation would seem
to allow. In suggesting that the line Horwitz draws between the two
concepts is more apparent than real, I do not mean to dispute his observation that legal history has traditionally exhibited a powerful and persistent indifference to the claims of theory.2 °7 Rather, I want to make two
205. Morton Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825 (1987).
206. Id.
207. There are two further points of disagreement between Horwitz' intervention in History and
Theory and the argument I pursue here. My first point goes to Horwitz' views about the role of
theory in the practice of legal history. Horwitz immediately undercuts his initial formulation
regarding the persistently untheoretical nature of Anglo-American historiography with a second and
significantly more cautious claim: "Many of the great legal historians never explicitly addressed the
theoretical issues to which their work was linked." Id. Horwitz is surely correct in saying that
much work in Anglo-American legal history fails to specify clearly the theoretical foundations on
which it rests; but unlike Horwitz' initial characterization, this second, more subtle one suggests that
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very different claims. My first claim is that the evidence probably war-

rants a much more critical argument than Horwitz proffers about the
predominant attitude toward theory among Anglo-American legal his-

torians. It may well be that the persistent absence of explicit attention to
theory in legal history is less a matter of benign untheoretical neglect

than active antitheoretical aversion.
A second, more crucial point is that whatever its precise form, we
should not uncritically interpret the prevailing silence of legal historians
regarding the role of theory in their scholarship as an indication that
their work has no theoretical foundation or carries no theoretical implications. Stated bluntly, what legal historians say (or fail to say) about
the role that theory plays (or does not play) in their work by no means
settles the matter. It is possible to argue-indeed, it is impossible to

deny-that a historical work can ignore, but not annul, its debts to theory. Put another way, we might say that all scholarship in legal history
necessarily offers explicit or implicit answers to theoretical questions
the earlier description of legal history as "persistently untheoretical" is imprecise, if not altogether
incorrect. At the end of his article, Horwitz argues that "all legal structures inevitably embody
normative positions." Id. at 1834 (emphasis added). I believe that what Horwitz maintains here
about legal thought generally is equally true of legal historiography in particular: It is obvious that
the persistent silence of legal historians about the theoretical dimensions of their work does not mean
that they have no theory. I suspect, then, that Horwitz would agree with me that if a legal historian's theoretical premises and purposes are not explicit, it is the task of the critical reader to make
them so. That is the main burden of my discussion in the following pages.
A second problem with Horwitz' analysis is that he fails to make clear that he uses "theory" to
refer to two very different sets of relationships. The two distinct points of convergence between
history and theory that Horwitz wants to explicate (which his title, and the article itself, unnecessarily elide) are between legal history and political and legal theory on the one hand, and between legal
history and the theory of history on the other. The first identifies the connections between "controversies over political and legal theory" and debates within the discipline of legal history. Id. at 1835.
It is this relation to which Horwitz devotes the body of his article, which sets out to demonstrate
"the way in which arguments in legal history serve as proxies for more general controversies in legal
and political theory." Id. at 1827. A second intersection between "theory" and "history" informs
the debate about what Horwitz calls "interpretive issues" in legal history: "whether there is a pattern
of conflict versus consensus, continuity versus discontinuity, and whether the way things are is the
way they had to be." Id. at 1825. Horwitz is right to note that these problems in interpretive theory
"raise questions similar to those in legal and political theory," id.; he may also be correct in his claim
that consideration of these questions by Anglo-American legal historians can be traced to lines of
influence outside the discipline. What Horwitz does not say, however, and what I would stress, is
this: Although one may discern a historical correlation between debates in legal historiography "over
how we arrived at the present and whether there are 'lessons' to be learned from the past," Id. at
1825, and similar disputes in political and legal theory, there is certainly no necessary connection
between the two. Whatever their genealogy, basic epistemological questions of the kind that Horwitz raises about the complex transactions between theory and history ought to engage the attention
of those interested in the historiography of legal thought and institutions, regardless of their presence
or absence as a concern in other fields. As I have already suggested, it should be clear by their very
terms that these questions stand at the heart of the historiographic enterprise.
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about the nature of historical knowledge and its object, the historical
process. Consequently, we must be careful not to overlook the way even
the most flatly empirical historical interpretation includes an account
(albeit covertly) of its theoretical interests and allegiances. We need to
pay close attention to the theoretical infrastructure of historical research
and writing not only for its own sake, but also because this level of the
historical work may well be the silent site of an author's ideological commitments. With this in mind, we are now in a position to identify the
ways in which the historical treatments of the case by Mendelson, Murphy, and Currie silently signify their theoretical, and ultimately their ideological, investments.
These three interpretations of the Angelo Herndon case share a core
conception about the nature of American constitutional history generally
and, more specifically, about the history of First Amendment jurisprudence. Each author sets out to make the case for the 1930s as a period of
exceptionalism in constitutional law that can be set off from the decades
that bracket it. The chief lesson we are to take from each of these
accounts is that the Depression years represent a period of evolutionary
progress in constitutional law, especially in First Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, Currie describes the 1930s as the moment when the
Supreme Court "quietly began to work on the agenda of the future."208
Similarly, Murphy frames his discussion of the case within a vision of an
ideologically transformed Supreme Court, which, unlike its predecessors,
was "determin[ed]" to take "early and resounding" action to use'the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "as a device for guaranteeing personal liberty by striking down laws infringing upon that
20 9
liberty."
It is Mendelson, however, who makes the most forceful claims for a
progressivist interpretation of First Amendment jurisprudence in the
1930s. Recall the terms in which Mendelson introduces his discussion of
the Court's First Amendment decisions during the years that Charles
Evan Hughes served as Chief Justice: "The chief justiceship of Mr.
Hughes clearly marks a new dispensation. 21 The theological resonance
208. Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33, at 800.
209. MURPHY, supra note 7, at 119.
210. Mendelson, supra note 180, at 317 (emphasis added). This position contains the seeds ofits
own deconstruction. The very language of "New Dispensation" connotes a radical rupture, which in
much of this literature is denied by the claim that the Court's jurisprudence in the 1930s was immanent in the logic and language of decisions from the "forgotten" era. See, e.g., David M. Rabban,
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
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of the metaphor of the "new dispensation" is difficult to ignore.2 t t The

deployment of this metaphor to characterize the Hughes Court's role in
the development of the clear and present danger doctrine is the figural

fulcrum on which Mendelson's reading of Herndon turns. It warrants
some detailed discussion.
To unpack Mendelson's interpretive and ideological premises, we
may draw on recent theoretical writing about the nature of historiography, the process and product of historical research, analysis, and writing.
In this connection, the analysis of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst regard-

ing the object of historical research and writing is penetrating. Hindess
and Hirst note that "despite all the elaborations, equivocations and qualifications of historians, 2 12 historiography reduces to the study of the
past. The historian, however, faces an immediate and insoluble problem:
'
"[B]y definition, all that is past does not exist."213
For Hindess and

Hirst, this obvious fact about the subject matter of history thus requires

us to qualify our understanding of the historical project. In their view, it
would be more correct to say that "history" is made of "whatever is
representedas having hitherto existed." 2' 14 This is an important modification of the historical project, because it suggests that the historian can
never hope fully to satisfy the Rankean injunction to discover wie es

eigentlich gewesen ist, that is, to show "how essentially things hap-

pened." 21 The constitutive antinomy between the past and historians'
discourse about the past derives from the fact that "[h]istory's object, the
hitherto existing, does not exist except in the modality of its current
211. The term "dispensation" was used in Christian theology to designate "the divine ordering
of the affairs of the world," "an appointment, arrangement, or favor, as by God," or "a divinely
appointed order or age." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 414 (2d ed.
1967). It might be argued that we ought not to make too much of this figural language, that it is a
stylistic device that has no bearing on Mendelson's substantive position. I reject the notion that
nothing of theoretical consequence flows from the terms Mendelson uses to characterize the First
Amendment jurisprudence of the Hughes Court. Recent work in the theory of discourse has thoroughly discredited the assumption that language can be segregated from thought in a clear and
convincing way. To my mind, style matters very much. The "ideological imagery" through which
Mendelson's analysis proceeds is inseparable from the substantive argument it advances. For a discussion of the notion of ideological imagery in legal texts, see Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel,
ContractLaw as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 373, 374 (David
Kairys ed., 1990).
212. BARRY HINDESS & PAUL Q. HIRST, PRE-CAPITALIST MODES OF PRODUCTION 309
(1975).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. LEOPOLD VON RANKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HISTORY (Georg G. Iggers &
Konrad Von Moltke eds., Wilma A. Iggers & Konrad Von Moltke trans., 1973).
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existence, as representations,',216 in the form of surviving records, documents, and the like. Since these records from the past do not speak for
themselves, the process by which representations or traces of an unrecoverable past are fashioned into a narrative and interpretive account necessarily reflect the historian's own epistemological and ideological
commitments regarding the nature of history and of historical
knowledge:
What the past is is determined by the content of the various ideological
forms which operate within the parameters of historical knowledge.
The content of the past, its nature, its periods and problems is determined by the character of a particular ideological form. The particular
modes of writing history invest this or that body of representations
with the status of a record. Artefacts [sic], washing lists, court rolls,
kitchen middens, memoirs are converted into texts-representations
through which the real may be read. The text, constituted as a text by
its reading, is at the mercy of this reading. Far from working on the
past, the ostensible object of history, historical knowledge works on a
body of texts. These texts are a product of historical knowledge. The
writing of history is the production of texts which interpret these
texts.2 17
Two fundamental conceptions about the nature of historiography
emerge from this analysis. First of all, Hindess and Hirst invite us to see
that history writing is essentially and unavoidably the production of text
about other texts: The historian begins and ends his or her work with
language, or, more precisely, with forms of signification. This is not to
say that because it is available to us only in and through its text, history
itself, understood as a process, can or should be reduced to or equated
with its textualization. Fredric Jameson rightly points out that history in
this sense is most emphatically not a "text, not a narrative, master or
otherwise, 2 1 8 but rather an absent cause: It is "absent" ' 9 because the
past by definition is never present. History is finally "inaccessible except
in textual form."2 20
To point out the ways in which historiography is the production of a
text about texts-or, more broadly, of figural language about figural language-is to call attention to the unavoidable but often unacknowledged
rhetorical character of historical discourse. Because the constitution,
216. HINDESS & HIRST, supra note 212, at 308-09 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 311.
218. Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Historicism, 11 NEw LITERARY HIST. 41, 42 (1979).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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selection, interpretation, and communication of historical facts takes
place in a textual domain that is not identical to the actual historical
past, any historiographical perspective must perforce be partial.2 2 '
In the context of the Angelo Herndon case, these theoretical understandings of the figural foundations of historical writing help us focus on
the importance of the underlying textual strategies through which Mendelson develops his account of the rise, fall, and renaissance of the clear
and present danger rule. As I have already indicated, Mendelson invites
us to view the Supreme Court's decisions in the Angelo Hemdon case as
part of a New Dispensation. 2 2 2 This perspective is embodied in rhetorical and stylistic forms that rive his historical interpretation of the case
from the actual events it aims to represent. One instance of the tension
221. In his classic work, The Savage Mind, Claude Levi-Strauss describes this unavoidable partiality as follows (in the chapter "History and Dialectic"):
As historical knowledge is claimed to be privileged, I feel entitled.., to make the point
that there is a twofold antinomy in the very notion of a historical fact. For, ex hypothesi, a
historical fact is what really took place, but where did anything take place? Each episode
in a revolution or a war resolved itself into a multitude of individual psychic movements.
Each of these movements is the translation of unconscious development . . . . Consequently, historical facts are no more given than any other. It is the historian, or the agent
of history, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though under the threat of an infinite regress.
What is true of the constitution of historical facts is no less so of their selection. From
this point of view, the historian and the agent of history choose, sever and carve them up,
for a truly total history would confront them with chaos. Every corner of space conceals a
multitude of individuals each of whom totalizes the trend of history in a manner which
cannot be compared to the others; for any one of these individuals, each moment of time is
inexhaustibly rich in physical and psychical incidents which all play their part in his totalization. Even history which claims to be universal is still only a juxtaposition of a few local
histories within which (and between which) very much more is left out than is put in ...
In so far as history aspires to meaning, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of
men and individuals in these groups to make them stand out, as discontinuous figures,
against a continuity barely good'snough to be used as a backdrop. A truly total history
would cancel itself out-its product would be nought. What makes history possible is that
a subset of events is found, for a given period, to have approximately the same significance
for a contingent of individuals who have not necessarily experienced the events and may
even consider them at an interval of several centuries. History is therefore never history
[of], but history for. It is partial in the sense of being biased even when it claims not to be,
for it inevitably remains partial-that is, incomplete-and this is itself a form of partiality.
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 257-58 (1966).
More recently, Agnes Heiler has argued that plural interpretations of the same historical event
are likely even in societies structured by a basic consensus:
[Even one world-view which is shared by a group of people can be interpreted in different
ways by them, and this accounts for individual selections ... [on] the readiness for exclusive messages and the hierarchism of different kind[s] of knowledges. Every historian is
ready to read certain messages and refuse to read others. Every historian assesses the
messages by labelling them as "important," "unimportant," "decisive," "indecisive," "primary," "secondary." Even a decision regarding the authenticity of historical sources isinside a given framework-dependent on the world-view of the historian. What is "primary" or "decisive" for one world-view can be "indecisive" or "secondary" for the otherindeed, it may not even merit a mention.
AGNES HELLER, A THEORY OF HISTORY 104-05 (1982).
222. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
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between Mendelson's interpretation and what actually happened to
Angelo Herndon is his use of the footnote. Although Herndon v. Lowry
and Herndon v. Georgia were the only two cases in which the clear and
present danger test figured in the Hughes Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, Mendelson consigns both to footnotes, literally relegating
the two opinions to the margins of his analysis.2 23 Mendelson provides
no information about the nature of the constitutional claims pressed in
the two Herndon cases and gives us not the slightest clue as to the results
the Court reached.2 24 Ultimately, Mendelson's characterization of the
Hughes Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as a New Dispensation
rests on nothing more than the force of his figural language and on the
rhetorical strategy-the muted murmur of the footnotes; the utter silence
about the issues presented, the decisions reached, and their articulated
rationale-allowing him to enlist Herndon v. Georgia and Herndon v.
Lowry for evidentiary duty and at the same time avoid any real discussion of precisely why and how they bear out his thesis. Like Murphy and
Currie, Mendelson makes it difficult to break the textual codes 22 5 in
223. The same may be said of Zechariah Chafee's discussion in FreeSpeech in the UnitedStates.
See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. As I have noted, David Currie altogether ignores the
Herndon v. Georgia decision. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text. A similar silence
regarding Herndon v. Georgia characterizes David Rabban's discussion of Herndon v. Lowry. See
David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205,
1347 (1983). As we have seen, Paul Murphy does mention Herndon v. Georgiabut does not view it
as qualifying in any way his characterization of the Hughes Court's commitment to civil liberties.
See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
224. This cursory treatment of the Angelo Herndon case differs radically from Mendelson's
discussion of decisions rendered both before and after the chiefjusticeship of Charles Evan Hughes.
See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 180, at 314-15 (discussing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919)); id. at 316 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); id. at 317-18 (discussing
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
225. One could describe the discursive problem of historical research and writing as involving
three distinct conceptual operations. I conceptualize this tripartite division around the terms "coding," "decoding," and "recoding." (My scheme here is heuristic. Its divisions should not be hardened into an absolute-these three stages are probably not so cleanly separable in practice.) First,
the historian "codes" certain representations of the past (court records, for example), selecting and
labeling them as properly "historical" objects for his or her examination. Obviously, the first
move-a process of selection and rejectionj of inclusion and exclusion-is critical for what follows.
It is what Hindess and Hirst call the historical "investment": Part of a body of representations is cut
off and isolated from its larger context according to a subjective notion of its importance; then it is
"constituted" (made to function) as a historical "text." HINDESS & HIRST, supra note 212, at 311.
This initial coding, acknowledged or not, determines the range of the historian's analysis and precludes the historian's later claim that he or she simply tried to discover and describe "what really
happened." To conclude that some records are important and citable (like the Supreme Court's
opinion in Herndon v. Lowry) and that others are not (like the Supreme Court's opinion in Herndon
v. Georgia) is to stop describing and start judging.
The second move of the historian is to "decode" the materials that she or he has selected as the
proper objects of historical analysis: Quite simply, this is a reading of the representation or, more
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which his references to the Angelo Herndon case are cast, primarily

because the reader is not provided with even the most minimal means for
testing his interpretations in light of the cited decisions.
But it is not only the textual strategy of Mendelson's account that
betrays its incompleteness. Mendelson's investment in a particular per-

spective toward the case is also revealed in his choice of narrative form.
To appreciate the role that narrative structure plays in Mendelson's
argument, it is necessary to understand historiography as a species of
literary genre. The claim that history is a kind of writing-that its textual representations are not identical to the lived historical reality of
which they purport to give an account-raises important questions about
the status of the narrative tradition in historiography. Most notably, it
challenges the notion that the historical text is or can be a faithful

retelling of what "actually" took place in the past. Students of the discipline have increasingly come to understand historical discourse as a nar-

rative literature that has much more in common with other types of
storytelling than historians have been willing to concede.

The most influential recent proponent of this view is historian Hayden White.22 6 White starts from the proposition that the textuality of
historical discourse means that "historical discourse should be viewed as
probably, of the complex of representations that the historian will eventually use to fashion a textual
narrative, usually in linear form, of a particular event or set of events. This recoding, or reading, is
circumscribed by the initial coding to which the representations have already been subjected. The
language of the coding is determined, moreover, by the concrete temporal and cultural context in
which the historian is situated, and by the historian's ideological vision of a particular period and its
representations. This is what Hindess and Hirst mean when they say that the historical text is
constituted as a text by its reading and is finally "at the mercy" of its reader. Id. Thus, a decision to
reconstruct the Angelo Herndon case solely on the basis of Herndon v. Lowry and to ignore the
rawer, less "literate" Unemployed Council minutes in the transcript of record, or even the earlier
dispositions of the case in 1935, is necessarily to foreclose, indeed to repress, certain readings of
Herndon v. Lowry itself in favor of others. Thus, the decoding of the historical text is never an
innocent-that is to say, objective---elucidation of meaning or significance. Following Colin Sumner's definition of "reading" as a complex practice whereby a reader recognizes, misrecognizes, or
fails to recognize levels of meaning and significance in a social text, we might go so far as to say that
the historical decoding is always in part a misreading: Better yet, it is an active rewriting. COLIN
SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARXIsT THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

AND LAW 63 (1979).
The decoding of the historical text is controlled by the intellectual and ideological biases that
inform its initial coding; the decoding limits in turn the scope of the historian's third and final move,
which is to (textually) "recode" the historical representation in an organized historiographical narrative. No historical writing can escape the effects of its constitutive coding and recoding; for, as we
have seen, these prior practices limit the terms of the historical discourse and determine what the
recoding can and cannot say, as well as what goes without saying. Something must be minimized,
ignored, or left unexamined under the censorship imposed by the mediatory effects that are nested in
the very texture of the historian's language.

226.

HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE

(1978).
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a sign system" and not as a "mirror image of the set of events that it
claims simply to describe."2' 27 White argues that the historical "sign system" simultaneously points in two very different directions: "toward the
set of events it purports to describe" and "toward the generic story form
to which it tacitly likens the set in order to disclose its formal coherence
considered as a structure or a process. ' 228 Viewed as a type of literary
form, then, history writing may be defined as the "fiction of factual representations. '22 9 Thus, the historical work is often plotted, or "thematized," in terms of the kinds of figurations and categories used to describe
plays, poems, and novels-the texts we think of as "literature." The historian might characterize her or his work as a study of the "epic" of
Manifest Destiny, the "tragedy" of the Civil War, or the "romance" of
the American Revolution.
What these narrative forms obscure, however, is the possibility that
the same event or set of events might be viewed in radically different
ways. For example, from the vantage point of the vanquished rather
than of the victor, the "epic" of Manifest Destiny might be the "tragedy"
of the extermination of the Indian nations. The point to be emphasized
here is that the narrative form in which a historical account is modeled is
not neutral or innocent. The narrative theme qua theme has a content,
and the content of the narrative theme around which a historical interpretation crystallizes may reflect a profoundly teleological or metaphysical attitude toward historical process. Insofar as the historiographical
representation of an event or set of events in terms of a single theme
presupposes that the past possesses a unitary logic or rationality, it
imposes an order on its object that is more fictive than real. Historical
discourse offers a "picture of the past [that] is . . . in every detail an
imaginary picture." 23
In Mendelson's article, the imagery of a New Dispensation mobilizes "the theological motif par excellence." 231 The characterization of
the 1930s as a New Dispensation not only reflects a choice of metaphor
but invests Mendelson's account with and evokes a distinct narrative
form. What Mendelson offers is a narrative account in the form of constitutional history of the Grand March of Progress. Mendelson tells of a
prophetic Supreme Court whose mission was to keep the memory of the
clear and present danger test alive until its inevitable resurrection in the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 121.
Mendelson, supra note 180, at 317.
R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 282, 245 (1946).
JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 64 (Alan Bass trans., 1981).
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next decade. In narrative terms, the metaphor of the New Dispensation

allows Mendelson to assert without argument that an enlightened Court
cautiously but consistently interpreted the Constitution to grant increas-

ingly expansive constitutional protection to unpopular speech.
Mendelson's figure of the New Dispensation, with its suggestion
that there was an underlying logic and forward-looking purpose behind

the decisions of the 1930s, is at best historically problematic. His progressivist characterization of the case law clashes with a competing his-

torical view argued most powerfully by Klaus Heberle.232 Heberle has
argued that the First Amendment decisions are more profitably understood as what he calls "absent-minded incrementalism" 233-the product,

in other words, of an irrational rationality, not of a mythic ordered purposiveness. He argues that the First Amendment cases of the 1930s only

appearto have marked a decisive shift toward the nationalization of the
Bill of Rights. Noting that this was a "step that the Court had repeatedly refused to take in the past out of deference to the federal character
of American government,, 234 Heberle contends that the Court in fact

"did not at any point in the process address itself to the problem of the
relation between the federal courts and state government, did not discuss
it, and did not evince any particular awareness that the problem was
involved. ' 235 In short, Heberle's study demonstrates that the self-conscious doctrinal innovation Mendelson finds in the Hughes Court simply
is not borne out by the historical record.23 6
232. Klaus Herbele, From Gitlow to Near: Judicial "Amendment" by Absent-minded Incrementalism, 34 J. POL. 458 (1972).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 460.
235. Id.
236. The claim that the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is most productively
understood as the product of "absent-minded incrementalism" applies to the federal government as a
whole. As Robert Goldstein has demonstrated, the federal government's record of respect for political dissent in the 1930s was checkered at best. Although the government was generally favorable
toward the exercise of political liberties from 1933 to 1938, these years were bracketed by waves of
political repression that the federal government not only tolerated but actively participated in. For
example, the Hoover Administration responded with massive brutality to the Bonus Marchers, a
group of unemployed veterans who set up camp in Washington for two months in the spring of 1932,
demanding immediate payment of their World War I bonuses. On Hoover's orders, Army Chief of
Staff General Douglas MacArthur led 600 Army troops "armed with sabers, bayonets, tanks,
machine guns and tear gas bombs" against the jobless veterans. More than 1,000 people were teargassed, and more than 50 were treated for injuries. See ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 198-200 (1978).
In the later years of the decade, after a relative hiatus, the federal government again took a
number of politically repressive measures. In 1938, the House of Representatives established the
Committee on Un-American Activities, whose mandate was to investigate the political activities of
both left-wing and right-wing groups. A year later, Congress enacted a relief appropriation bill that
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By itself, the Mendelson thesis that "the decade of the thirties far
surpasses all prior decades in the number of Supreme Court decisions
vindicating civil liberties" is not inaccurate. However, the metaphorical
and narrative description of the work of the Hughes Court in the ideological imagery of the New Dispensation is misleading. The term suggests
that the period from 1931 to 1937 marked some kind of fundamental
change in the "nature" of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the very designation of the cases as "Hughes Court
decisions" not only permits but actively promotes a reading which
obscures the fact that these decisions were made in a political and cultural context of profound ideological conflict. Moreover, the exclusive
focus on the Court's internal doctrinal development and membership
changes is utterly indifferent to the dialectical relationship between legal
and social change. The implication that the Hughes Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence represented a radical break from what had
come before overlooks the degree to which the Court proceeded piecemeal, with no discernible logic or progression. It neglects to consider
that the decisions were marked by the justices' continuing debate over
the Court's proper role in protecting individuals against repressive state
action, a debate never fully resolved. It minimizes the fact that the same
Court that vindicated freedom of expression in striking down a California law that made displaying a red flag as a symbol of political opposition
a felony2 37 also upheld a denial of citizenship to a Canadian Baptist minister who asserted a right of private judgment on matters of military conscription.2 3' The ideological imagery of the New Dispensation
conveniently ignores the fact that the Hughes Court's decisions did not
differ radically from the decisions that came before or after them. Moreover, the progressivist vision cannot account for the fact that "no direct
action by the Court has ever had any significant bearing in either stopping
or slowing' 2 39 political repression in America.
This perspective reveals the fictive relationship of Mendelson and
his narrative to the historical period. Narratively, Mendelson's article
denied funds to "any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates
the overthrow of the government of the United States through force or violence." Id. at 245. That
same year, Congress passed the Hatch Act, which barred from federal employment any individual
who had "membership in any political party or organization which advocated the overthrow of our
constitutional form of government in the United States." Id.
237. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
238. United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled by Gironard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946).
239. John P. Frank, Review andBasic Liberties,in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 109,
113 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
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can be squarely situated within a body of historical literature that Hayden White has called a complex of "verbal fictions, the contents of which
are as much invented as found."''
My objection to Mendelson's historical analysis of the Angelo
Herndon case, or, more precisely, my objection to Mendelson's lack of
analysis of the Angelo Herndon case, reduces to the following claim.
Mendelson, like Murphy and Currie, offers no theoretical category to
account for the extent to which the Supreme Court's First Amendment
doctrine of the 1930s reveals more discontinuity than coherence, more
contradiction than consistency. What we are given is a unified constitutional history of a period whose recorded remains are read "as a repository of a [secularized] eschatology of meaning."241 For Mendelson, as
for Currie and Murphy, the Herndon case marks a stage in the historical
unfolding in constitutional law of an inexorable logic of progress. The
singularly forward-looking character2 4 2 of the interpretive models in
which these readings of the Herndon case are nested is a vision of constitutional history with the history left out.
Murphy, Currie, and Mendelson's indifference to the essentially
erratic character of First Amendment jurisprudence during the 1930s
makes their work profouindly historicist. By historicism I mean the view
that historical events obey and embody an immanent rationality or inherent order. Historicism is a perspective that ignores, denies, or attempts
to minimize the errant and uneven course of social life and its historical
development. Contrary to the lawlike logic of the historicist perspective,
I believe that it is not possible to think and write about the history of
social practices like constitutional politics and law without taking
account of the constitutive role of conflict, chaos, and contradiction.
The interpretations that Murphy, Currie, and Mendelson offer of
the Angelo Herndon case are hampered by an inability to apprehend,
much less account for, the warring social forces at work in the First
Amendment jurisprudence of the 1930s, forces that invested the period
240.

WHITE, supra

241.

Tony Bennett, Texts in History: The DeterminationsofReadings and Their Texts, in POST-

note 226, at 82.

STRUCTURALISM AND THE QUESTION OF HISTORY 80 (Derek Attridge et al. eds., 1987).
242. See, e-g., MURPHY, supra note 7, at 123 ("[I]n squaring national ideals with concrete prac-

tice in the fields of civil rights and liberties [the Court] took the first steps in a legal revolution in
which black leadership would eventually mount a national campaign for full first class citizenship");
Currie, Civil Rights, supra note 33, at 830 ("By holding first amendment freedoms applicable to the
states... [the Court under Hughes] made a significant start in dealing with [a new agenda]). See
also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 169, 171 (1960) (arguing that
Supreme Court decisions of the 1930s reveal a "logic.. .working on behalf of civil rights [that bore]
the seeds of the future").
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with a strange "double reality." Bent as they are on advancing a progres-

sivist, evolutionist view of First Amendment history, Murphy, Currie,
and Mendelson assume away or simply ignore an alternative perspective
on the period: that the 1930s were years of political conflict, ideological
crisis, and cultural contestation. It is precisely this counterhistory that

we can glimpse in cultural artifacts such as Let Me Live.
C.

MAKING HISTORY

The indifference exhibited by Mendelson, Murphy, and Currie to

other texts and other narratives-materials from which they might have
derived a very different account of the Angelo Herndon case-appears to
be driven by largely unacknowledged investments. I do not mean to suggest that the relationship between their interpretations and the ideological investments that inform them is indefensible. Rather, I believe that
the combined force of their interpretive models and ideological affilia-

tions forecloses lines of historical inquiry that might call their
approaches and results into question. More fundamentally, what Murphy, Mendelson, and Currie have to say about the Angelo Herndon case
reflects something more than mere intellectual interest. Ultimately, the
belief that the case and the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as a
whole reflect "a striving for fidelity to a true line of progress"2 43 is just

that-a belief. It is this article of faith more than any other feature of
their work that forces the recognition that their accounts of Herndon are

not disinterested scholarly analyses but rather interested interventions in
a contested ideological field. In short, each of these works resonates with

ideological affiliations and implications that a popular countermemory of
the Herndon case aims (in the strongest sense of the term) to expose. 2'
243.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

13 (1970).

244. My purpose in raising these questions is not simply or primarily to suggest that the ideological biases at the base of these texts lead to interpretive errors that must be corrected so that we may
get to the objective truth of the matter. One of the aims of this Article is to challenge the idea that
historical interpretation of constitutional law is or should be conducted outside of a whole network
of interests, associations, and affiliations that are touched by and tied to relations of power. My
attention to the "affiliative" bearings of the readings that Mendelson, Murphy, and Currie offer of
the Angelo Herndon case is intended not so much to correct their interpretations, but rather to
contest them, to make room for other, competing "truths." To be sure, the thrust of my remarks is
clearly critical, but what I want to emphasize is that the burden of my argument is not so much to
show that their interpretations are erroneous; I am more concerned with establishing that these
interpretations are possible only because their authors have excluded equally plausible alternative
accounts, and that these interpretive absences, or omissions, are caused by interests that are not
exclusively, or even primarily, intellectual. It should be stressed here that my emphasis on the interested omissions that structure these texts by no means reflects an indifference on my part to basic
empirical accuracy, either in my own interpretation of the Angelo Herudon case or in the work of
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There is a sense that the belief "in the inexorable laws of development"
driving the historical work we have examined actually reflects "a certain
contempt for ordinary people," such as Herndon.24 5
A popular constitutional history of the Herndon case is skeptical of
any historical practice that forces the events that led to Herndon v. Georgia and Herndon v. Lowry into the interpretive model of foreordained
progress. A popular constitutional history is unwilling to impose a teleological framework on the raw material that constitutes its object of study.
The source of this agnosticism is a realization that the progressivist
vision of constitutional history is both an interpretive "[structure] of
memory and remembering" and, at the same time, an ideological strategy
of "organized forgetting":2 46 What is forgotten is the lived experience of
those whose stories disrupt the ordered image that the historical narrative of constitutional progress imposes on an unruly past.
It is precisely this aspect of organized forgetting that I have aimed
to identify and interrogate in my critical readings of the rhetorical and
narrative dimensions of the accounts of Mendelson, Currie, and Murphy.
History does not always have a happy ending. When one considers the
cultural context in Which Herndon v. Georgia arose and was adjudicated,
it was at the time far from obvious that the defeat in that case would
become the "success story" of Herndon v. Lowry. This is probably the
main reason for the doctrinal and historical segregation of Herndon v.
Georgiafrom Herndon v. Lowry. For the events leading up to the Court's
decision in Herndon v. Georgia tell a story of repression and resistance, a
story that is crucial to an understanding of the case from the bottom up.
A subaltern perspective on the Angelo Herndon case discloses an alternative historical vision of the 1930s, in which First Amendment law was
a contested terrain, scarred and cracked by a bleak and often bloody
political past. In my view, Let Me Live and the decision in Herndon v.
Georgia are important textual sources for recounting this countermemory
the historians discussed in this section. I am indebted to the writing of Edward Said for my understanding of the inescapable "affiliative" dimensions of all intellectual work. See EDWARD W. SAID,
COVERING ISLAM: How THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE How WE SEE THE REST OF
THE WORLD (1981); SAID, supra note 52.
245.

CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS

220

(1991).
246. ROGER BROMLEY, LOST NARRATIVES 7 (1988). Bromley describes the contested terrain
of history as a dialectical unity of anamnesis and amnesia in which
[florgetting is as important as remembering. Part of the struggle against cultural power is
the challenge to forgetting posed by memory. What is "forgotten" may represent more
threatening aspects of popular "memory" and have been carefully and consciously, not
casually and unconsciously, omitted from the narrative economy of remembering.
Id. at 12.
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of repression and resistance. As such, they should not be cordoned off in
a separate historical field.
I am aware that my emphasis on the themes of political and cultural
struggle may be critiqued for offering a picture of the Angelo Herndon
case that is no less partial than the progressivist historical accounts I
have criticized. But this objection fails to recognize that there are two
different senses in which a particular historical interpretation may be
considered partial. I do not claim that my account of the Angelo
Herndon case offers anything like a comprehensive historical explanation
of the case's constitutional meanings. In this sense, my alternative narrative cannot help but be partial. But I believe that the historical interpretations of which I have been critical are partial in a different and
avoidable sense. Mendelson, Murphy, and Currie never seriously consider the concrete social grounding of the Herndon case, most notably
the cultural politics of race. My earlier discussion of that context demonstrates that the culture and politics of race made up one of the central
arenas in which the ideological contest between subaltern resistance and
superordinate repression was fought.2 "7 Mendelson, Currie, and Murphy
fail to provide a space in their institutionally oriented history for the
active role that Herndon played in the events that led to the Court's
decisions in his case. It is precisely this absence that led me earlier to
describe the stories that Mendelson, Currie, and Murphy tell about the
248
Angelo Herndon case as history with the history left out.
The heart of my argument is that the questions of race, power, and
culture are no less central to Herndon's significance in our constitutional
history than the aspects of the case around which institutional histories
have revolved. I believe, with W.E.B. Du Bois, that the subaltern's view
of Herndon v. Georgia tells a story of which constitutional history "has
saved all too little of authentic record and tried to forget or ignore even
the little saved. ' 24 9 In reading the record of the case left by Herndon
himself, I have attempted to highlight features of the case that seem to be
outside the interpretive horizon of institutional history. The themes of
resistance and repression sounded in Let Me Live must be accorded their
rightful place, alongside the theme of progress that has so captured the
institutionalist's historical imagination. A history of the Angelo
Herndon case that ignores his subaltern account of its significance is a
247. See supra part III.B.
248. Id.
249. APTHEKER, supra note 23, at 51 (quoting W.E.B. Du Bois).
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history, in Herndon's words, "without blood and entrails."2 ' Herndon's
account is valuable because it provides a perspective on the case from
below-from the point of view of those for whom "[h]istory is what
hurts.

' 25 1

I am not endorsing a historical practice that uncritically siphons off
Herndon's subaltern experience from the larger historical current of
which it was a part. The two are inextricably related; their separation is
neither possible nor desirable. However, I do contend that Herndon's
subaltern experience (or, more precisely, the recorded remains of it) is as
fundamental and significant an index of American constitutionalism as
that found in official legal texts. My insistence on reckoning the constitutional meanings into the cultural record left by the historically dispossessed is not merely an effort to replace the current hegemony of
institutional history with that of a hegemonic popular memory. It is an
25 2
attempt rather to retrieve the "buried" and "subjugated knowledges"
bequeathed to us by Americans who lived out their lives at the bottom of
our constitutional order.
My discussion has been guided by three main concerns. First, I
have tried to show that the complex ebb and flow of the events that make
up American constitutional history is likely to remain obscure unless the
experiences of individuals like this young black coal miner are brought to
its surface. Second, I have tried to indicate why, when those experiences
are brought to the surface of constitutional history, they expand like a
ripple in a pond. What Herndon has to say about his experience sheds
light on the cultural foundations of legal ideology and institutions and
thus calls our attention to the ways law and culture have intersected in
American constitutional history. Third, in urging that the subaltern record of the Herndon case left in Let Me Live must be taken seriously, I
have tried to clear the ground for a fresh reading of the text of Herndon
v. Georgia itself. The interpretive model I have developed for reading
Herndon's nonofficial account of the case also provides a framework for
rereading official legal texts. The historiographical interest of such an
undertaking, as I presently show, is that it permits us to see traces of
subaltern political consciousness inscribed in the very terms and texture
of the judicial discourse through which the Court tried to avoid both the
250.
251.
252.
Gordon

HERNDON, supra note 27, at 89.
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS 102 (1981).

Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 83 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin
et al. trans., 1980).
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constitutional issues raised in Herndon v. Georgia and the broader conflicts regarding race, culture, and power for which these issues were a site
of intersection.
IV.

SPEAKING LAW

[T]he fact that one ignores something by no means puts an end to its
existence.
253
Karl Mannheim
Felix Frankfurter and Henry M. Hart, Jr., begin their article The
Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 19342" 4 like this:
Events are again demonstrating that in the context of the country's history, the history of the Supreme Court is a rhythm of quiescence and liveliness pulsating with alternating periods of relative
placidity and vitality in American politics. But probably at no time
could Mr. Justice Holmes more truly than now have said of the Court,
"We are very quiet there, but it is the quiet of a storm centre." 25 5
The piece is one of a series published in the HarvardLaw Review on the
"procedure by which the Court speaks-or abstains from speaking-as
the ultimate voice of the Constitution." 2 6 As the first scholarly effort to
address the implications of Herndon v. Georgia for the theory and practice of Supreme Court jurisdiction, The Business of the Supreme Court
offers a useful contemporaneous introduction to a concept that frames
my reading of the decision.
The concept is found in the difference Frankfurter and Hart posit
between law and politics. In The Business of the Supreme Court, the
opposition that Frankfurter and Hart draw between law and politics
functions as a conceptual axis on which their discussion of Herndon (as
well as the other cases decided that term) turns. But although the distinction between law and politics is central to Frankfurter and Hart's
analysis, the rhetoric of their argument belies the reasoning on which this
opposition stands. The authors of The Business of the Supreme Court
attempt to resolve the "problem" of the relationship between law and
politics in constitutional adjudication, which they see as the heart of the
253. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 4 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936).
This line comes from the first part of an expanded version of Mannheim's treatise on the sociology of
knowledge, written especially for English readers. The original German version appeared in 1929.
254. Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68 (1935).

255. Id.
256. Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REv. 577, 578 (1938).
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Court's disposition ofHerndon v. Georgia. In the final instance, however,
they only restate the problem of the politics of constitutional law at
another level of their text. The result is that The Business of the Supreme
Court reenacts the very dilemma the Court faced in Herndon v. Georgia
itself.
I read both Frankfurter and Hart's article and the Court's opinion
in Herndon v. Georgiaas meditations on the problem of power in American constitutionalism. Michel Foucault has said that one of the primary
characteristics of power is that it manifests itself indirectly. At a discursive level, the operation and effects of power are often concealed in texts
25 7
or statements that appear to be about something other than power.
Foucault attributes this discursive displacement to the fact that "power is
tolerable only on the condition that it mask a substantial part of itself.
Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. '2 s3
Foucault argues that we must therefore employ strategies in our reading
that catch power on the wing so that we may analyze it "in the places it
'259
both inhabits and vacates simultaneously.
This perspective on the nature of power suggests a specific interpretive approach to legal discourse (a term I use here to refer both to judicial
decisions and to commentary on those decisions). Legal discourse is not
simply about relationships of power; it expresses power relations. Pierre
Macherey has said that "[w]e always eventually find, at the edge of the
text, the language of ideology, momentarily hidden, but eloquent by its
very absence." 2" This suggests that a legal text must be subjected to a
process of double reading: a reading that both scans the text for what it
says and rescans it for what it says within what it leaves unsaid. Thus,
my exploration of the language of ideology in Frankfurter and Hart's
discussion and in Herndon v. Georgia itself embraces two overlapping
objects. I am interested in an ideological analysis not only of the explicit
arguments that these texts make, but also of those they do not make. As
we shall see, a number of the most significant ideological turns in The
Business of the Supreme Court and in Herndon v. Georgia occur on the
margins and between the lines of these texts, in questions that are not
asked, in limiting presuppositions that remain unspoken and implicit. To
make the point another way, The Business of the Supreme Court and
257. For a fuller discussion of Foucault's position, see supra note 88.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 86 (Robert Hurley trans., 1980).
259. Hayden White, Michel Foucault, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE 109 (John Sturrock ed.,
1979).
260. MACHEREY, supra note 80, at 60.
258.
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Herndon v. Georgia reveal a great deal in their "patterns of silence,' ' 261 or
structured absences. Against this backdrop, I want to turn to Frankfurter and Hart's discussion of what Herndon v. Georgia teaches about
the way the Supreme Court "speaks-or
abstains from speaking-as the
262
Constitution.
the
of
voice
ultimate
A.

THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT

Frankfurter and Hart mention Herndon v. Georgia in a section of
The Business of the Supreme Court that discusses the arsenal of techniques and devices the Supreme Court uses to avoid "decision on what is
loosely called the merits. ' 26 3 These rules of avoidance-self-imposed,
discretionary limitations on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court-"express the sensibilities of statesmen, not the formulation of
technicians." 2'
In all constitutional cases, Frankfurter and Hart contend, "whether on review from state or federal courts, jurisdictional limitations assume peculiar importance. '265 For Frankfurter and Hart,
delicate "balances of power" in a federal system call for constant "reaffirmation of old procedural safeguards and the assertion of new ones
against subtle or daring attempts at procedural blockade-running. "266
The Court, in this scheme, is the "umpire" of the federal system. Its
"self-denying" ordinances protect it from "undue suction into the avoid'267
able polemic of politics.
The rules of avoidance to which Frankfurter and Hart refer are neutral and transsubstantive in their application. They take on special
importance in cases involving federal review of state actions, because
"conflicts of jurisdiction between state and federal courts, actual or
268
potential, are questions of power as between the states and the nation.
Accordingly,
261. John Ford's 'Young Mr. Lincoln,' in MOVIES AND METHODS: AN ANTHOLOGY 496 (Bill
Nichols ed., 1976). My discussion of the meaningful silences that structure the opinion in Herndon
v. Georgia might be read as an effort to explore two questions that Maurice Merleau-Ponty has posed
in a philosophical context: "But what if language speaks as much by what is between words, as by
the words themselves? As much by what it does not 'say' as by what it 'says'?" MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 45 (Richard C. McCleary trans., 1964).
262. Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 256, at 578.
263. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 98.
264. Id. at 94.
265. Id. at 93-94.
266. Id. at 91.
267. Id. at 90.
268. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
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[r]espect for ["the rightful independence of state governments" and for

state court judgments] founded on large considerations of policy-referable both to our political system and to the stricter aspects ofjudicial
administration-appears in the Court's insistence that the determination of the federal question sought to be reviewed shall have been indispensable to the conclusion reached. The same factor underlies the
congeries of rules designed to prevent the assertion of federal rights as

an afterthought-after the case has been lost on state grounds. But
these rules rest in part also upon the policy in the more general canon
that federal questions, and particularly federal constitutional questions, will be decided only when it is necessary to decide them.
Herndon v. Georgia discloses the application of these canons in their
least sympathetic but for that reason all the more striking aspect. In
that case the accused was held to be foreclosed by his failure to make
timely assertion of a constitutional right of free speech, although assertion of the right would have required anticipation, on the basis of
recent statements by the state supreme court, that a favorable ruling in

the trial court under which the issue was not raised would later be held
269
erroneous.

Several fundamental conceptions can be drawn from this passing
reference to Herndon v. Georgia. A few years before, Frankfurter had
noted that "perhaps the decisive factor in the history of the Supreme
Court is its progressive contraction of jurisdiction. ' ' 270 The Business of
the Supreme Court can be read on one level, then, as an attempt to show
how the self-imposed procedural rules that had achieved this "progressive contraction of jurisdiction" shaped and informed the day-to-day
work of the Supreme Court during the 1934-35 term. Early in their article, Frankfurter and Hart indicate that one of their primary aims is to
undertake what Frankfurter would later call the "scientific study"2 7 1 of
procedural practices in the Supreme Court.2 72 Their central premise is
that a court "the scope of whose 'activities lies as close to the more sensitive areas of politics as does that of the Supreme Court must constantly
be on the alert against undue suction into the avoidable polemic of politics. '' 273 Challenging those rule skeptics who "have not adequately
experienced the serious clash of forces so often embedded in the procedural interstices of constitutional litigation, or who do not appreciate to
269.

Id. at 93 (citations omitted).

270.

FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDES, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 186
(1928).
271. FELIX FRANKFURTER & HARRY SCHULMAN, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE vii (1937).

272.
273.

Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 90.
Id.
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what extent the Supreme Court's prestige has been won through its selfdenying ordinances,"2 74 Frankfurter and Hart set out to show that
"observance of seemingly technical rules" in fact reflects "wise
275
statecraft":
[Mjuch comment, and not only by laymen, on the work of the Court is
not placed in the perspective of the long process of constitutional adjudication by the Court. A just understanding of its functions, the
Court's self-consciousness as to what it is doing when it is deciding, the
extent to which it is confined by the very terms of the Constitution or
by the streams of doctrine which it has poured into the Constitution
and on which future adjudications more or less must float (how much
"more" and how much "less" being the crucial intellectual problem)on these underlying aspects of a specific controversy the Court itself
can shed not a little illumination by the accent and atmosphere of
speech through which it conveys a particular decision. But much must
also be left to the disinterested learning of commentators on the
Court's work.276
This language instructs us in the ideological premises of Frankfurter
and Hart's study of the procedures through which the Supreme Court
"manufactures ' 277 legal theory. Frankfurter and Hart aim to be strictly
objective (as the metaphor of an annual report 278 on the "business" of the
Supreme Court, complete with a "balance sheet, ' 279 suggests): Their goal
is to demystify the sometimes runic utterances of the Court that term.
"Confidence in the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of controversies to which a federalism like ours inevitably gives rise," write Frankfurter and Hart, "has never been furthered by treating constitutional
opinions as opaque mystery or esoteric mysticism. '"280 The value of rigorous investigation of the Court's decisions by "disinterested ' 281 commentators like Frankfurter and Hart is that such analysis situates the
work of the Court within its local institutional history and, by implication, the larger history of the country. The position of the authors seems
to be that the Court's opinions cannot be read adequately without attention to their broader context. This methodological focus appears to
274. Id. at 98.
275. Id. at 91.
276. Id. at 68.
277.

THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 62 (1937).

278. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 70.
279. Id. at 71.
280. Id. at 68.
281. Id.
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derive in part from Frankfurter and Hart's belief in the possibility of a
general "science" of Supreme Court jurisdiction.
From a historical perspective, the analytic model Frankfurter and

Hart brought to bear on the Court's work no doubt represented an
important contribution to the theory of federal court jurisdiction and
procedure. Nevertheless, their discussion of Herndon v. Georgia shows
that they have purchased these general institutional insights at the cost of
a certain ideological blindness about the Court's work product. In short,
in their discussion of the Angelo Herndon case, Frankfurter and Hart
practice the very mystification they purport to dispel. Their disinterested
critical program becomes an interested and affirmative one: It is as

though they are advocates rather than analysts of the Court. To the
extent that Frankfurter and Hart's overarching aim is to inspire "confidence"2 2 in the jurisdictive practice of the Supreme Court, this lapse
into mystification is not surprising. To sustain the tense relationship
between criticism and consecration"' of the Supreme Court, they had to

avoid some issues, not speak about some things.
As a consequence, their analysis of Herndon v. Georgia veers
between two distinct types of discourse. The predominant rhetorical reg-

ister is a kind of sober scientism. Read in context, the passage in
Herndon v. Georgia stands out as reriarkably restrained, almost "neu-

tral," particularly compared with the authors' longer and much more
heated treatments of the decisiois that put the Court on a collision
course with the Roosevelt Administration. 4 In one sentence, Frankfurter and Hart manage to say as little as they can about Herndon v.
282. Id.
283. The point here is that the Frankfurter and Hart article is vulnerable to the trenchant claim
leveled by Thurman Arnold about the ideological origins and effects of legal commentary: "[T]he
great literature of the theology of yesterday is astonishingly like the great literature of the law today,
both in style and content." THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 66 (1935).
Arnold acidly elaborates the parallelism in the following passage:
[Tihe conception of pleading of our present judicial system was duplicated in the church of
fifty years ago. Today there is a struggle between those who favor informal pleadings in
litigation and those who are sticklers for correct technical form. The same struggle raged
between the Episcopalians with their liturgy and the Presbyterians with their informal
prayer. Tracts were written about the correct way to present petitions to the Deity which
contain most of the legalisms of the lawbooks of today on the correct form of petitions to a
court. The eternal question as to whether or not a defect in a pleading is "jurisdictional"
(that is, such a"defect as makes the paper no pleading at all) was argued in discussing
whether defects in prayers were mere matters of form, or whether they eliminated some
element so vital that they were not prayers at all."
Id. at 68.
284. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 98-103 (discussing Perry v. United States, 294 U.S.
330 (1935) (invalidating a joint congressional resolution that nullified "gold-clause" provisions in
federal government bonds); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
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Georgia without ignoring the case altogether. In short, the passage is full
of silences and gaps. These lacunae are all the more pronounced in view
of the authors' emphasis at the outset on the importance of reading
Supreme Court decisions against the local history of the Court and the
larger history of the country. The authors do not even tell us the name of
the "accused" and give us almost no information about his crime.
Moreover, for a study that addresses itself to the "procedure by
'
which the Court speaks ... as the ultimate voice of the Constitution," 285
the article is strangely silent about the specific procedural steps through
which Herndon v. Georgia reached the Court and the precise jurisdictional defects that prevented the Court from deciding the case's substantive First Amendment issues. In his treatment of the case, Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., writes that its most significant aspect is that it illustrated
"the importance of the procedure in a sedition prosecution. 2 8 6 Frankfurter and Hart provide only the sketchiest details about the "recent
statements by the state supreme court" 2 87 and the "favorable ruling in
the trial court"2 8 on which Herndon relied, a reliance that cost him his
right to Supreme Court review. Frankfurter and Hart do point out-in a
footnote-that the decision in Herndon v. Georgia was not unanimous:
"Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting, insisted that the statements relied upon
[by the majority] had no proper application to the defendant's case, a
view which, if accepted, makes the result doubly harsh."2' 89 They do not
say who wrote the opinion for the Court, or who joined Cardozo in dissent. They do not examine the specific issues of procedure and jurisdiction that split the Court. They neither describe nor evaluate the
competing claims of the majority and minority positions in light of relevant past decisions, nor do they indicate whether they themselves accept
or reject the jurisdictional argument Cardozo advanced in dissent.
The authors' silence on this last point is most revealing. Frankfurter
and Hart note the disagreement among members of the Court over the
basic issue presented in the case-which from their brief summary
appears to be whether Herndon did or did not "make timely assertion of
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton Rwy.
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934)). For a history of the
Court's collision with the Roosevelt Administration, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION 178-229 (1976).

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 256, at 578.
CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 393 (emphasis added).
Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 93 n.65.
Id.
Id.
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a constitutional right of free speech. '290 The obvious next question is
whether Cardozo's dissent had any force. Was Cardozo right or wrong
in insisting that the Court's procedural requirements had in fact been
met and that the Court should therefore take jurisdiction over Herndon
v. Georgia? Frankfurter and Hart never say what they think about these
conflicting jurisdictional analyses or whether the way the majority
resolved the jurisdictional question could survive close scrutiny. In
short, Frankfurter and Hart address the context of the opinion in only
the most superficial way. The absence of a contextual analysis that
probes behind the opinion's "accent and atmosphere of speech",29 1 is startling when one recalls that it is precisely the context of the Court's "business" on which the opening sentence of the article promises its authors
will focus.
These omissions are significant, particularly in light of the second
rhetorical register in which Frankfurter and Hart's discussion of the
Herndon case is pitched. There is something hesitant, even troubled,
about the language Frankfurter and Hart use to describe the result in
Herndon v. Georgia. The authors suggest that the decision corresponds
to and can be explained in terms of a rigorous "general canon": 292 The
Supreme Court can and will consider only those constitutional issues
properly before it ("federal constitutional questions ... will be decided
only when it is necessary to decide them" 293 ). But the Herndon decision,
they admit, may have been less than "sympathetic. ' 294 They concede in
a footnote that if Cardozo's dissent was correct, the Court's holding
might even be "harsh.12 '9 These terms import an element of moral sentiment into the authors' discussion that is striking in view of their otherwise rigorously sober language. These words are confusing, not the least
because they are the only textual indicators of Frankfurter and Hart's
own views of the Court's decision to decline jurisdiction in Herndon.
Frankfurter and Hart compound this confusion when they subsequently
imply that although they have cited the case, it is not really a "representative" application of the Supreme Court's self-created rules of jurisdiction.29 6 This statement appears to lead the analysis into a contradiction.
One would expect some elaboration of what in Herndon v. Georgia makes
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

68.
93.

93 n.65.
93.
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the decision unrepresentative. But Frankfurter and Hart offer no such
discussion.
Taken together, the authors' uncomplimentary description of the
harsh") and their classification of it as both
case (not "sympathetic, ....
"representative" and apparently aberrational lead to one question.
Might it be that Herndon v. Georgia does not receive more thorough consideration because it is a much more difficult decision than it appears to
be? Frankfurter and Hart's uncertain treatment of the case only widens
the gap they say the legal critic must try to bridge to gain a "just understanding"2' 97 of what the Court is doing when it decides-or decides not
to decide-the constitutional issues presented in a particular case. The
reader is left with the feeling that Herndon v. Georgia does not easily fit
the category in which Frankfurter and Hart place it-indeed, that the
case seems to resist positive classification altogether.
We may leave to one side the question whether these silences are
deliberate. My analysis is directed to issues of structural organization,
not subjective intent. Focusing on structural matters, then, it is fair to
say that given the nature of their project, Frankfurter and Hart's description of Herndon v. Georgia could not help but reproduce rhetorically
many of the same omissions that traverse the text of the Court's opinion
itself.
As I have noted, despite its claims to objectivity, the primary purpose of The Business of the Supreme Court is affirmative. Frankfurter
and Hart seem especially concerned with defending the Court against the
attack of critics whose commentary is not informed by a properly "disinterested" perspective. This felt necessity effectively narrows the range of
questions Frankfurter and Hart seem able or willing to ask about the
Court's work and limits the thoroughness with which they address even
the questions they do pose. Above all, there is little if any place in their
analysis for a sustained critical engagement and interrogation of the
Court's decision in Herndon v. Georgia. However, the fact that Frankfurter and Hart neglect to address even the most abecedarian questions
about Herndon does not mean that they fail to provide the terms for their
readers to do so. That is, the validity of their analysis is only incompletely undermined by the apologetic uses to which it is put.
To establish this contention, it is helpful to imagine the multiple,
and probably unintended, meanings that the metaphor of the "business"
297.

Id. at 68.
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of the Supreme Court might have held for contemporary readers of
Frankfurter and Hart.
As Frankfurter and Hart use it, the business metaphor subsumes
two key ideas. The first has to do with judicial administration and the
value of efficient case disposition. Frankfurter and Hart place great
emphasis on the speed and proficiency with which the Hughes Court
cleared its docket during the 1934-35 term:
A tradition of prompt disposition of business for which Mr. Chief Justice Taft did so much to lay the foundations appears to have become
fixed under his successor.... The volume of litigation of which the
Court now disposes at a single term [and] the smoothness of the
administrative mechanism by which this is accomplished... would
startle the shades of Marshall and Taney.... 29s
They stress the importance of striving to "perfect the court's barriers
against excessive demands made upon it"' 299 if the Court is to continue to
standards that our constilive up to "the intellectually high and austere
'" 3 °
judges.
nine
from
exacts
tutional system
The business metaphor serves as well to provide a theoretical framework for addressing the division of labor between the state and federal
courts. Recall Frankfurter and Hart's insistence that the jurisdictive
principles and practices of the Supreme Court cannot be explained without reference to the structural issues of federal and state "power." In
Frankfurter and Hart's analysis, the rules of Supreme Court jurisdiction
reflect the limits on federal judicial review imposed by the allocation of
authority between state and national courts.3 0 1 One of the central
themes of the article is that "the progressive contraction of jurisdiction" 2 by the Supreme Court demands the constant "reaffirmation of
procedural safeguards and the assertion of new ones against subtle or
daring attempts at procedural blockade-running. '303 "From the beginning," they write, "the Supreme Court has laid down strict canons for
protection against inroads upon the defined limits of federal power and
federal judicial authority. '"' 3 4 Conventions and practices "too subtle and
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 69, 107.
Id. at 76.
Id
Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 91.
FRANKFURTER & LANDES, supra note 270, at 186.
Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 91.
Id.
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too flexible to be adequately summarized into rules"' 30 5 guide the "everyday administration of the Court. ' 30 6 These rules demonstrate the "deep
wisdom of the Court's self-restraint against undue or premature intervention" 3 7 and intrusion upon the day-to-day working of the federal constitutional system. Above all, the "procedural devices" that allow the
Court to avoid substantive intervention "in what are ultimately political
controversies ' 30 8 minimize the risk of "self-inflicted wounds" which can
only weaken "permeating confidence in the judicial process. ' 3 9 Thus,
from Frankfurter and Hart's perspective, the Court's jurisdictional and
procedural requirements function not only to make the Court more efficient. They operate as well to keep the Court from deciding too much
too often and thus from doing anything to impair its legitimacy as the
"ultimate arbiter of controversies to which a federalism like ours inevitably gives rise."'3 10 Together, these rules embody the "economy of means"
by and through which the Supreme Court goes about the "business" of
"manufacturing" legal theory.
Frankfurter and Hart understand the constitutionally and selfimposed jurisdictional limits that the Supreme Court applies in cases
such as Herndon to be indispensable for preserving the symbolic capital
of the federal judiciary and, to a lesser degree, of the national government as a whole. In this context, Frankfurter and Hart's remarks about
the Court's decision in Herndon are informed by a distinct vision of politics or, more precisely, of the relationship between politics and constitutional law. The picture of politics drawn in The Business of the Supreme
Courtis of a process hostile at all points to law. As Frankfurter and Hart
depict it, politics threatens the Court's ability to function as the disinterested, deliberative voice of the Constitution. The "business" of the
Supreme Court is, above all, to stay out of politics.
However, Frankfurter and Hart seem unable to apprehend, much
less describe, a different threatened danger: that because the distinction
between substance and procedure is as much contextual as categorical,
the Court's refusal to decide substantive constitutional questions on procedural grounds might involve the Court in the very power politics from
which the rules of jurisdiction were designed to protect it. In short,
Frankfurter and Hart seem utterly unaware of the fact that political
305.

Id. at 94.

306. Id.
307.

Id. at 107.

308. Id.
309. Id. at 105.
310. Id. at 68.
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struggles over substantive constitutional meanings could be waged even
in the passionless language of procedure. As I shall argue presently, this
was precisely the result of the Court's decision in Herndon v. Georgia not
to decide. First, however, I must briefly describe two contemporaneous
rival understandings of law and politics that might have enabled Frankfurter and Hart to offer just such an account.
B. THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
1. The Realist Challenge
By 1935, Frankfurter and Hart's vision of a Supreme Court insulated from the dirty business of politics had come under sharp attack.
Frankfurter and Hart never say who they mean when they refer to critics
of the Supreme Court who have not "adequately experienced the serious
clash of forces so often embedded in the procedural interstices of constitutional litigation,"3"' or who do not "appreciate to what extent the
Supreme Court's prestige has been won through its self-denying ordinances." 3' 12 They leave no doubt that, in their view, these critics lack a
"just understanding" 313 of the concept of jurisdiction and its procedural
complexities. The critics simply fail to place the Court's work "in the
perspective of the long process of constitutional adjudication."' 3 14 However, it is likely that Frankfurter and Hart's remarks were directed
toward at least two different critical camps.
One group would surely have been the proponents of legal realism.
The scholarship of legal realists constituted a powerful assault on the
long-standing myths of reason, autonomy, objectivity, neutrality, and
impartiality in American judicial law-on the very ideas that figure so
centrally in The Business of the Supreme Court. In their work, these
thinkers insistently hammered home the view that the traditional image
of law in America did not comport with contemporary realities. To be
sure, like Frankfurter and Hart, scholars associated with legal realism for
the most part confined themselves to case law. Nonetheless, in forcing
such insistent focus on the gaps between formal legal theory and its concrete application, the legal realists precipitated an intellectual crisis in
legal thought whose reverberations were eventually felt in the courts.
The realist project "contributed to the breakdown of formalistic, mechanistic theories of contract and property rights, which culminated in the
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
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late 1930s and early 1940s decisions of the United States Supreme Court
upholding New Deal and other Depression-era social legislation." 3'15
One of the chief targets of the realist approach was the idea that the
law is an internally consistent system or science whose component principles ultimately transcend their own historicity and whose monastic independence from the political world is perfectly expressed in judicial
decisions. In an article published the same year as The Business of the
Supreme Court, Felix S. Cohen set out to demolish the idea that courts
could or should try to distance themselves from the pressures of the
social world to which their legal decisions are addressed. "The law,"
writes Cohen, "is not a science but a practical activity. ' 3 16 Critics like
Frankfurter and Hart, who modeled their work in the image of "scientific study," were captives, in Cohen's view, of "transcendental
nonsense":
[T]he language of transcendental nonsense ...is entirely useless when
we come to study, describe, predict and criticize legal phenomena....
[T]he traditional language of argument and opinion neither explains
nor justifies court decisions. When the vivid fictions and metaphors of
traditional jurisprudence are thought of as reasons for decisions, rather
than poetical or mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached
on other grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion
or argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law
317

Similarly, five years before Frankfurter and Hart's article was published, Jerome Frank specified the relationship (or, more precisely, the
nonrelationship) between abstract legal principles and concrete legal
judgments by insisting on the difference between "rule" and "decision"
in law:
Law is made up not of rules for decision laid down by the courts but of
the decisions themselves. All such decisions are law. The fact that
courts render these decisions makes them law. There is no mysterious
entity apart from these decisions. If the judges in any case come to a
"wrong" result and give forth a decision which is discordant with their
own or any one else's rules, their decision is none the less law. The
"law of a great nation" means the decisions of a handful of old gentlemen, and whatever they refuse to decide is not law. Of course those
315. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & MADELEINE R. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 229
(1977). In a succinct formulation, Tigar and Levy argue that the realist project "is to legal ideology
as Keynesianism is to political economy." Id.
316. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 812 (1935).
317. Id. at 812.
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old gentlemen in deciding cases do not follow their own whims, but
derive their views from many sources. And among those sources are
not only statutes, precedents, customs and the like, but the rules which
other courts have announced when deciding cases. Those rules are no
more law than statutes are law. For, after all, rules are merely words
and those words can get into action only through decisions; it is for the
courts in deciding any case to say what the rules mean, whether those
rules are embodied in a statute or in the opinion of some other court.
The shape in which rules are imposed on the community is those rules
3 18
translated into concrete decisions.
The most important feature of the conceptual vocabularies forged
by such scholars as Frank and Cohen is that they provide fresh critical
perspectives for thinking about the social and historical situatedness of
law. Especially important for our purposes is the legal realist attack on
the claim that legal thought and practice reveal an immanent rationality
and internal intelligibility that constrain lawyers and judges. The realist
project carries unsettling intellectual implications for those like Frankfurter and Hart who have invested in an idealized vision of law as an
autonomous sphere that is different from, and of a higher order than, the
machinations of power politics.
2.

The Marxist Assault

In the same year that Frankfurter and Hart published The Business
of the Supreme Court, the legal realist attack was sharpened and deepened by the English schol r Harold Laski. Although not formally associated with the legal realists, Laski shared many of their views about the
instrumental functions of law and the need to recognize its membership
in the social and political community. Laski, however, pressed further
than most of the realists in an article he published in 1935 that aimed to
uncover the ideological infrastructure of American law. 3 19
The Crisis in the Theory of the State, Laski's contribution to a book
celebrating the centenary of New York University School of Law, paints
an unflattering picture of the "business" of the Supreme Court as seen
from its underside, arguing that the primary purpose of the American
legal system is to secure the political and economic interests of the elite
who control it. (His argument is of course the same one that Angelo
318. FRANK, supra note 56, at 125.
319. Harold J. Laski, The Crisis in the Theory of the State, in 2 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935 1 (1937).
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Herndon made in Let Me Live, the difference being that Laski is at the
top of the economic pyramid and Hemdon at the bottom.)
Laski's article begins with an outline of the Marxist theory of the
relation between law and the state.3 2 Laski finds in Marx an analytic
framework that, as an "index to the problems of our age," decisively
"holds the field." 3'21 Under liberal political theory, argues Laski, obedience to the state has been justified on the basis of the state's ability first to
secure order; second, to provide a technique for peaceful change; and
third, to enable material demands to be satisfied on the widest possible
scale.32 2 In Laski's view, there is no doubt that the liberal state secures
order-"this is universally admitted."3'2 3 What the liberal state fails to
do, however, is to provide a means for peaceful social and political
change and to satisfy the material needs of as many of its citizens as it
possibly can.324 In Laski's view, this twofold failure has resulted in the
"crisis" that is his topic. Laski sees Marxist political theory as providing
the best explanation of this state of affairs:
The state, it is urged, is, in fact, the supreme coercive power in any
given political society; but it is, in fact, used to protect and promote in
that society the interest of those who own its instruments of production. The state expresses a will to maintain a given system of class
relations. It does so by the use of its supreme coercive power to that
end. In the last analysis, this power consists of the defense forces of
the state. These are used, in ultimate challenge, to impose the will of
the owners of the instruments of production upon those excluded from
such ownership. Whatever the philosophic purposes attributed to the
state power, these, it is said, are the naked facts. There may be more
or less coercion at any given moment, according as the economic condition of society enables more or less concessions of material well-being
to be made to those excluded from the privileges of ownership. But
any state in which the instruments of production are privately owned
the demand
cannot [provide a technique for peaceful change and meet
325
for material satisfaction on the widest possible scale].
The critical question for Laski is whether those who defended the
classical liberal theory of the state in 1935 could show that the actual
states in which they lived-and "not an ideal state which exists only in
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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their own construction-are inherently capable, granted the class relations they maintain, of fulfilling demand on the largest possible scale, and
that, therefore, they have a moral claim to the allegiance of their
members.

326

Laski examines the legal "balance sheets"3 27 of the major capitalist
states, America included, and finds them wanting. "At bottom," contends Laski, "only the Marxian interpretation of law can explain the sub328
stance of law" in American society:
The proceedings of the American courts... in the use of the injunction, in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in their reading of industrial conspiracy into the category of tort, in their attitude
toward free speech and free assembly are all pervaded by the notion,
often hardly conscious in the individual judge, that the purpose of the
law in fact is, whatever its ideal professions, to maintain existing class
relations. It represents the use of the state's supreme coercive power
for this end and for no other end. American constitutional law is, no
doubt, elastic enough as a broad statement of principles. When it fails
to be applied by the judges, it is, in general, permeated by a philosophy
that prevents a change
in class relations being introduced through the
32 9
interstices of law.
Moreover, according to Laski, this conclusion is not invalidated by
the fact that, as a theoretical matter, much of the legal system is internally coherent and logical, or by the fact that many lawyers are indeed
committed to the ideals of equality, fairness, and justice in law. He
writes:
The lawyer's search for consistency always seeks to build a legal system that is internally logical.... But the essential shape of his effort is,
despite the reaction of the search for consistency upon the material,
inescapably set by the relations of production in any society at any
given time. Nor is it invalidated by the fact that lawyers, like most
other men, search for the good of society in the rules they evolve.
They search for the good of society as they see it; and they see the
good, broadly speaking, in terms of an experience in which they are
placed by the relations of production in which they are involved. The
economic philosophy of those who made the Napoleonic Code, of
Chief Justice Marshall, of Baron Bramwell and of Lord Farwell is
stamped unmistakably on the whole fabric of their work. Each of
them was serving the law to the best of his great ability; but each
326. Id. at 6.
327. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 71.
328. Laski, supra note 319, at 9.
329. Id.
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brought to that service33a0body of class prepossessions of which he was
definitely the prisoner.

These passages from Theory of the State set forth the three fundamental concepts in orthodox Marxist theory of the relation between law
and the state. First is the determinant effect of economic structure on
legal ideology and institutions; in Marx's terms, economic structure
"reveals the innermost secret ' 33 1 of the law in a given social formation.
Second is the concept that the main benefits of the legal system in any
society inure to its ruling classes, because the elites have designed the
system to maintain their power and privilege. Third is the critical function of the law in maintaining the specific class relations of society and
protecting the economic system from perceived or actual challenges.
In the light of more recent developments in Marxist theory, Laski's
analysis seems rather quaint.3 32 Nonetheless, Laski's article indicates the
330. Id. at 10.
331. KARL MARX, 3 CAPITAL 791 (1977).
332. Readers familiar with intellectual developments in western Marxism over the past 60 years
know that Laski's analysis is vulnerable to internal criticism on several grounds. First, Laski does
not place sufficient emphasis on the fact that the ruling class sometimes must recognize as law the
ideas, traditions, and unofficial rules of other groups to ensure the continued existence of the economic system from which it benefits. Second, Laski's analysis comes perilously close to viewing the
law as a mere epiphenomenon of the economic system on the one hand, or as the mere instrument of
class struggle on the other. Both of these views reflect what has come to be pejoratively known as a
"crude economism": They suggest that the superstructure of the law is always a direct, unalloyed
reflection of a society's economic infrastructure. The problem with both views is that they fall to
account for the ways the law must be approached as an ideological form that possesses what Marxist
theorists refer to as "relative autonomy." As Colin Sumner has noted, "law is only an instrument of
class rule through the mediating arenas of politics and ideology." SUMNER, supranote 225, at 269.
The "relative autonomy" thesis holds that law is not merely an instrument of class rule, but is
simultaneously an instrument of party politics, a protector of revered ideologies, and an agent for the
prevention of social chaos. Further, a legal system can successfully sustain itself only on the basis of
political and ideological consensus among classes (whether this consensus is spontaneous or constructed). Id. Moreover, it must be recognized that the laws that govern a particular society often
originate outside the economic infrastructure. Law, like all ideologies, arises from an ensemble of
political, cultural, and economic practices and thus reflects and expresses relations within classes as
well as class relations. The ramifications of the noneconomic determination of the law militate
against a conception of law as the mere reflection and expression of ruling class ideology, and ruling
class ideology only. Id. at 267-68.
The chief limitation of Laski's analysis in The Theory of the State may be attributed to his
failure to consider the possibility that legal institutions may be controlled by the ruling class or
classes (understanding that notion in a broad sense) and yet "not always originate economic class
conflict, function well for the ruling class, reflect the full range of ruling class opinion, remain
immune from lawyers and bureaucrats who administer it [and whose interests are not necessarily
those of a ruling class or coalition of classes], or serve economic ends." Id. at 255. The law is not
just a weapon of the ruling class, nor is it a simple mirror of the ruling class' economic ideologies. It
must never be forgotten that those who do not rule also shape the law and have legal rights-indeed,
this is why any legal system, no matter how oppressive, still points to unrealized possibilities of
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shape that a contemporaneous critical response to Frankfurter and Hart
might have taken. Laski turns the metaphor of the business of the
Supreme Court on its head, showing its hidden connection to, and dependence on, the ideological interests of those who control the capitalist
economy. For Laski, ideology is not only an indispensable condition of
the Court's "production" of constitutional law; the production of constitutional law is itself an ideological practice. Given the historical context
in which Laski spoke, Laski's equation of law with ideology must have
been nothing short of vertiginous for those who shared Frankfurter and
Hart's vision of the Court.
C.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS:

A

CRITIQUE OF

FRANKFURTER AND HART

My brief review of these two alternatives to Frankfurter and Hart's
model is obviously not intended to be exhaustive. I mention the work of
Laski, Cohen, and Frank for the modest purpose of conveying some
sense of the sharply contested character of the debate Frankfurter and
Hart joined when they published their article The Business of the
Supreme Court. Readers familiar with the positions staked out by Laski,
Cohen, and Frank would have been alert to the inherent tension between
analytical method and ideological affiliation in Frankfurter and Hart's
account of Herndon v. Georgia.
The arguments elaborated by Cohen and Frank suggest that Frankfurter and Hart might have reached a deeper understanding of Herndon
v. Georgia had they not assumed away the difference between the general
"canons" of self-restraint and respect' for state court judgments on one
hand and the concrete applications of these canons in the particular case.
Had they delved beneath the "accent and atmosphere of speech"3'33 in
the Court's decision in Herndon, perhaps they might have been more
justice, equality, and fairness; this is what I earlier called the utopian feature of law. As E.P.
Thompson has written, within a cultural Marxist framework:
It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize class relations. Its
forms and procedures may crystallize those relations and mask ulterior justice. But this
mediation, through the forms of law, is something quite distinct from the exercise of
unmediated force. The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on
occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless.
THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 266.
Thompson's characterization may be adapted from its context of class to that of race to describe
the experience of African-Americans, who have clung-often against all the evidence-to the belief
that in spite of slavery, legally enforced segregation, and countless other indignities, the Constitution
is "on our side." The belief that this is the great promise of that document has always been a central
component of the black community's vision of the American Dream.
333. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 68.
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attentive to the gulf between the abstract principles of federal court jurisdiction and the actual practices of the federal courts. In short, they
might have been forced to confront the possibility that the Court's jurisdictional and procedural "barriers" might not be able to prevent an occasional fall from high principle into low politics.
In Frank's terms, The Business of the Supreme Court fails to distinguish "rules" from "decision." Committed as they are to developing a
unitary "scientific" theory of federal court jurisdiction and procedure,
Frankfurter and Hart offer no theoretical category for the problem of
contradiction in judicial discourse: for coming to terms, that is, with the
difference between the asserted and actual reasons for a decision. More
precisely, Frankfurter and Hart never consider whether the "unsympathetic" or "harsh" outcome in Herndon v. Georgia might best be
explained not by the stated grounds of the Court's decision but rather, in
Cohen's words, by "the [social] forces which it reflect[ed]." 33' 4 Had
Frankfurter and Hart been willing to pursue an analysis along these lines,
they might have been forced to engage and interrogate the distinction
between law and politics, a distinction they simply take for granted.
Frankfurter and Hart may have felt compelled as well to examine the
concrete substantive effects of the Court's procedural defense of the
result in Herndon v. Georgia. In a scathing critical analysis of the Sacco
and Vanzetti case that he had written in 1927, Frankfurter had noted
that "[g]rave injustices... arise even under the most civilized systems of
law and despite adherence to the forms of procedure intended to safe'
In The Business of the Supreme Court, Frankguard against them."335
furter and Hart do not seem to apprehend, much less address, the
relevance of this claim to the decision in Herndon v. Georgia. In the final
instance, the authors' asserted distinction on the line of division between
law and politics, as well as between substance and procedure, enables
them to ignore a number of difficult questions about Herndon v. Georgia.
Nevertheless, the curious reader of The Business of the Supreme
Court wants to know more. Did the decision in Herndon v. Georgia actually comport with the relevant doctrine? Or, to use Frankfurter and
Hart's phrase, did Herndon "collide" with the Court's "own statement of
its functions and with its avowed criteria for their discharge"?3 36 Did the
334. Cohen, supra note 316, at 843.
335. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 108 (1927). See also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION 203 (1930) (arguing that "procedural safeguards are not enough" to prevent
judicial abuse of the labor injunction in industrial conflicts).
336. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 98.
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decision not to decide in Herndon v. Georgia depart from the idea of
"mandatory" jurisdiction laid down so long ago by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia?3 37 Did Herndon contradict the fundamental
principle that although the Court may impose procedural and jurisdictional requirements, it must decide cases that meet those requirements?33 8 A summary of Herndon appears in the very same issue of the
HarvardLaw Review as The Business of the Supreme Court. The article
argues that the Court's decision was clearly wrong: that although the
Court's procedural rules should be strictly enforced, "this case seems to
go too far.",3 39 Is this criticism unfounded?
Alongside these narrow procedural problems lie more substantive
social concerns. Recall that Herndon v. Georgia was the first sedition
case to come to the Supreme Court from the South. Moreover, it was the
first civil liberties case ever to reach the Court in which an AfricanAmerican dissident sought the protection of the First Amendment.
Finally, this particular dissident belonged to the most radical political
party in the country. The social significance of these facts was not lost
on at least one student commentator. A devastating dissection of
Herndon that appeared at about the same time as The Business of the
Supreme Court contends that the case "destroyed the expectation" raised
by the Scottsboro Cases34 that the Court would "uphold the constitutional rights of Negroes who attempt to assert them in the struggle
against their miserable economic and social status."3 4 '
The failure of the Court to avail itself of this opportunity to discourage
other legal and extra-legal methods of preventing such assertion and
the encouragement at the same time of the employment of criminal
statutes clearly designed for other purposes to defeat the exercise of
civil liberties, are to be deplored. It is conceivable that in the present
period of social unrest the Court reached the result it did in order to
avoid the necessity of formulating a standard according to which
337. It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally
true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may,
avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it
by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly
avoid; but we cannot avoid them.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (emphasis added).
338. See sources cited supra note 18.
339. Recent Cases, 49 HARV. L. REv. 143, 151 (1935).
340. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
341. Recent Decisions, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 1129, 1147 (1935).
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"sedition" legislation might be tested. This may have the factual consequence of arousing the feeling in oppressed groups that the protection of their constitutional rights lies not in the courts 342
but in
organization against the forces working for their suppression.
Frankfurter and Hart argue that "conflicts of jurisdiction between
state and federal courts" are at base "questions of power as between the
states and the nation. '34 3 As we have seen, the racial implications of

Herndon's arrest and trial were clear. In the Scottsboro cases, the
Supreme Court had placed weight on the racial dimensions of Southern

political and legal culture. Were these issues irrelevant to the outcome in
Herndon v. Georgia? What is the reader of Herndon v. Georgia to make
of the fact that the opinion never mentions any of these aspects of the

case at all?

D. THE RHETORIC OF RESISTANCE
If we insist less forcefully than Frankfurter and Hart on the difference between law and politics, we might find the terms for addressing
3
these questions in the rhetorical discourse of Herndon v. Georgia. 1 I
mean to show that a rhetorical reading of Herndon v. Georgiamight most
profitably proceed by attending to the "politics of discourse" that
informs the Court's analysis of when, how, and to whom it may "speak
'
the law."345
Viewed in these terms, the Court's opinion reveals itself to
be an instance of the very power that it claims merely to address.
I take the conception of rhetoric as the politics of discourse from
Paolo Valesio.346 Valesio argues that "it is no more possible to speak
'
without being rhetorical than it is to live without breathing."347
All
communication is in this sense rhetorical. Valesio maintains that even
discourses like the discourse of law, which pretend a plain, forthright
opposition to rhetorical ornament, embody a subtle and deceitful form of
rhetoric-what he calls the "rhetoric of anti-rhetoric. ' 348 Valesio argues
for a technique of "political" reading that delves beneath a discourse's
342. Id. at 1147.
343. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 91 (emphasis added).
344. As used here, "rhetorical discourse" means the functional deployment of tropes and
figures, not empty eloquence or bombast.
345. I mean here, of course, to evoke the sedimented etymological history of the concept of
"jurisdiction," which fuses two Latin words-jus and its cognatejuris (right or law) and dictio (from
dicere, meaning to speak or declare). 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DicTIONARY 1522 (1971).
346.

PAOLO VALESiO, NOVANTIQUA 44-45 (1980).

347.
348.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 44.
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apparent subject matter to reveal the rhetorical structures that are its
"bones and sinews," indeed its very "biological structure."'3 49 Rhetoric,
in this perspective, "constitutes the real politics of the text-the only
350
kind of politics that is really relevant to its interpretation.
Few would disagree that the judicial opinion can be placed squarely
within the tradition of the "literature of legal persuasion"3 51 and conviction. As Anthony Kronman puts it, the legal discourse represents, "in
352
essence, the construction of a convincing or persuasive argument.
Similarly, Mark Tushnet has broadly defined judicial opinions as "structures of thought... [fixed in] documents designed to convince by linking
5 s
's
specific results to general assumptions.
What is most striking about the opinion in Herndon v. Georgia,however, is the degree to which the suasive work of the text relies on silence
and strategic omission. The structured absences in the text of the Court's
opinion can nonetheless be forced to yield up their meaning. A group of
contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions (whose connections to
Herndon seem to have eluded most students of the case) help to show
that while the Court's opinion in Herndon v. Georgia claims to be and
appears to be about radical politics, it is in fact best understood as a case
about the politics of race.
The starting point for such a reading is the very first line of Justice
Sutherland's opinion for the Court:
Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment upon conviction
by a jury in a Georgia court of first instance of an attempt to incite
insurrection by endeavoring to induce others to join in combined
resistance to the authority of the state to be accomplished by acts of
violence, in violation of Section 56 of the Penal Code of Georgia. The
supreme court of the state affirmed the judgment.... On this appeal,
the statute is assailed as contravening the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in certain designated particulars. We find it
unnecessary to review the points made, since this court is without
jurisdiction for the reason that no federal question was seasonably
raised in the court below or passed upon by that court.3 54
349.
350.
351.
352.
955, 961

Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J.
(1981).

353. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 30 (1981).

354. Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 442 (1935) (footnote omitted).
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This opening passage serves a double function. One commentator
has suggested that a "substantial part of legal discourse is not even particularly legal.., but is merely descriptive of thefacts to be dealt with."3 5
This suggests that the "mere description" of the facts in legal discourse
cannot be said to be part of its ideological composition; it is, rather, a
neutral statement of "what happened." To borrow a set of analytic categories developed by Roland Barthes, one might say that this understanding is underwritten by a distinction between factual "functions" and
ideological "indices" of a text.3" 6 Within the general rhetorical economy
of the opinion, however, the ideological valence of the opening statement
of the "facts" in Herndon v. Georgia admits of no such hard and fast
distinction. Sutherland's words carry the twofold force of factual
"description" and normative "judgment." It is more than a "mere"
technical summary of "the facts to be dealt with." The abstraction and
reduction of complex social events to the simplified language of "facts" is
not, of course, unique; it does not appear only in a discourse like law,
which works in general concepts, categories, and classifications-it is a
feature of all language. Richard Wasserstrom has noted that the language of "law is conservative in the same way in which [all] language is
conservative. It seeks to assimilate everything that happens to that
which has happened." 3" 7 Nonetheless, factual description in law quite
obviously can entail different ideological effects in different concrete
contexts.
In my view, it is precisely the conservatism of this statement of the
facts-what it does not say-that alerts us to the form of the discursive
politics of Herndon v. Georgia. The opening passage provides an exemplary instance of what Valesio calls the "rhetoric of anti-rhetoric."3 ' Its
substantive function is to limit the scope of the questions that the Court
will address to its narrowest possible range. Note how little information
is given about the "appellant" or about the substantive constitutional
issues the Court is being asked to address: "We find it unnecessary to
355. SUMNER, supra note 225, at 273 (emphasis added). Sumner goes on to say:
This part of the discourse is difficult to evaluate when it exists in a judicial decision, for
what count as "the facts of the case" are the product of the filtering mechanisms of the trial
and pre-trial investigations. Facts can be constructed either by accident, by the court procedure or by lies, just as much in the legal system as in any other form of social practice.
In any case, whether true, false or somewhere in between, "the facts" are a substantial part,
or reference point, of legal discourse.
Id.
356.
(Michael
357.
358.

Roland Barthes, Historical Discourse, in INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALISM 145
Lane ed., 1970); see also Guha, The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,supra note 28.
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, in RULE OF LAw 31 (R. Wolff ed., 1971).
VALESIO, supra note 347, at 44.
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review the points made" to support the appeal. Note, too, the passivity
of the language of the final sentence of the paragraph: The problem of
jurisdiction, the power of the Court to "speak law," is rhetorically
framed as something that is "found" or "vested" or "conferred"-not
something that is "taken." In Sutherland's view, the Court, through no
fault of its own, is "without jurisdiction." This presumption of
powerlessness shapes the Court's subsequent discussion and guides us
toward the political core of the text.
Let us compare the passive language of Justice Sutherland with the
statement of the facts in Justice Cardozo's dissent.3 59 Cardozo begins by
noting that "[t]he appellant has been convicted of an attempt to incite
insurrection in violation of the Penal Code of Georgia.""a Although the
language in which Cardozo frames his statement of the facts is, like Sutherland's opinion, rigorously technical, it stands in subtle but significant
contrast to Sutherland's opening lines. Cardozo approaches the facts of
the case in terms of the events that led to Herndon's conviction. Sutherland, on the other hand, begins by noting that the "appellant" was "sentenced" to a prison term. By itself, Sutherland's focus on the
consequences of the conviction, as opposed to the legal processes that led
to the conviction, may not mean much. However, Sutherland's emphasis
on punishment is resonant with political meaning, especially when one
remembers just who the "appellant" was-a fact that the opinion very
carefully avoids mentioning.
The exclusionary force of the bloodless factual language Sutherland
uses to set up his legal analysis becomes clear when one compares it to
the opening lines of Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, the 1932
decision in which the Court first took up the constitutional issues
presented in the Scottsboro Cases:
The petitioners, hereinafter referred to as defendants, are negroes
charged with the crime of rape, committed upon the persons of two
white girls. The crime is said to have been committed on March 25,
1931. The indictment was returned in a state court of first instance on
March 31, and the record recites that on the same day the defendants
were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty ... no counsel had been
employed, and aside from a statement made by the trial judge several
days later ... the record does not disclose when . . . or who was
appointed .... It is perfectly apparentthat the proceedings,from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited
359. 295 U.S. at 448 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Of course, given their opposing arguments, one
can see that the rhetorical strategies of these two opinions should be directly opposite.
360. Id. at 446 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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public sentiment. During the entire time, the defendants were closely
confined or were under military guard. The record does not disclose
their ages, except that one of them was nineteen; but the record clearly
indicates that most, if not all, of them were youthful, and they are
constantly referred to as "the boys." They were ignorant and illiterate
361

This passage is also a statement of the "facts" of a case; but the differences between the two texts, written by the same author, are remarkable.
In Powell, Sutherland is keenly aware of the concrete circumstances in
which the Court is intervening. His rhetoric captures the sociopolitical
drama behind the legal questions to which the Court's judgment is
addressed: It notes the convergence of race, gender, age, and class, and it
uses the statement of facts to presage the outcome.
The stark contrast between the rhetorical politics of Powell and the
textual strategy of Herndon is startling. In Herndon, Sutherland does
not note even once that Angelo Herndon, the "appellant" (never even the
"defendant"), was black, or that he was only 19 at the time of his arrest
and conviction. But for the pronoun "he," the reader would have no
clue even as to Herndon's gender. Nor does Sutherland discuss at all the
extent to which Herndon's trial, like that of the Scottsboro defendants,
took place in a "tense, hostile" atmosphere. The Court cannot have been
unmindful of these omitted facts. The constitutional relevance of race in
Herndon is underscored in the evidentiary record and in Herndon's brief,
which describes Sutherland's "accused" as "a Negro." '6 2 The marked
exclusion from Sutherland's opinion of the "language of race ' 36 3 is the
most significant textual indication of the Court's determination to avoid
the constitutional issues in Herndon v. Georgia, and with them the political realities in which these issues were lodged.
To make the point another way: The Court's silence on the politics
of race must be read symptomatically. My choice of that term is deliberate. Sigmund Freud identified the essence of repression as "simply...
turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious." 3" The Court's omission of the fact that Herndon was an African-American criminal defendant appealing a conviction from a
southern court is a textualized instance of such a psychic gesture. I shall
361. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-52 (1932) (emphasis added).
362. Brief for Appellant at 5, Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (Nos. 474 & 475).
363. Charles Miller, ConstitutionalLaw and The Rhetoric of Race, in LAW IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 147 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
364. Sigmund Freud, Repression, in XIV THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 141, 147 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1957).
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consider in more depth the meaning of the Court's silence on Herndon's
race, because it highlights the need to pay close attention to the "political
unconscious ' 365 of the judicial discourse in Herndon. But first I will discuss Sutherland's other rhetorical silences so that we may consider his
silence on Herndon's race against this broader constellation.
We have seen that the inaugural gesture of Sutherland's opinion is
one of exclusion, omission, and silence. This rhetorical strategy sets the
analytic itinerary of the rest of the opinion:
It is true that there was a preliminary attack upon the indictment in
the trial court on the ground, among others, that the statute was in
violation "of the Constitution of the United States," and that this contention was overruled. But, in addition to the insufficiency of the specification, the adverse action of the trial court was not preserved by
exceptions pendente lite or assigned as error in due time in the bill of
exceptions, as the settled rules of the state practice require. In that
situation, the state supreme court declined to review any of the rulings
of the trial court in respect of that and other preliminary issues; and
this determination of the state court is conclusive here. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 585; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U.S.
532, 535; Nevada-California-OregonRy. v. Burrus, 244 U.S. 103, 105;
Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U.S. 394, 400; Central Union Telephone Co. v.
Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 194-195; Erie R.R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U.S.
148, 154; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U.S. 291, 308.
The federal question was never properly presented to the state
supreme court unless upon motion for rehearing; and that court then
refused to consider it. The long-established general rule is that the
attempt to raise a federal question after judgment, upon a petition for
rehearing, comes too late, unless the court actually entertains the ques-

tion and decides it. Texas & Pacific C. Ryo Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,
137 U.S. 48, 54; Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U.S. 580, 585; Godchaux Co.
v. Estopinal, 251 U.S. 179, 181; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S.
114, 117; Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,263 U.S. 444, 454-455, and cases
cited.36 6

The conceptual infrastructure of this passage argues that a judicial
decision can be justified only if it is authorized by an already-existing rule
of law-that is, by "precedent. 3 67 I need not enter here into a fullfledged discussion of theories of legal precedent. Rather, I want to
approach the dialectical relay between assertion and appeal to authority
365.
366.
367.

See generally Jameson, supra note 218.
Herndon, 295 U.S. at 442-43.
RICHARD WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 39-83 (1961).
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set up in this passage in terms of what might be called the "politics of
spatialization." As law, the thrust of the passage is clear enough: The
Supreme Court cannot reach the merits of Herndon v. Georgia because
the case's constitutional question was not raised in the trial court and the
state supreme court declined to consider it. As discourse, the passage
links the past and the present in space, on the page, joining them in a
conceptual and doctrinal identity. The unstated assumption behind the
citations is that the Court is only doing here what it has done many times
before, that this case is the same as the past cases cited in the text. The
Court has no choice but to decline jurisdiction, because like cases must
be treated alike. Thus, the discussion of Angelo Herndon's unsuccessful
attack on his conviction is situated in an appeal to the authority of the
past. "[T]he settled rules of state practice" and a "long-established general rule" dictate the result. But this passage is no less ideological than
the omission of all information that would have humanized "the
accused" or brought to light the social and political circumstances of his
case. This becomes clearer in the next paragraph of the opinion:
Petitioner, however, contends that the present case falls within an
exception to the rule-namely, that the question respecting the validity
of the statute as applied by the lower court first arose from its unanticipated act in giving to the statute a new construction which threatened
rights under the Constitution. There is no doubt that the federal claim
was timely if the ruling of the state court could not have been anticipated and a petition for rehearing presented the first opportunity for
raising it. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317, 320; Ohio v. Akron Park
District,281 U.S. 74, 79; Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313, 320; Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 677-678; American Surety Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 164; Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Co.,
287 U.S. 358, 367. The whole point, therefore, is whether the ruling
here assailed [that is, that of the Georgia Supreme Court] should have
been anticipated.3 68
In the discussion of the trial proceedings, I note that Judge Wyatt
instructed the jury that mere advocacy of insurrection, "however reprehensible morally," would not justify a guilty verdict unless the jury found
that Herndon had intended his advocacy to be acted upon immediately:
"In order to convict the defendant, gentlemen, it must appear clearly by
the evidence that immediate serious violence against the State of Georgia
was to be expected or was advocated., 369 Although Herndon's counsel
objected to this charge, it was in fact stricter than the test they argued
368. 295 U.S. at 443-44.
369. Transcript, supra note 45, at 133 (emphasis added).
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should be applied: the clear and present danger test. The Supreme Court
had applied the clear and present danger test to statutes, like section 56
of the Georgia Penal Code, that did not criminalize specific language but
merely prohibited certain acts. When the acts were verbal, the Court had
held that a conviction could stand only when "the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils" that Congress and the state legislatures had a "right to prevent. '370
From Herndon's point of view, then, the critical question on appeal
to the Georgia Supreme Court was not whether the trial court had given
an unfavorable jury charge-it had not-but whether the evidence warranted a conviction under the jury instruction the trial court had given.
However, the state supreme court ruled that the trial court had been
wrong in its charge: Section 56, the court said, did not require that violence should follow Herndon's words immediately, or even at all (nor,
presumably, that the violent consequences be "serious" or "widespread"); rather, it "would be sufficient that [Herndon] intended [violence] to happen at any time, as a result of his influence, by those whom
he sought to incite. ' 71 On that reading, the court refused to overturn
Herndon's conviction. This expansive (to say the least) reading smacks
of the old "bad tendency" test the Supreme Court had (apparently)
rejected in favor of the clear and present danger test.a72 As Chafee points
out in Free Speech in the United States, the state supreme court's test was
"so wide as to be fatal to open discussion"3 73 or even moderate disagreement and dissent. 374 It was this radically open-ended bad tendency interpretation that Herndon's counsel challenged for the first time on a
motion for rehearing (a motion the state court rejected on the rather
capricious ground that it had not literally meant at any time, but only
any reasonable time). 75 Similarly, it was this unanticipated interpretation of section 56 that was the basis of the argument made on Herndon's
370. This formulation of the test is taken, of course, from Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
371. Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597, 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934) (emphasis added).
372. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1009 (12th ed. 1991).
373. CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 394.
374. And as Justice Owen Roberts pointed out two years after the Court's decision, in Herndon
v. Lowry:
Within what time might one reasonably expect that an attempted organization of the Communist Party in the United States would result in violent action by that party? If a jury
returned a special verdict saying twenty years or even fifty years the verdict could not be
shown to be wrong.
301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937).
375. Transcript, supra note 45, at 195.
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behalf before the Supreme Court: that Herndon's case fell within the recognized exception to the rule that the Supreme Court could not take
jurisdiction of cases in which the constitutional issues the Court was
being asked to decide had been raised for the first time on a motion for
rehearing in the highest state
court after that court had heard and
37 6
appeal.
upon
case
the
decided
As Sutherland analyzes the case, the "whole point" in Herndon v.
Georgia is not that the state court rejected the trial court's jury charge
but rather that Herndon's counsel should have known that the trial
court's charge was wrong:
The verdict of the jury was returned on January 18, 1933, and judgment immediately followed. On July 5, 1933, the trial court overruled
a motion for new trial. The original opinion was handed down and the
judgment of the state supreme court entered on May 24, 1934, the case
having been in that court since the preceding July.
On March 18, 1933, several months prior to the action of the trial
court on the motion for new trial, the state supreme court had decided
Carrv. State, 176 Ga. 747; 169 S. E. 201. In that case Section 56 of the
Penal Code, under which it arose, was challenged as contravening the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court in substance construed the statute
as it did in the present case. In the course of the opinion it said (p.
750): "'It [the state] cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace of imminent
and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. .

.

. Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the

advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of
the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait
until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect
itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the
government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor
courts for the enforcement of the law.' "The language contained in the
subquotation is taken from People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 35; 136 N. E.
505, and is quoted with approval by this court in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 669.
In the present case, following the language quoted at an earlier
point in this opinion to the effect that it was sufficient if the defendant
intended an insurrection to follow at any time, etc., the court below, in
its original opinion, (178 Ga. 855) added--"It was the intention of this
376.

Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1935).
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law to arrest at its incipiency any effort to overthrow the State government, where 377
it takes the form of an actual attempt to incite
insurrection."

The textual strategy of Sutherland's argument warrants careful scrutiny. What Sutherland has to say about the language of the Georgia
Supreme Court's Carr decision provides the reader with a guide to how
Sutherland thinks Herndon v. Georgiashould be read. Sutherland writes:
The phrase "at any time" is not found in the foregoing excerpt from
the Carr case, but it is there in effect, when the phrase is given the
meaning disclosed by the context, as that meaning is pointed out by the
court below in its opinion denying the motion for a rehearing (179 Ga.
600), when it said that the phrase was necessarily intended to mean
within a reasonable time-"that is, within such time as one's persuasion or other adopted means might reasonably be expected to be
directly operative in causing an insurrection."
Appellant, of course, cannot plead ignorance of the ruling in the
Carrcase, and was therefore bound to anticipate the probability of a
similar ruling in his own case, and preserve his right to a review here
by appropriate action upon the original hearing in the court below. It
follows that his contention that he raised the federal question at the
first opportunity is without substance, and the appeal must be dis3 78
missed for want of jurisdiction.
In one breath, Sutherland concedes that Carr never unequivocally repudiated the clear and present danger test in favor of the bad tendency
standard. In the next breath, he says that Herndon's counsel should
have acted as though Carr had, "in effect," adopted the bad tendency
test. Herndon's counsel did not do this; therefore, the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction. Thus, in Sutherland's hermeneutic model,
Herndon's counsel were expected to act on their interpretation of what
the Georgia Supreme Court did not say.
We do not face this problem with respect to the Sutherland opinion
in Herndon v. Georgia. Rather, the problem is that Sutherland says altogether too much. In the last pages of Herndon, Sutherland analyzes in
detail the Georgia Supreme Court's disposition of. the appeals of the
Atlanta Six, a group of white Communists who were arrested under section 56 two years before Angelo Herndon was. 379 The apparent purpose
377.
378.
379.
officially

Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. The charges against the Atlanta Six were
dropped in 1939. See MARTIN, supra note 91, at 212.
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of this discussion is to explain why Herndon's counsel should have anticipated the state supreme court's bad tendency construction of section 56.
Justice Sutherland's analysis is, however, irrelevant on at least two
counts. Sutherland's analysis ignores the radically different context in
which the state court discussed section 56 in Carr. Cardozo, however,
devotes the greater part of his dissent to a sympathetic re-creation of
what Carr might have looked like from the perspective of Herndon's
counsel. Cardozo sets out to show that even if Herndon's attorney had
been aware of Carr, he would still have had no inkling that the state
court would review Herndon's conviction under a much looser standard
than the clear and present danger test. The state supreme court issued
two separate opinions in the Carr case. To understand Cardozo's position, we must briefly discuss them both.
The Georgia Supreme Court's first decision in the Carr case, Carrv.
State 1,380 was issued several months before Angelo Herndon's trial.
This appeal came to the court on demurrer to an indictment under section 58 (not section 56) of the Georgia Penal Code. The criminal prohibition set out in section 58 applied only to the circulation of
insurrectionary literature: That is, it was a statute that specifically
referred to written language. Thus, according to Justice Cardozo, section 58 was like the New York criminal anarchy act in Gitlow v. New
York: 3 1 It placed statutorily denied "insurrectionary" language on an
"expurgatory index," 38 2 and a conviction under the statute could be sustained without reference to the clear and present danger test.38 3 Cardozo
notes that in Gitlow, the Court had drawn a sharp distinction "between
statutes condemning utterances identified by a description of their meaning and statutes condemning them by reference to the results that they
are likely to induce." 3 4 He calls attention to language in Gitlow that
suggests that the clear and present danger test should be applied to cases
in the latter, "circumstantial," category.38 5 He then argues that this distinction undercut the Herndon majority's reliance on CarrI as a reason
for refusing to reach the merits of Herndon's claim:
The conduct charged to this appellant-in substance an attempt to
enlarge the membership of the Communist party in the city of
Atlanta-falls, it will be assumed, within the second of these groupings
380. 166 S.E. 827 (Ga. 1932).
381. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
382. 295 U.S. at 450.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 451.
385. Id.
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[that is, in the category of acts rather than language], but plainly is
outside the first. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court
of Georgia, when it quoted from the opinion in Gitlow's case, rejected
the restraints which the author of that opinion had placed upon his
words. For the decision of the case before it there was no need to go so
far. Circulation of documents with intent to incite to revolution had
been charged in an indictment. The state had the power to punish
such an act as criminal, or so the court had held. How close the nexus
would have to be between the attempt and its projected consequences
was matter for the trial.38 6

Thus, for Cardozo, all that the state court had held in CarrI was "that
upon the fact of the indictment there had been a willful incitement to
violence, sufficient, if proved, to constitute a crime."3'87
Carr v. State 11318 was decided in March 1933, after Herndon had
been convicted but before his attorney had moved for a new trial. Like
Carr1,Carr H1 came before the Georgia Supreme Court on demurrer.
Cardozo argues that the Herndon majority's reliance on Carr11 was also
misplaced. For him the holding in CarrII, as in CarrI, was much narrower than the majority believed: "All that the court held was that when
attacked by demurrer the indictment would stand. '3 89 This was clear to
Cardozo from the headnote to the decision, drafted by the state court
itself. Furthermore, Cardozo notes that the state court referred to the
headnote in the body of its decision and then reaffirmed its holding in
Carr1,quoting much of the same language from Gitlow. 39° In Cardozo's
view, the plain meaning of the language lifted from Gitlow left no doubt
that the Gitlow analysis applied to statutes that denounced a particular,
named doctrine and prohibited attempts to teach it. Cardozo insists that
the language from Gitlow "gives... no test of the bond of union between
39 1
an idea and an event."
Cardozo then goes on to point out that not only Herndon's counsel
but even Herndon's trial judge had apparently thought that the Carr
decisions had no bearing on Herndon's case.3 92 He notes that at the time
of Herndon's trial, the Georgia Supreme Court had not yet unequivocally rejected the clear and present danger rule; indeed, he points out, the
trial court had made that rule the law of the case at Herndon's trial. To
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id.
Id. at 449.
169 S.E. 201 (Ga. 1933).
295 U.S. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 451-52.
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have met the jurisdictional requirements imposed by the majority in
Herndon v. Georgia, Cardozo insists, Herndon's counsel would have had
to predict the Georgia Supreme Court's rejection of the clear and present
danger test, even though at that point "there had been no threat of any
change, still less any forecast of its form or measure."3'93 He would have
had to ask the trial court for a far less favorable substitute charge. "It is
a novel doctrine," writes Cardozo,
that a defendant who has had the benefit of all he asks, and indeed of a
good deal more, must place a statement on the record that if some
other court at some other time shall read the statute differently, there
will be a denial of liberties that at the moment of the protest are
unchallenged and intact. Defendants charged with crime are as slow
as are men generally to borrow trouble of the future.39 4
Moreover, Cardozo flatly rejects the idea that Herndon's appeal to the
state supreme court should have attacked the court's rejection of the
clear and present danger test even though the court had not yet rejected
the test. Requiring Herndon to have done this, Cardozo writes, violated
Supreme Court precedent and undermined "the doctrine that must prevail if the great securities of the Constitution are not to be lost in a web of
procedural entanglements.,

395

A second reason for being suspicious of Sutherland's analysis is that
the issue of whether Herndon's counsel should have anticipated a broad
interpretation of section 56 is a separate question from whether
Herndon's appeal from that reading was timely. Sutherland treats these
two distinct questions as though they are analytically inseparable.
"There is no doubt," he writes, "that the federal claim was timely if the
ruling of the state court could not have been anticipated and a petition
for rehearing presented the first opportunity for raising it.",396 Because

the timeliness of Herndon's attack on the state court's interpretation
depended not on the ability of his counsel to predict the interpretation
but rather on the "settled rules of state practice" to which Sutherland is
so deferential, Sutherland's analysis poses the wrong question: The
"whole point" is whether the petition for rehearing to the state supreme
393. Id. at 452.
394. Id. at 448.
395. Id. at 452-53. Cardozo's opinion in Herndon v. Georgia is a powerful example of his
description of the discourse of dissent: "Deep conviction and warm feeling are saying their last say
with knowledge that the cause is lost. The voice of the majority may be that of force triumphant,
content with the plaudits of the hour .... The dissenter speaks to the future.. " BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 354 (Margaret E. Hall ed.,
1947).
396. 295 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
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court was Herndon's first opportunity to challenge that court's interpretation of section 56 on federal constitutional grounds. Sutherland's opinion does not address this question at all. It raises the timeliness issue in
passing, but it never squarely attempts to resolve it. Sutherland focuses
solely on the anticipation question; the more technical and critical timeliness question literally disappears from view. Like the question of race, it
becomes part of the structure of omissions around which the rhetorical
politics of the opinion in Herndon v. Georgia revolves.
Had the Herndon Court been disposed to probe more deeply into
local state practice, it might have discovered that under Georgia's rules
of criminal procedure, the petition for rehearing before the state supreme
court was in fact the first clear chance for Herndon's counsel to challenge
the constitutionality of the court's interpretation of section 56. This was
true even if the court's broader construction of the statute could somehow have been anticipated. As Herudon's counsel pointed out to the
Supreme Court in a petition for rehearing after Herndon v. Georgia, 97 a
motion for a new trial after Herdon's conviction was unavailable;3 98 a
motion in arrest of judgment could not be made;3 9 9 and under the Georgia law of criminal procedure, a constitutional question not raised in the
trial court could not be argued on appeal to the state supreme court. 0
In short, under the "settled rules of state practice," there was no procedural device available except the motion for rehearing to preserve
Herndon's right to review in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court, then, had refused to take jurisdiction over Herndon's case on the
ground that Herndon's counsel had failed to meet what was in effect an
unmeetable jurisdictional requirement.
It might be argued that it is unfair to criticize the result in Herndon
v. Georgia on the basis of Georgia case law that, after all, was not
brought to the Court's attention until after the Court decided not to
reach the merits of Herndon's claim. Leaving aside the fact that the
Court denied the petition that contained this information, I concede that
at first consideration this objection carries some force. But it can be sustained only if one ignores the emerging constitutional understandings of
397. Angelo Herndon was represented in the Supreme Court by Whitney North Seymour, Walter Gellhorn, Carol King, and Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler discusses his work on the Herndon
appeals in Tape of The Reminiscences of Herbert Wechsler (Feb. 23, 1979, & Mar. 12-13, 1982) (on
file in the Columbia University Oral History Collection, New York).
398. Hendry v. State, 93 S.E. 413, 415 (Ga. 1917).
399. Herron v. State, 19 S.E. 243, 244 (Ga. 1894); Beall v. State, 41 S.E. 654 (Ga. 1902).
400. State v. Henderson, 48 S.E. 334, 336 (Ga. 1904); Moore v. State, 55 S.E. 327, 328 (Ga.
1906).
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racial politics against which the Court's choice to forgo a decision on the
merits of Herndon's claim must be read.
Earlier in my discussion, I contrasted the texture and tone of Justice
Sutherland's statement of the facts in Herndon with his statement of the
facts in Powell v. Alabama. In Herndon, Sutherland recites an antiseptic
procedural account; but in Powell, he painstakingly situates his discussion of the constitutional issues in a concrete social and political context.
What is interesting is that Powell, not Herndon, is the norm. Of the
Court's decisions from this period that invalidated the convictions of
African-American defendants on constitutional grounds, all except
Herndon follow Powell's rhetorical strategy with respect to the politics of
race.
Consider, for example, the language of the Court's opinions in Norris v. Alabama4 "1 and Patterson v. Alabama,4 ' 2 decided a bare month
before Herndon v. Georgia. Writing for the Court in Norris, Chief Justice
Hughes begins by noting that the "[p]etitioner, Clarence Norris, is one of
nine negro boys who were indicted in March, 1931, in Jackson County
Alabama, for the crime of rape."'40 3 In Patterson, another opinion by the
Chief Justice, the race of the defendant and the location of his alleged
introduce the Court's analysis of the relevant constitutional
crime 4also
issues. 04
A year after Herndon, in Brown v. Mississippi,4 "5 the Court invalidated several murder convictions because they were based solely on confessions procured by physical torture. Chief Justice Hughes again wrote
the opinion, quoting extensively from the Alabama Supreme Court's
opinion in the case. The quoted passages refer to the defendants as "all
ignorant negroes ' ' ° and describe in meticulous detail the torture of
these "helpless prisoners""4 7 at the hands of a white "mob." 4 "8
In each of these cases, the Court placed the brute facts of racism and
power in the foreground of its constitutional analysis. The opinions in
Brown, Norris, Powell, and Pattersonemphasize these realities of race and
region even though on the face of it none of the cases required it. Indeed,
in Patterson, sensitivity to racial politics led the Chief Justice to address
401. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
402. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
403. 294 U.S. at 588.
404. 294 U.S. at 601.
405. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
406. Id. at 281.
407. Id. at 282.
408. Id.
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the substantive constitutional issues even though the State of Alabama
claimed that the Court could not properly take jurisdiction. 4 9 Significantly, the jurisdictional question in Patterson was whether the defendant
had lost his right to Supreme Court review by failing to take timely
action in the state courts to preserve his federal claim.4"' In Herndon,
Hughes agreed with Sutherland that Angelo Herndon had forfeited his
right to Supreme Court jurisdiction; but here, he had no time for too
fastidious a concern for the procedural difficulties of the case, given what
'4
he describes in constitutional terms as a "serious situation." 1
A reading of the rhetoric of Herndon v. Georgia against the backdrop of the Court's opinions in these other cases leaves no doubt that
Sutherland's silence in Herndon is indeed "harsh."' 4 2 In my view, the
Court's refusal to take up Herndon's substantive claim in Herndon v.
Georgia is best understood in political rather than procedural terms.
In Brown, Norris,Powell, and Patterson, the Supreme Court acted to
protect African-Americans against the most egregious uses of the criminal process as an instrument of racial domination. I believe that the
Court was able to justify these interventions to the country and to itself
by showing that the defendants in those cases fit contemporary cultural
images of African-Americans. These defendants, as Justice Sutherland
writes in Powell, were "ignorant and illiterate Negroes" and thus fit
4 13
objects for a jurisprudence of "mercy.
Herndon confronted the Court with an altogether different sort of
black defendant. The Angelo Herndon case marked the first occasion on
which the Supreme Court was forced to come to terms so directly with
the concept of political crime in a case in which the alleged criminal was
a black American. If Angelo Herndon was a political criminal, what of
the white southerners who, if the Court upheld his conviction, stood
ready to punish him? The Court had to face harsh historical and contemporary realities that it could neither ignore nor openly acknowledge.
409. 294 U.S. at 602.
410. Patterson claimed that blacks had been unlawfully excluded from juries in the Alabama
county in which he was indicted. Id. at 601.
411. While we must have proper regard [for the rulings] of the state court in relation to its
appellate procedure, we cannot ignore the exceptional features of the present case. An
important question under the Federal Constitution was involved ....It is always hazardous to apply a judicial ruling especially in a matter of procedure, to a serious situation
which was not in contemplation when the ruling was made.
Id. at 605, 607 (emphasis added).
412. Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 254, at 93.
413. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
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If it intervened, it would have to decisively condemn the racial and political culture that Herndon too had fought. This was a step that ideology
and cultural experience did not yet allow the Court to take. Indeed,
shortly before it decided Herndon v. Georgia, it also declared that the
4 14
Texas Democratic Party's exclusion of blacks was not state action,
showing its willingness to tolerate all but the most visible, formal exclusions of black Americans from the political process.
In 1937, two years after Herndon v. Georgia and one year after its
denial of a motion for a rehearing in the case, the Supreme Court issued
its third, final, favorable judgment on Angelo Herndon's constitutional
claim. 15 The Court's ultimate vindication of Angelo Herndon's First
Amendment rights marks an important moment in the history of free
speech jurisprudence. As a doctrinal matter, it can and should be viewed
as a landmark First Amendment decision. What I have tried to show
here, however, is that the history of the Angelo Herndon case is more
than a story about the constitutional politics of the First Amendment.
There is another story behind the case, and that story is about the
constitutional politics of race. Properly understood, the Herndon case
must be placed at the intersection of two jurisprudential axes. The
Angelo Herndon case marks the beginnings of the modem Supreme
Court's hesitant and halting efforts to address the dissonance in American legal and political consciousness between two competing images of
the African-American community generally and of the black male in particular: as an ignorant and helpless victim on one hand and a dangerous
insurgent on the other. In the 1930s, these two contradictory images of
the black American still weighed like a nightmare on the white American
mind. In Herndon v. Georgia, the Supreme Court found itself caught
between these two warring cultural images, which held decidedly different political and constitutional implications. Rather than choose
between them, the Court decided not to decide.
V.

CONCLUSION

David Luban has recently argued that legal discourse is "neither
analytic nor empirical, but rather historical. The life of the law is not a
vision of the future but a vision of the past. . ,,4""
Legal argument may
414. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
415. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
416. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2152,
2154 (1989).
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thus be understood as "a struggle for the privilege of recounting the past.
To the victor goes the right to infuse a constitutional clause, or a statute,
or a series of prior decisions with the meaning that it will henceforth bear
"417

What Professor Luban says of legal argument and its outcome holds
equally true for argument and interpretation in legal history. This Article has undertaken a historical rereading of the Angelo Herndon case
from below. I have focused on the events leading up to the Supreme
Court's decision in Herndon v. Georgia. I have done this not because I
believe that Herndon v. Lowry was not an important constitutional victory, but rather because the story of the constitutional failure in Herndon
v. Georgia is an equally important part of the historical record. As we
have seen, the great weight of historical scholarship has focused on the
Court's decision in Herndon v. Lowry. The absence of Herndon v. Georgia in most histories of the case suggests that some fifty years later, the
Angelo Herndon story is still not a fully citable episode in our constitutional history. Revisiting that history from the bottom up, I have aimed
to show that we cannot remember only one part of that story without
forgetting them both.

417. Id. at 2152.

